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1. 
incarceration without bail of a juvenile upon a finding that unless 
detained, there is a serious risk that he will do an act which, if 
~ ,Jiu.~ yf t1 J< ~ P'f_;JI.., c,,.d- p ~r" cit~-~-= s/.;;t ~~ 
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committed by an adult, would constitute a crime under state law. 
Appnts argue the CA2 erred when it struck down the scheme as violative 
of procedural due process. Appnts in No. 82-1278 also argue that in 
this~lass action habeas corpus suit the CA erred in mandating the 
release from preventive detention of accused juvenile delinquents who 
were ordered detained in the time period between the granting of the 
writ by the DC and its affirmance on appeal. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Appees are a class 
consisting of "all juveniles who are now being held or will be held 
before these proceedings are concluded, in 'p°'retrial detention" in New 
York City. Appnt in No. 82-1248 is the Commissioner of the New York 
City Department of Juvenile Justice, and in No. 82-1278 appnt is the 
Attorney General of the State of New York, who intervened below to 
; defend the constitutionality of the state statute at issue. 
New York ~tate juvenile proceeding~ work as follows: a 
proceeding is initi~ed by~ ~ tn f ~r delinquency, which alleges 1) .... 
that the youth did an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute 
a crime (giving the particulars of the act}, 2) that the youth was 
under 16 years of age at the time of the act, and 3) that the youth 
re~ supervision, treatment, or confinement. The case then goes 
for act-findin hearing before av;,amily Court judge, fan the /~: 
conclusion of wh ~ e youth either is adjudged a delinquent or the 
petn is dismissed~ delinquency c!J.djudicated at the fact-finding, 
a probation investigation precedes a dispositional hearing, at which 
the judge may choose from a number of alternatives, including 
suspension of judgment, probation, placement at home or with other 
indi~iduals, or at a facility for treat~ent, or "restrictive 
- 3 -
placement," which is incarceration. Often, the limits on resources 
leave judges with no actual options except probation or incarceration. 
The statutory criteria for determining the appropriate disposition are 
the needs and best interests of the juvenile, the character of the 
offense and the need for protection of the community. 
It V 
The challenged provision governs an intermediate step. 
Section 739(a) (ii) of the New York Family Court Act authorizes 
detention of a juvenile after the filing of a petn, but before fact-...-
finding, when a Family Court judge finds and states the facts and 
reasons for so finding -- that "there is a serious risk that [the 
juvenile] may before the return date do an act which if committed by 
an adult would constitute a crime. 111 The potential crimes are not 
limited to felonies or violent crimes, but include every crime on the 
state books. The CA stated that "the statute itself offers no 
procedural safeguards and does not set out substantive criteria, other 
than the conclusory 'serious risk' test, such as prior court contacts 
or lack of family supervision, to limit which accuseds juveniles may 
be detained." This is in sharp contrast to the carefully channeled 
and elaborate procedural safeguards provided at disposition. 
Juveniles detained under §7 39 (a) (ii) are entitled to a 131,vr 
.,,--- probable cause hearing within three to six days and an expedited fact 
1section 739 (a) (i) authorizes detention at that time if, 
in its view, "there is a s~bstantial probability that he will not 
appear in court on the return date." Detentions authorized under 
this subsection are not at issue here. No equal protection 
questions are before the Court either. Resps argued below that 
equal protection was violated by using pretrial detention only 
for juveniles. The DC rejected this approach and resps did not 




Resps filed a habeas corpus petn challenging the scheme. 
The DC (SONY Carter) granted the writ, finding that §739 (a) (ii) 
deprived resps of liberty without due process. 
3. DECISION BELOW: In a<arrow opinion, the CA2 affirmed. 
Judge Winter's majority opinion examined the actual operation of the 
scheme, on the~asis of the extensive evidence presented to and fact-----------...----:...----- - -
finding made by the DC. 
----------""'-- po 
The evidence established that "the vast majority of 
juveniles detained under 739(a) (ii) either have their petitions 
dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after 
adjudication •••• The result in practice is that the vast majority of 
juveniles considered sufficiently dangerous by the Family Court to 
justify pre-trial incarceration under 739(a) (ii) are in fact released 
••• within days or weeks." Relying on the testimony of a Family Court 
judge called by the City, the CA attributed this to the nature of the _ _..,, 
hearings provided and the criteria applied. The detention hearing 
under §739 (a) (ii): 
"usually involves only the Family Court Judge, a prosecutor, 
a Court Liaison Officer, the juvenile, his or her attorney, 
and the parents or their representative. It takes place 
on after the arrest •••• In the t yp ical case, the 
ev i.d~nce before the judge is limited to: (al the petition 
f or eil iquency and an affidavit by a witness stating that 
the petition is accurate: (b) a recommendation by the Court 
Liaison Officer to detain or release the juvenile based on 
inquiries and recommendations made by a probation officer 
who usually is not present: (c) statements by the juvenile 
or his or her attorney and by the parents or other persons 
accompanying the juvenile." 
The criteria utilized at the detention hearing deal solely with 
<. ' _______, ? 
protecting the community. They do not include the interests of the • 
child. According to the testifying state judge, the preliminary 
o:~~ 
umstances harmful to the ju~ confinement often results in 
At the disp ositional hearing, the best interests of the child are very -important, and there is far more information about the child before 
the judge -- including psychological assessments. Two other factors 
influenced the lenient disposition of adjudicated delinquents: the 
time served, including the preventive detention period, is frequently 
considered by the judge at the disposition to have been sufficient 
punishment, and the absence of alternatives other than probation and 
incarcertation usually mitigates toward the former, given the harsh 
consequences of imprisonment. 
The CA started with the proposition that "any exception 
general rule that incarceration follow, rather than .,. precede, ~ ~ . 
adj ~d._,icati:>ns_ ~f guilt can be justified, if at all, by a compellin :P»» J:;;::b 
4<-= 4a:-7,w..z ~ .,,,,,,,. 
governme,1tal interest." The governmental defendants argued that 
prevention was such an interest, but the CA did not reach that 
question "because 739(a) (ii) is utilized principally, not for __,,.. -





reventive purposes, but to impose punishment for unadjudicated • 
Over tw~thirds of 739 (a) (ii) detainees are "(1) 
those against whom ' the evidence of guilt is weak or insufficient: (2) 
those who are not so dangerous that they cannot be released after a 
short period of detention: and (3) those who are regarded as having 
served enough time in confinement." Crime prevention is not a 
rationale for detaining th~se children without usual due process 
protections. The only purpose served is punishment "since early 
release -- within days or at most a few weeks -- by a Family Court 
Judge contradicts any asserted need for pre-trial confinement to 
protect the community." Punishment is an unconstitutional purpose, 
,.. 
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given the procedures here afforded. In In re Winship, which also 
dealt with the New York juvenile justice system, this Court held that 
"an adjudication of delinquency which entails the possibility of 
institutional confinement must rest on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, because such confinement is constitutionally analogous to 
punishment for criminal acts." 
The CA, having found that the scheme has an unconstitutional 
impact on most detainees, then held it unconstitutional as to all 
juveniles. Most persons detained suffer punishment without 
adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and absent a 
compelling governmental interest. Individual litigation of each c~ 
could never proceed to judgment given mootness considerations. And 
"the record clearly demonstrates that the unconstitutional impact of 
the statute results directly from its substantively and procedurally 
unlimited terms which cause Family Court judges to incarcerate 




Whether the statute failed because it produces unconstitutional 
results, or whether it simply fails to provide adequate guidance for 
law enforcement personnel and courts, it violates due process: "We --hold only that pre-trial detention may not be imposed for anti-crime eR z. 
.... r, • .... 
purposes pursuant to a substantively and procedurally unlimited -lwlJ. 
statutory authority when, in all likelihood, most detainees will ~ 
either not be adjudicated guilty ot will not be sentenced to 
confinement after an adjudication of guilt." 
Appnts challenged the relief granted by the DC -- that the writ 
be granted to all juveniles held at the time the class was certified 
or who will be held before these proceedings are concluded -- as 
-1,.4,,1 
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given the procedures here afforded. In In re Winship, whi 
dealt with the New York juvenile justice system, this Cour 
"an adjudication of delinquency which entails the possibi J 
institutional confinement must rest on proof beyond area~ 
doubt, because such confinement is constitutionally analogous ~u 
punishment for criminal acts." 
The CA, having found that the scheme has an unconstitutional 
impact on most detainees, then held it unconstitutional as to all 
juveniles. Most persons detained suffer punishment without 
adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and absent a 
compelling governmental interest. Individual litigation of each c~ 
could never proceed to judgment given mootness considerations. And 
"the record clearly demonstrates that the unconstitutional impact of 
the statute results directly from its substantively and procedurally 
unlimited terms which cause Family Court judges to incarcerate 
juveniles they know will be released before or at disposition." 
whether the statute failed because it produces unconstitutional 
results, or whether it simply fails to provide adequate guidance for 
law enforcement personnel and courts, it violates due 
hold only that pre-trial detention may not be imposed 
'-'" ,.,.., ... 
purposes pursuant to a substantively and procedurally unlimited 
statutory authority when, in all likelihood, most detainees will 
either not be adjudicated guilty ot will not be sentenced to 
confinement after an adjudication of guilt." 
APpnts challenged the relief granted by the DC -- that the writ 
be granted to all juveniles held at the time the class was certified 
or who will be held before these proceedings are concluded -- as 
,. 
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given the procedures here afforded. In In re Winship, which also 
dealt with the New York juvenile justice system, this Court held that 
"an adjudication of delinquency which entails the possit 
institutional confinement must rest on proof beyond a ri 
doubt, because such confinement is constitutionally ana: 
punishment for criminal acts." 
The CA, having found that the scheme has an uncons 
impact on most detainees, then held it unconstitutional as to all 






adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and absent a 
compelling governmental interest. Individual litigation of each c~ 
could never proceed to judgment given mootness considerations. And 
"the record clearly demonstrates that the unconstitutional impact of 
the statute results directly from its substantively and procedurally 
unlimited terms which cause Family Court judges to incarcerate 




Whether the statute failed because it produces unconstitutional 
results, or whether it simply fails to provide adequate guidance for 
law enforcement personnel and courts, it violates due 
hold only that pre-trial detention may not be imposed 
..,, pc '"• .... 
purposes pursuant to a substantively and procedurally unlimited 
statutory authority when, in all likelihood, most detainees will 
either not be adjudicated guilty ot will not be sentenced to 
confinement after an adjudication of guilt." 
A~pnts challenged the relief granted by the DC -- that the writ 
be granted to all juveniles held at the time the class was certified 
or who will be held before these proceedings are concluded -- as 
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granting in futur~ release to those whose incarceration began atter 
the DC granted the writ. But the CA upheld the relief because class & 
actions are permissible in habeas proceedings and the writ is 
available to attack future confinement. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 u.s~ 
(1968). While true that habeas is directed to the unlawful custody of ~ 
individuals, and while prosective relief against enforcement of r~ 
affects only those detained while the action continues, and,...not those 
detained after. This focused properly on those in custody. 
\I.fudge Newman concurred in the result. He was less certain tha~ 
the majority that the record supports a conclusion of a significant 
number of instances where detention was imposed either erroneously or 
for purposes of punishment. But, applying traditional due process 
analysis he found the statute unconstitutional "because it permits 
liberty to be denied, prior to adjudication of guilt, in the exercise 
of unfettered discretion as to an issue of considerable uncertainty --
\\ ? 
likelihood of future criminal behavior. Judge Newman suggested five 
ways in which the statute fails to channel decisionmaking: 1) it d~es -not limit the crimes for which the person subject to detention has 
been arested: 2) it does not require an evaluation by the 
decisionmaker of the likelihood that the person committed the crime of 
which he was accused -- the statute authorizes pretrial detention 
without a finding of probable cause: 3) the judge is not required to 
assess.the individual's background: 4) the statute places no limit on 
the types of crimes the judge may determine the individual is likely 
to commit: and 5) the statute does not specify any standard of proo~ 
by which the judge must be persuaded of a serious risk the individual 
- 8 -
will commit crimes between the petition and disposition. 
4. CONTENTIONS: The City appnt argues that the question 
presented is substantial because it affords the Court the opportunity 
to answer a question left open in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 
n. 15 (1979): namely, whether the governmental interest in protecting 
the community from crime may constitutionally justify the pretrial 
detention of juveniles. The New York Ct. of Apps. has already upheld 
this very scheme, People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 68~, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 518, 350 N.E.2d 906 (1976), and thus this decision conflicts 
with that one. In United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C.App. 
1981), cert. denied U.S. -- (1982), the DCCA upheld a preventive --
detention scheme for adults. There is no reason that a pretrial 
detention scheme is necessarily unconstitutional, and it is important 
that this be established. 
The scheme at issue has sufficient procedural safeguards. The 
delinquency petition must be supported by an affidavit of a person 
with knowledge attesting to the truth of the allegations of the petn. 
The court must make a determination, and is required to state the 
facts and its reasons, that there is a serious risk that the child 
will commit a crime before the return date."- At the hearing, the chi"id 
may have his parents present, may have an attorney, is advised of his 
rights to counsel and to remain silent. Clergymen or social workers 
brought by the child or pa~ents may be questioned. The probation 
department makes a recommendation whether the juvenile should be 
released or retained. The testimony of the trial judge below revealed 
that he and his colleagues, in making their decisions whether to 







evaluation, "if possible," of the probability that the allegations 
will be sustained, the age of the victim, the time of day of the acts, 
the juvenile's past record and how recent the other offenses were, any 
other information developed at the hearing, and probation's 
recommendation. The decision is individualized, supported by a 
judicially reviewable statement of facts and reasons. 
Due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." Greenholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). The procedures 
outlined above are adequate to this situation. While disputing the 
CA's characterization of the results of the system, "we submit that 
even assuming a majority of detainees are not placed following a 
dispositional hearing, such a result does not mandate a finding of 
unconstitutionality." There is more data at the second hearing, ~nd 
it should surprise no one that caution and concern for both the 
juvenile and society cause judges to err on the side of remand at the 
earlier hearing in the face of less data. Further, by statute, 
different considerations enter the two decisions at the detention 
hearing only society's interests are considered, because the period of 
potential detention is brief. At the second hearing, the interests of 
the child are considered as well. 
The fact that the statute requires a prediction of future 
behavior does not make it ~nconstitutional either. Courts constantly 
do this in the bail context, for example. Parole and other important --------------
issues turn on such evaluations. 
The state appnt makes similar arguments, but adds that the 
prospective effect of the order here was improper under habeas corpus, 
- 10 -
effectively transforming the writ into an injunction enforceable 
against the State and City. 
Resps move to affirm. This case does not pose the question 
whether pretrial detention is ever constitutional. The CA's decision 
explicitly does not reach that question, but focuses on this statute 
and even more particularly, on the results this statute produces. 
This statute is patently unconstitutional, and is completely 
distinguishable from the one upheld in the Edwards case. Unlike this 
statute, the one in Edwards permitted persons to be detained only if 
charged with certain crimes of violence, and required a convictio~ for 
a crime of violence at some point within the preceding ten year 
period, or a finding that the subject crime was committed while on 
bail or other release pending completion of sentence. "Clear and 
convincing" evidence of all elements was required. The court was 
required to find that no condition of release would "reasonably 
assure" the safety of the community. And the court was required to 
find a "substantial probability" that the accused is guilty of the 
offense. More than half of those given pretrial detention in New York 
in 1979 were charged with crimes which would preclude their 
eligibility under the standard upheld in Edwards. 
The narrow holding of the panel "that pre-trial detention may not 
be imposed for anti-crime purposes ••• when, in all likelihood, most 
detainees will either not be adjudicated guilty or will not be 
sentenced to confinement after an adjudication of guilt" is correct 
and should be affirmed summarily. 
5. DISCUSSION: The CA2 certainly decided the case on narrow 
, 
grounds, and if its factual conclusions are correct -- that the vast -- -... 
- 11 -
majority of pretrial detentions impose are due to 
mistake or a desire to punish --
procedures provided are adequate 
s difficult to argue that the 
questions presented by 
appellants do not squarely challenge this factual finding. If the 
Court accepted the case and decided it on these grounds, it might not 
have occasion to clarify the circumstances in which pretrial detention 
is constitutional, if any. Further, there will be a temptation to 
delve into the factual underpinnings of the panel's conclusions, which 
could render this a very unsatisfactory vehicle to consider the large 
underlying legal questions. 
YJudge Newman also makes a very strong case that, whatever the 
actual results under the statute, and whatever the constitutionality 
of pretrial detention in the abstract, this statute is simply too 
\___, standard1ess substantively and provides insufficient procedural 
safeguards to be constitutional. Incarceration is authorized without 
any clear substantive guidelines. Were the case here on a petition 
for certiorari, I would not hesitate in recommending denial. Because 
the decision below is very narrow, and appears to be correct, the 
Court may wish to consider affirming. Affirmance here would not 
invalidate more careful procedures than this one. 
On the other hand, the Court has not addressed the 
constitutionality of pretrial detention in its prior cases. In 
considering the constitutionality of the procedures at issue, the 
Court would indicate, to some degree at least, the sorts of procedures 
that may or may not be acceptable constitutionally in imposing 
pretrial detention. 
'The CA's reading of §1254 to permit the relief granted here also 
- 12 -
seems reasonable. The order does not constitute a general injunction 
against enforcing the statute, but instead orders the State to release 
specified individuals. Should the Court determine to note probable 
jurisdiction on the merits, however, it should note on this remedy 
question, as well. 
6. RECOMMENDATION: I lean toward summary affirmance, but if one 
appeal is to be granted, both should be granted and the two appeals 
consolidated. 
There is a motion to affirm. 
April 7, 1983 Ogden opn in App. to JS 
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82-1248 Schall v. Martin 
82-1778 Abrams v. Martin 
MEMO TO JOE: 
This is the juvenile pre-trial de tent ion case under 
the New York statute. A class action habeas petition was 
filed by three fourteen year olruveni les, each of whom 
was charged with violent crimes and two with prior 
criminal offenses. 
Both the DC and CA2 invalidated New York procedure. 
The majority opinion of CA2 (J. Winter) invalidated 
§739(a) (ii) of the statute, finding a denial of due 
process because: (a) in the "vast majority" of instances 
where detention had been ordered "mistakes in judgment" 
had been made concerning the risk that the accused would 
commit other crimes~ or (b) the detention had been imposed 
"solely as punishment for unadjudicated crimes". On this 
..P I ~·.J . & AN C /I '2- ~ ~~ ~~ basis, the .gf and.I\ majority concluded that the statute 
~~ granted "li'2:!-tless -*cretiqn to family court judges" -
~ f /-~vt--;esulting in numerous mistaken decisions. 
~ ., Judge Newman stated that he was "less certain than 
the majority that the record supports a con,ifusion of 







significant number of instances where detention was 
imposed even mistakenly or for purposes of punishment. A. 
24a." Nevertheless, applying my three-step analysis in 
Matthew, Newman found the statute authorized an 
impermissible denial of liberty "prior to adjudication of 
guilt. in the unfetter discretion as to the - ---------------
likelihood of criminal behavior." A. 24a. 
The New York Procedure 
The long descriptions of the New York procedure in 
the briefs are not easy to follow. I will need guidance 
from you, Joe, as to whether my understanding of the 
procedure is accurate: Police have authority to arrest 
juveniles..-"\ (as I understand it, on probable cause but ., 
without a warrant). A juvenile proceeding then is 
commenced by a petition of delinquency filed by the New 
York City Department of Juvenile Justice. The petition 
identifies the crime that, by statute, is any crime -
misdemeanor or felony - that would constitute a crime if 
committed by an adult. The petition must allege that the 
juvenile requires treatment or confinement. Prior to 
subsequent elaborate procedural safeguards, the statute 
authorizes the Family Court Judge to order detention of 




,p <.ffet ~. 1;;-~~ 
~jpt/(~,~~-? indings and reasons - that "there is a serious risk that 
the juvenile (prior to the return date of the petition) 
will commit an act that would constitute a crime by an ,, ,, 
adult. LIE.JICA~dlfc..u?fa~1·~  
My understanding is that the statute then requires a 
probable cause hearing within six days, and thereafter an - ,-, ..... 
expedited fact finding hearing. It is not clear to me 
that the fact finding hearing before the Family Court 
Judge must be held within these six-days. This is rather 
an important point. In any event, at such a hearing the 
juvenile will be found a deliquent or the petition will be 
dismissed. If held to be a delinquent, further procedural 
safeguards are provided including a probation report 
before final disposition. In making such disposition, the 
judge has a number of alternatives including return to the 
juvenile's home, probation, treatment, or incarceration. 
GENERAL COMMENTS 
I voted to dismiss, rather than note probable 
jurisdiction, because I was then under the impression that 
both the DC and the CA2 had made the findings of fact I 
mentioned above. I must say, however, that the facts as 
stated in the briefs of Fred Schwartz (formerly a Cravath 
partner, as I recall), Corporation Counsel of the City of 
r 
I 4. 
New York, and the New York Attorney General put this case 
in an entirely different light. It is not our function, 
however, to review the factual record if indeed both 
courts below specificallly found these facts. 
Even on the basis of these findings, my decision in 
~ Gerstein v. Pugh provides a good deal of support for the 
view that the New York statute is not nearly so outrageous 
as the courts below and the ACLU brief assert. The only 
significant difference between this case and Gerstein, as 
__.-, I understand it, is that the New York statute does not 
1lv-:J ~~ tt,vf";s'" require a finding of probable cause to be made 
--- contemporaneously with the pre-trial detention decision. 
But if a hearing on that issue must be held within six 
days, I am not sure that due process has been denied. 
Two compelling interests are involved in this case: 
The liberty interest and the public interest in being 
protected from er ime, particularly the type of street 
crimes that juvenile now commit with shocking frequency. 
See, e.g., the record of the three-named plaintiffs in 
this case (pp. 16, 18 and 19 of the State's brief). 
In sum, Joe, I am not rest in this case and will be 
intersted in your views. 
LFP, JR. 
• 
~ --~ 1 / 1 7 
j en O 1/16 /8 4 ( Uo.,..,_,, /-~ -~) 
Joseph Neuhaus 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Nos. 82-1248, 82-1278 
Schall v. Martin 
Question Presented 
January 16, 1984 
whether New York's scheme of pre-trial detention of juveniles 
in cases in which there is Ila serious risk" that the juvenile 
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may commit a crime prior to trial, is a violation of the Due 
Process Clause. 
Statutory Scheme 
My understanding of New York's 
with yours as set forth in your memo of For conve-
nience, I(Q'll summarize After a juvenile is 
I 'l ... 1.4 t -e .&h : arrested, petition of delinquency , must be filed within four ~~------------- - . 
days. (The pre-petition period of detention is not at issue 
' ( \l 
here.) The petition must on its face provide "reasonable cause" 
to believe the juvenile did an act which, if done by an adult, 
would constitute a er ime (herein referred to as "committed a 
er ime") . If the juvenile is in detention--alternatively, he 
might have been arrested and released--the juvenile has his "ini-
tial appearance" or "detention hearing" on the first day that the 
court sits after the petition is filed. At this informal hear-
ing, the judge decides whether the juvenile should be released or 
detained pending further proceedings. He is detained if the 
judge finds, inter alia, "a serious risk that [the juvenile] may -
before the return date" commit a er ime. The detention lasts a 
maximum of & days for misdemeanor and less serious felony 
charges, and a maximum o:0ays for serious felony charges. 
(The statutory periods are 3 and 14 days, with a ~ t -day exten-
sion for good cause shown.) Within that time ~ act-finding 
hearing (i.e., a trial) must be held in which delinquency is ad-
judicated. It is this pre-trial detention that is at issue here. 
_. uz:$ I ....... µ > ,,,,...___ 11 ;we ¢ fZC4 
Within 6 days %~ ys with an extension of 3 days) of the 
initial appearance,lUobable cause hearing must be held. This 
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is a formal hear ing--i. e. , with cross-examination and applying 
the hearsay rules--to determine if there was probable cause to 
effect the arrest and detain the juvenile. 
ti ,, 
The _probable cause 
hearing and the fact-finding hearing may coincide. For misde--
meanor and less serious felony charges, the maximum time periods 
prior to each hearing are the same. For serious felony charges, 
the time period for a probable cause hearing is shorter than for 
the fact-finding hearing. If the juvenile was not detained at 
the initial appearance, it appears that no probable cause hearing 
is held, and the fact-finding hearing must be held within 60 to 
120 days. 
For detained juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent, a 
dispositional hearing (i.e., sentencing) is held within 10-20 
days of the fact-finding hearing. 
Discussion 
There are two aspects to the problem presented ~ his case: @ _...  
the Fourth Amendment probable cause question, and the due process 
arbitrariness question. The first asks whether the detention 
v 
here satisfies the standards of your opinion in Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. 103 (1975). The second asks whether in any case the 
detention imposed by New York is essentially arbitrary, generally 
.,... 
under the standards of your opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976). The plaintiffs' challenge in this case is based 
entirely on the Due Process Clause, and thus the Gerstein ques-
r----
tion has not been separately addressed here or in the opinions 
below. It appears in this case primarily because of the argument 
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that requiring a finding of probable cause would decrease the 
arbitrariness of the de tent ion. See J. A. 121 (concurring opin-
ion): see also J.A. 69, 86-88 (District Court opinion: detention 
without probable cause is per se violation of due process) . 
Therefore, I am not entirely certain to what extent the separate 
Fourth Amendment question should be reached in this case. I ad-
dress it only briefly. 
1. Probable cause. Your opinion for the Court in Gerstein 
v. Pugh held that the Fourth Amendment requires the State to 
"provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a 
condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and 
this determination must b-e- made by a judicial officer either be-
fore or promptly after arrest." 420 U.S., at 125. The determi-
nation might be entirely informal, that is, nonadversar ial and 
based on hearsay and written testimony. Id., at 120. There are 
two potential hearings in this case that may satisfy these stand-
ards. First, there is the very informal detention hearing or 
initial appearance. Second, there is the more formal "probable 
cause hearing" three to six days later. Each is problematic. At 
the first, there is no requirement of a judicial finding of prob-
able cause. The only way it can be construed a probable cause 
hearing at all is that the petition is required to give "reason-
able cause" to believe the juvenile committed a crime, and the 
juvenile's lawyer apparently may challenge the sufficiency of the 
, 
petition at that initial appearance, see J.A. 255: N.Y. Br. at 5. 
The second hearing is completely adequate procedurally, but it --------~ - .......___ - - - -- ::::;-, 
comes rather late, only after three to six days of detention. -- \~ 
•' 
;, 
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My inclination is to say that these procedures would satisfy 
the requirement of a probable cause hearing. Gerstein explicitly 
recognized "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation 
by the States" in designing their procedures. Id., at 123. I 
suspect neither of the hearings would satisfy the requirement 
alone. Gerstein itself invalidated a procedure like the first 
hearing here under which there was an appearance before a judi-
cial officer that lacked one "crucial" requirement: "the magis-
trate does not make a determination of probable cause." 420 
U.S., at 109. As for the second hearing, Gerstein does not quan-
tify its test of "significant pretrial restraint of liberty"--
elsewhere it uses the term "extended restraint of liberty follow-
ing arrest," id., at 114--but six days seems like a fairly long 
time to be in jail without this important procedural safeguard. 
Nevertheless, in combination the two hearings may be enough. 
Presumably, the ability to challenge the petition--which New York 
represents is permissible--will enable truly egregious cases to 
be caught. The formal probable-cause determination shortly 
thereafter will ensure that all arrests are subject to some fair-
ly swift review. A contrary answer presumably would require New 
York to forgo formality in favor of swiftness, which would be 
somewhat contrary to Gerstein's encouragement of experimentation. 
(Of course the Court simply could require New York to have a 
swift and informal probable cause determination in all cases: if 
the s'tate desired a later, more formal determination, it could 
add it as a matter of state law.) Moreover, the_ N_e_w_ Y_o_rk sch~ e ~ 
appears to be very close to the procedure followed in the federal 7'-tJ ____________ ...., ______ .........,_.... 
...,_ 1e4_ 
12 ~~,r.l!liJ.,,.Q., 
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courts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5, 5.1 ( nitial appearance immedi-___ ,,___.,.."'41,.,_ • ...,..,_, ... ,_,... .. ,,._ 
ately, at which facial validity of co plaint may be challenged; 
''probable caus~ hearing within 10 days f in custody, 20 days if 
~
not). 
2. Due process. Compliance with Gerstein does not end the 
inquiry. h II \.\.. ' h' h' h T e ~ue process argument 1n t 1s case--w 1c is the 
only argument fully presented in the briefs--is essentially that 
New York's procedj!!eS leaQ to arbitrary results. That is, that 
~ ... .. 
the decision of which juveniles are detained and which are re-
leased is arbitrary and capricious. Put in terms of Mathews v. 
Eldridge, the argument is that the risk of an "erroneous" depri-
vation of the juvenile's admittedly important liberty interest is 
too high--it outweighs the government's also important interest 
in proceeding as it does. "Erroneous" in this context presumably l 
means that juveniles are detained who in fact do not present a 
serious risk of criminal behavior in the relevant time period. 
I am persuaded by the factual evidence presented that the 
sy~em here operates in a plainly irrational fashion. Its stated 
'--" 
goal is to prevent the juvenile from committing crime during the 
period between arrest and trial. But under the system as it op-
erates, it appears that at least i!_ majority, and perhaps a vast 
majority, of juveniles who are detained ultimately are not adju-
dicated delinquent or are placed in some manner or other back on 
the street. This can make no sense: if the goal is to restrain 
the j'uvenile from committing crime, it is irrational to detain 
him for at most two weeks, and then release him thereafter. The 
same is true of the alternative purpose of helping the child by 
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keeping him out of trouble. It is true that the figures are not 
as reliable as they might be. But I agree with you that it is 
not the function of this Court to review the facts specifically 
found by both courts below. In any case, the journal article and 
nationwide study cited by the plaintiffs on pp. 79-80 of their 
brief confirm the findings below. Nationwide, pretrial detention 
of juveniles is about seven or eight times more frequent than 
post-adjudication commitment to secure facilities. 
These facts are not simply or solely a matter of judges mis-
applying the statute. By its terms, the statute instructs the 
court at the initial appearance to consider almost exclusively 
the need to prevent crime, while at the time of disposition the 
court is instructed to consider in addition the best interests of 
the child, see J.A. 100. This in fact is how judges apply the 
statute, emphasizing principally the needs of the community at 
the initial appearance and the interests of the child at the dis-
position stage. J.A. 105-106. This trivial-seeming distinction 
appears more than anything else to account for the disparity that 
plaintiffs have shown. 
In addition, the District Court noted that juveniles fre-
quently are detained after having been released upon arrest sev-
eral days or weeks earlier. J.A. 83-86. I agree with the DC 
that this is "the most patently arbitrary" application of the 
statute. J.A. 83. 
There are two possible justifications for this state of af-
fairs. One is that New York is, as it claims, seeking to further 
the purely administrative (as opposed to "penal") purpose of en-
Wtn-tr.1 .: 
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suring that juveniles do not commit further crimes while awaiting 
trial, but that it is enormously unsuccessful in doing so. Once 
more information is obtained, detention is seen as unwarranted. 
This rationale is undercut to some extent by the fact that the 
statute in fact mandates different standards at the detention and 
dispositional hearings. Nevertheless it is the defense of the 
statute offered by the New York Court of Appeals when it upheld 
the law against a constitutional challenge using similar statis-
tics. That court emphasized that the State's leeway with juve-
niles properly is far greater than with adults: 
"It should surprise no one that caution and concern for 
both the juvenile and society may indicate the more 
conservative decision to detain at the very outset, 
whereas the later development of very much more rele-
vant information may prove that while a finding of de-
linquency was warranted, placement would not be indi-
cated." People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y. 2d 
682, 690 (1976). 
The second possible defense of the statute is that merely 
preventing the juvenile from committing er ime during the weeks 
before trial is not the sole aim. Rather, detention is imposed 
as a swift and general punishment or rehabilitation for the most 
serious juvenile offenders. The theory presumably would be that 
a brief stay in detention takes the child out of his gang and 
does long-term good. This rationale was hinted at in the New 
York Court of Appeals' opinion. See id., at 689. 
Both defenses share an emphasis on the fact that it is juve-
niles'who are involved here, and in my view this is the soundest 
tion statute that had a penal or rehabilitative purpose, or had 
.., 
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the kind of error rate that this statute has could survive a con-
sti tutional challenge if the accused were adults. Either more 
procedural safeguards would be required to minimize error, or, if 
that were not possible, pretrial detention on the basis of a pre-tl"),1.,-0-
diction of future dangerousness would be barred altogether. 
(Basing post-trial sentencing on future dangerousness is very 
different, because the accused has been convicted. This means 
that the constraints on the State's treatment are broader, and 
there is a surer basis for inferring future dangerousness. Also, 
basing pretrial detention on factors such as the risk of flight 
is different, because the prediction is more specific and there-
fore more certain.) 
The question then is whether ( 1) an error rate as high as --- - .......... this one in an administrative detention system, or (2) a pretrial 
detention system based on a rehabilitative or penal purpose, is 
acceptable when dealing with juveniles. My conclusion is that it 
It \, \. 
is not. The error rate was what was considered at length below. 
It is here that the Mathews analysis is most relevant. Since 
both the juvenile's and the government's interest are reasonably 
\ ; arge in this case, the primary question is whether there are 
~
ocedur~s that could be i ~ would reduce the risk. 
Ju~:_ Ne! m.!_.n' s concurrence suggested five procedures that he 
v~ought would reduce the risk of error. J .A. 121-122. In my 
)v,Jf"' v_iew, fit would=~ First and second, 
there is no reliable evidence that predictability of future crim-
inal behavior is improved either by limiting the pool to those 
juveniles who are accused of committing an especially serious 
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crime, nor by limiting the crimes sought to be prevented. As to 
the first, it might be expected that the joy-rider or turnstile-
hopper would be more likely to do it again than the murderer or 
rapist. As to the second, there is evidence in the record that 
it is generally less accurate to try to select those who will 
commit violent crimes than those who will commit crimes general-
ly. Third, it does not seem to me likely that adding an explicit 
direction that judges consider juveniles' backgrounds would make 
much difference--the "serious risk" criterion suggests that in-
quiry, and it seems likely that all judges in fact do consider 
such evidence to the extent it is available. The requirement 
that they state facts and reasons further ensures that they do. 
Fourth, the lack of a standard of proof seems to me minor, espe-
cially since the "serious risk" standard serves the same func-
tion: it determines the degree of certainty that the juvenile in 
fact will commit a crime. Fifth, an explicit probable cause _de------~ 
termination probably would not make much difference since peti-....__ ___ ......, 
tions unsupported by probable cause already can be dismissed on -
motion. ---
In my view, the one significant change in the statute that 
would make a difference, and that would answer to the concerns 
~ 1J 
raised in this case, would be to require judg~ to detain O12)-y 
those they ' t easonably expected would be \' incarcerated at he 
dispositional hearing. This is a substantive change in the stat-
ute, and may involve a prediction that is difficult to make with 
any great precision. But it would reduce in a relevant way the 
number of incarcerated juveniles and would not "cost" the govern-
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ment very much in terms of its stated goal of restraining crime 
behavior. Therefore, under Mathews the New York procedure is 
lacking in due process. 
Even if no other procedures are available to accomplish what 
the State seeks to do here, it seems to me that the error rate 
simply is too high. The government's interest in preventing 
crime by the truly dangerous during the fairlL b~ ief Eeriod__! that 
are involved here simply is not great enough to justify detaining -------------------------------------------------
massive numbers of apparently nondangerous others. 
It may be argued that the government interest is in fact ~ 
greater, because the incarceration at issue here has a lasting ~ 
effect. This is essentially a rehabilitative rationale. There ~ ~ 
are several problems with it. First, it is not clear that N~~ 
York's legislature has made the necessary findings. In fact, 
there is evidence of "profound legislative concern that detention 
is bad for children, not good for them." Schupf, supra, at 692 
(Fuchsberg, J., concurring in result). More important, rehabili-
tation is normally considered "punishment" in the due process 
sense. Generally, the imposition of "punishment" must be accom-
panied by a trial to determine past wrong. The rule is no dif-
ferent simply because juveniles are involved. See In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). These cases 
held that the normal elements of due process apply in a proceed-
ing at which incarceration of a juvenile is sought, even he is to 
, 
be sent to a state "school." The only major differences between 
this case and those are the length of the stay contemplated, and 
the fact that it is not accompanied by a stigmatizing label of 
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delinquency. These differences are not unimportant, but it seems 
to me that the basic fact is that this is imprisonment that can 
have a profound effect on children. Given the nature of the pop-
ulation, it is not an ef feet that is necessarily a good one. 
Moreover, it is not clear to me that there is no stigma if the 
1«,";r juvenile does not show up in school or at work for this reason. 
~ These effects should not be imposed without at least the sem-
~ blance of a trial, with adequate preparation time. That was 
~ lacking here. 
~ ~ difJUl~5 
~-- To summarize, it seems to me that your initial vote to~~ffirm 
~ correct. The plaintiffs have shown that New York's pretrial 
~ ention system results in an unacceptably hi 9,.h nu,mbe.{_~f erro-
neous or irrational detentions if the statute is justified on a ... 
theory of crime prevention. This result appears to be built into 
the statute, by the way the standards at the detention and 
dispositional hearings are set up. If the detention is justified 
on a broader rehabilitative rationale, the State still must fol-
low normal adjudicative procedures before imposing this treat-
ment. 
RECOMMENDATION: Affirm. 
P.S. If you find this case as difficult as I have, you may 
find the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals in the Schupf 
case to be helpful. They are brief and written from a broader, 
sociat policy perspective than was taken in the courts below. As 
will be obvious, I find the concurrence's argument more persua-
sive than the majority's. I have attached a copy. 
82-1248 SCHALL v. MARTIN 
82-1278 ABRAMS v. MARTIN A'e.gued 1/17/84 
'I RP· 
tf ~ { ~/-/l? ~ 1(,_ 'I) 
~~~---~~ 
~.. j _ ~ a. ~11,/1 tl-c.., ,:,,.,,r:,..-,c;............,.~~~ ~c:-~ 
b//?, A I 
_,..~ •• ~.,(J,11 ~~ .... 4 ~ 
~414.CL:~ 4~-<- . ( ~ 
..;r ~~,/ ~. tf~_, ~ 
 ~ ~~~~~ 
~//l ~ ~4"- ~""'-~ a~ ,.z~, .... .L-,~.,~ 
~,. _r~ ~,4,L,c.,;,,,_; ~(1) ~ 
/7-L-~#-, ~~,4-c e~/ 1~~-Lvw<~ 
a,em w(u,v 6 &!.,,,~ -4 ~z) ~/-
~ ct- ~<1.c~4..L- ~l'tdr-t-4"1>). 
?l(,i.. 1~~~~~ 
~ 4Lf ~ .. # ~ U.f', . 
~Ir ~ ~//-?. ~ F-,~4.at..r 
4 ~c q! c ,JtJ z ~ ,, U--IA-(ti!.a'ii,« ~~1 
~~ \\ ~ /lo ~~~ 'i 
~~f-~4. . . 
hu,_,,f- ~. 'f. ~-~ ~.e.L~'-"'-L-~ ' 
~~~~~~-
.I'S /? w 9! w Ir£ r-2~ ~ ~ 
( tN-r--,) ~  d-<_ 
~,4,~. 
(. ~.,.._,,...,,~~ ~ ~~ 
h ~ ry.,i-<.. '3/ ~ ~-w/htf'). 
~~~-z,.., ~ ~ 
.. ~~~O'>\- :,, 
/,A>--(_ ~~.4C,..C.,.,,...~ w , c..i a.,,~ d.-a-, 
~·~~~~~ 
~4 ..... ~,124,,t-~ ~ ,u...o ~~~ 
13/!W~~~~" 
,.,,<.ta 2& ~~'f ~ ~ 
vi:.... ~,-4.~~~ ~ ~ ~. 
~-;.. ~-d!JL~~ ~~2~:c_ 
~-6-t>HA..J~·1>1~ 
 ~ ~~~- efl l-o 
F~ ~. ~~,..-...,~~-'CJ ).a 
13 /{,'-½  /;I ?.,,..,~d._ ~ ~ 
l'l-~~~ ~~ Rf..~tj 
~ ~GA4$.I.-'~~ 
/3/f 4) -en,c,t.~:u.....,-,,~ ~ ~ 
~,, ~ 4- r.l ,.CA41,J/a,t.J-~ ~ . 
~ .. 
~~~'-t.-,~~ 
( d J.tt.,,tt., 4~ H) ~ ~~--~...----,, ;-~)~ 
~ .  ~ 
~~~~-4-o/( 
~ ~1-~~~ ~ J,(' 'f, 
S, 2·/z..'14' s~A.. -21<_ 
32. /2. 7~ ----
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
----- -- -- ---------------- -------------------- , 19 ________ _ 
I. ~-el. o'.f ~i ~ ~~ 
w;~ ~ ~4-" 
p~ I- ~-f ~ 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 




P~ M<' u.c,.A .. .-
C{~~ 
... 
2, 8'/~:'au.~ &/~~ 
~be~ cA-2-
~ .df¼,eA~ ~~I/ 
' " .. 
·=·l . . •, 
. ;•:,. 

























I , :, ,, 





' I ' , ~~ . - - . . II L \ 
:,, "-1~ 
\ ' 2.., ~~~J ----...~  
.5~~l--L.> 
~~~ 
' I---'-  ~ 
j-7:U)- ,. 1:0:.! t::. b,~ ! : 
-~ . M ~~a..<-R 
c7f z... ~r~  </---
.. · ~ ~ 1-o }1,,t_ 4-~& 
' 
: ·" . . 'Jut !fu# ~ k 
~ ~ 
!1·"11 ; h \, 
... '.1-l , 
·~:, ~ 
%2. -12-t/g 5~ {g__ . 
~~~ 
( }-  J ~lo 
r>-'Y7!1-_;::!-~~~ ~/1-7 :' '. 
/, J~kt<-z#~ 'I~ 
~~5~~~ 
ff)  ' ',,, '· ' 
z., {:) ~~ LA--~ 
~ .~ ~ ~~~~~-'C-L.~ -:, 
1·1 • ;}:~~~~ 
~ ~~ ~, 
( 9~~f-A--f,C.,+'-~.., . 
.. i " ~ ~ .. ~-·k4f' -1 ~rj4~ 
. , ·r j., .... ,,,A...'1c-~ ~# • 
' 11 '· · .. • ~H':u...~c~,~ 
+1· . ; .. ,I ,,' ~ ~ - - ' ' 
:. ~~A.~ ·,,., 
, .'!,· . _,,.., # d - u; •t....l. ~ -,,G.,,.,cc. 1:,,,,,,,...) 
' ~ j.1 ' ' ' ::· '· ' . 
' j 1 !>;; ,;,..,t•>.._ .,/ l. 1 >' ,~. 'I 
·•· ;f)_·. ~ 
,. ·1·1 1.. I 
No. 82-1248 , __ Schall v. Martin Conf. 1/20/84 
Justice Brennan ~)-.,c_ 
<-9 UV~ f ~~ ~~ ~ eL.LJ~ '-t..., ~ 
~ I /./,~ ~ ~ ~ ~Zf', /.A-~~ 
l.A.-,..A,_,,.~~~~, . . 
~~~~ ~ ~~~ 
~ ~ ~ 3/ ~,.. _,_,....,,_, -/---~ 
~  k ,4) i,~-v\ 
- T-: . r------r - ~- rl ~ 
~, ~~~6.;~ I( ~ ~~~.a--z-,F--,t!I ~
h--L- /,...-Z:,,,~~-- ~ - -~ .--1 
<j_ -~ ~- q. ~ d-rf~., 
Justice White ? dA-1.-
/U)-/-A.I--~1-. c:flu. a;:_~~ 4-~f 4--t 
~~~~u-~ ~ ),,(....£8---3~~~~ 
,, S-1-~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ /]A,f,/L-e,.,,1 s:.- ~r ~ ~~ 
 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ / ... ., 
, -- ~ ~
~~ 17s  ~  ~ - - , --- -7 
~ r ~;/4~ ~ 6L/I-~ ~1-~ 
~ 
Justice Marshan · ~ ~ 
d/-~r-~17--~, -1--~~~~-I-
~ 'U., L(, /)__~. ·~ ~  J 
~-lf' ~ ~f~:"'"L~ ~A.., 
13 kl- ~ ~ c:9/ 5 h-e_~VZ--ldz!:t~ . / 
'J?~ 4-~ ~ ~ 1..-(;(_, ~~_,; 
ttF-/1). ~, - 7 
Justice Powell T ~~ -~ . ._ ~ f ~ ;;__,/--~ • 
a~~~ /,J,lf'w9 11-»g. 
lluz_ ,,-;u__~. ~~~~~A~!'f-~ ~~ 
~~~st~~~~~ 
~~~~-
~-~u).s- ~4.--i- ,0 ~~ ~ 
t,1~  ~~~~ ~ at-~ $ ~ 
~f~, 




41-_ r = ~ ~ ~<?~ 
~ ~~~ ~ , . 
CHAM!IERS 0,-
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.in.p:rtuU Q+onrl of tlft~h .itatts 
)lu4tngton, ~. <!J. 2llffe,., 
January 21, 1984 
Re: 82-1248;1278 - Schall; Abrams v. Martin 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I conclude to vote to reverse on as narrow a ground as possible. 
Regards, 
.§Ul}unu C!fau.rt of tlrt ~b .§tau& 
'lllaslfi:ngfon. J. C!f. 2.tlp'l.;l / 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
March 12, 1984 
Re: Nos. 82-1248 and 1278-Schall v. Martin and 
Abrams v. Martin 
Dear Bill: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent in 
this · one. 
Justice Rehnquist 






JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Bill, 
.i1qtrtutt ~onri .ttf tltt 'Jlttittb .itab,G' 
Jhudpngfon, 1). ~. 2.0ffe'!~ 
March 13, 1984 
No. 82-1248 
No. 82-1278 
Schall v. Martin 
Abrams v. Martin 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMISERS 01" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.u.prmtt <ft&ntri of ut~~b •tatt• 
,rulfinghtn. f. <If. 21lffe~, 
March 13, 1984 
Re: 82-1248) - Schall v. Martin 






Copies to the Conference 
rr~- The Chief Justice 
J t' ce Brennan 
lLJ.' /J , /) J ; ._ z. I /I~ J ,/}, Id ce White 
1- {_ vv~_ ce Marshall 
19A //1.-J.Y./LJAJvM ~ ~ Justice Blackmun 
v I f' .. -........,- - --· Justice Powell 
-~·--U.--u ... ~-1L.LI~) ~ I~ c!lliE t L ~ tE>/---,( Justice Stevens 
tf' - -- -- 7 ---;_ '-t Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice Rehnquist Tft I I) 2,,) 
;5 ( fJ 2.. I - 2 '7) ( ~ /-t:u__ ~ , l{. Circulated:_______,-----
,A /'"::7r- 11 _ • I 1A~ I 4 ~b4 
"~ ~ c.--#.~~~/ZA.'..4t.......-1: Recirculated: ________ _ 
---~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~~ l 
/)l=<G'.: (z /;- 31) ~ ndDRAFT ) 
!Fh ~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 




SCHALL, COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK 
~ //A__,,~_/~~- ., CITY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
~ : ~, V. 
~ ~~,------:, J GREGORY MARTIN ET AL. "f' 
~~ ~ Bi iT ABRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
11- ~ A..J J-j--/Z OF NEW YORK 
82-127~ v. 
~ J.£ {j /.la a !4f GREGORY MARTIN ET AL. 
~ __. 'k L/ ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
- -/ .,_. - -, ' FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
~ ~ 9 
..I)/ /J 4-~ JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
~ A.Ah.A'~ection 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act 
1 
__ ~ /J .. J /)-. I ..-...-- --(FCA) authorizes pretrial detention of an accused juvenile 
• .. delinquent based on a finding that there is a "serious risk" 
that the child "may before the return date commit an act 
which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." 1 
1 Section 320.5 of the Family Court Act provides, in relevant part: 
"l. At the initial appearance, the court in its discretion may release the 
respondent or direct his detention. 
3. The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts 
and reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is detained; 
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on 
the return date; or 
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an 
act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." 
Appellees have only challenged pretrial detention under § 320.5(3)(b). 
Thus, the propriety of detention to ensure that a juvenile appears in court 
on the return date, pursuant to § 320.5(3)(a), is not before the Court. 
2 
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Appellees brought suit on behalf of a class of all juveniles de-
tained pursuant to that provision. 2 The district court struck 
down § 320.5(3)(b) as permitting detention without due proc-
ess of law and ordered the immediate release of all class 
members. 513 F. Supp. 691 (1981). The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding the provision "uncon-
stitutional as to all juveniles" because the statute was admin-
istered in such a way that "the detention period serves as 
punishment imposed without proof of guilt established ac-
cording to the requisite constitutional standard." 689 F. 2d 
365, 373-374 (1982). We noted probable jurisdiction, --
U. S. -- (1983), 3 and now reverse. Section 320.5(3)(b) is 
2 The original challenge was to § 739(a)(ii) of the New York Family Court 
Act, which, at the time of the commencement of this suit, governed pretrial 
release or detention of both alleged juvenile delinquents and persons in 
need of supervision. Effective July 1, 1983, a new Article 3 to the Act 
governs, inter alia, "all juvenile delinquency actions and proceedings com-
menced upon or after the effective date thereof and all appeals and other 
post-judgment proceedings relating or attaching thereto." FCA 
§ 301.3(1). Article 7 now applies only to proceedings concerning persons 
in need of supervision. 
Obviously, this Court must "review the judgment below in light of the 
... statute as it now stands, not as it once did." Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 
45, 48 (1969). But since new Article 3 contains a preventive detention sec-
tion identical to former § 739(a)(ii), see FCA § 320.5(3), the appeal is not 
moot. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41, 43 (1969). 
3 Although the pretrial detention of the class representatives has long 
since ended, see pp. 3-7, infra, this case is not moot for the same reason 
that the class action in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975), 
was not mooted by the termination of the claims of the named plaintiffs. 
"Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any 
given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal be-
fore he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless 
suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly 
situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. 
The claim, in short, is one that is distinctly 'capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review.'" 
See also People ex rel . Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 519-520 
(1976). 
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not invalid "on its face," and its application to the three 
named plaintiffs in this case did not violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
I 
Appellee Gregory Martin was arrested on December 13, 
1977, and charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree 
assault, and criminal possession of a weapon based on an inci-
dent in which he, with two others, allegedly hit a youth on 
the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers. 
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Martin had possession of the gun 
when he was arrested. He was 14 years old at the time and, 
therefore, came within the jurisdiction of New York's Family 
Court. 4 The incident occurred at 11:30 at night, and Martin 
lied to the police about where and with whom he lived. He 
was consequently detained overnight. 5 
' In New York, a child over the age of seven but less than sixteen is not 
considered criminally responsible for his conduct. FCA § 301.2(1). If he 
commits an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, he 
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court. Id., at 
§ 302.1(1). That court is charged not with finding guilt and affixing pun-
ishment, In re Bogart, 259 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (1963), but rather with deter-
mining and pursuing the needs and best interests of the child insofar as 
those are consistent with the need for the protection of the community. 
FCA §301.1. See In re Craig S . , 394 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (1977). Juvenile 
proceedings are, thus, civil rather than criminal, although because of the 
restrictions that may be placed on a juvenile adjudged delinquent, some of 
the same protections afforded accused adult criminals are also applicable in 
this context. Cf. FCA § 303.1. 
5 When a juvenile is arrested, the arresting officer must immediately 
notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care. 
FCA § 305.2(3). Ordinarily, the child will be released into the custody of 
his parent or guardian after being issued an "appearance ticket" requiring 
him to meet with the probation service on a specified day. Id., at 
§ 307.1(1). See n. 9, supra. If, however, he is charged with a serious 
crime, one of several designated felonies, see id., at § 301.2(8), or if his par-
ent or guardian cannot be reached, the juvenile may be taken directly be-
fore the Family Court. Id., at § 305.2. The Family Court judge will 
make a preliminary determination as to the jurisdiction of the court, ap-
4 
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A petition of delinquency was filed, 6 and Martin made his 
"initial appearance" in Family Court on December 14th, ac-
companied by his grandmother. 7 The Family Court judge, 
citing the possession of the loaded weapon, the false address 
given to the police, and the lateness of the hour, as evidenc-
ing a lack of supervision, ordered Martin detained under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) (at that time § 739(a)(ii); see n. 2, supra). A 
probable cause hearing was held five days later, on Decem-
ber 19th, and probable cause was found to exist for all the 
crimes charged. At the fact-finding hearing held December 
27-29, Martin was found guilty on the robbery and criminal 
possession charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent and 
point a law guardian for the child, and advise the child of his or her rights, 
including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. 
Only if, as in Martin's case, the Family Court is not in session and special 
circumstances exist, such as an inability to notify the parents, will the child 
be taken directly by the arresting officer to a juvenile detention facility. 
Id., at § 305.2(4)(c). If the juvenile is so detained, he must be brought be-
fore the Family Court within 72 hours or the next day the court is in ses-
sion, whichever is sooner. Id., at 307.3(4). The propriety of such deten-
tion, prior to a juvenile's initial appearance in Family Court, is not at issue 
in this case. Appellees challenged only judicially ordered detention pursu-
ant to § 320.5(3)(b). 
6 A delinquency petition, prepared by the "presentment agency," origi-
nates delinquency proceedings. FCA § 310.1. The petition must contain, 
inter alia, a precise statement of each crime charged and factual allega-
tions which "clearly apprise" the juvenile of the conduct which is the sub-
ject of the accusation. Id., at § 311.1. A petition is not deemed sufficient 
unless the allegations of the factual part of the petition, together with those 
of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable 
cause to believe that the juvenile committed the crime or crimes charged. 
Id., at § 311.2(2). Also, nonhearsay allegations in the petition and sup-
porting deposition must establish, if true, every element of each crime 
charged and the juvenile's commission thereof. Id. , at §311.2(3). The 
sufficiency of a petition may be tested by filing a motion to dismiss under 
§ 315.1. 
7 The first proceeding in Family Court following the filing of the petition 
is known as the initial appearance even if the juvenile has already been 
brought before the court immediately following his arrest. FCA § 320.2. 
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placed on two years' probation. 8 He had been detained pur-
suant to § 320.5(3)(b), between the initial appearance and the 
completion of the fact-finding hearing, for a total of fifteen 
days. 
Appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan, both age 14, 
were also ordered detained pending their fact-finding hear-
ings. Rosario was charged with attempted first-degree rob-
bery and second-degree assault for an incident in which he, 
with four others, allegedly tried to rob two men, putting a 
gun to the head of one of them and beating both about the 
head with sticks. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. At the time of 
his initial appearance, on March 15, 1979, Rosario had an-
other delinquency petition pending for knifing a student, and 
8 The "fact finding" is the juvenile's analogue of a trial. As in the earlier 
proceedings, the juvenile has a right to counsel at this hearing. Id. , at 
§ 341.2. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). Evidence may be sup-
pressed on the same grounds as in criminal cases, FCA § 330.2, and proof 
of guilt, based on the record evidence, must be beyond a reasonable doubt, 
id., at§ 342.2. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). If guilt is estab-
lished, the court enters an appropriate order and schedules a dispositional 
hearing. Id., at§ 345.1. 
The dispositional hearing is the final and most important proceeding in 
the Family Court. If the juvenile has committed a designated felony, the 
court must order a probation investigation and a diagnostic assessment. 
Id., at § 351.1. Any other material and relevant evidence may be offered 
by the probation agency or the juvenile. Both sides may call and cross-
examine witnesses and recommend specific dispositional alternatives. 
Id., at § 350.4. The court must find, based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence, id. , at§ 350.3(2), that the juvenile is delinquent and requires super-
vision, treatment or confinement. Id., at § 352.1. Otherwise, the peti-
tion is dismissed. Ibid. 
If the juvenile is found to be delinquent, then the court enters an order of 
disposition. Possible alternatives include a conditional discharge; proba-
tion for up to two years; nonsecure placement with, perhaps, a relative or 
the division for youth; transfer to the commissioner of mental health; or 
secure placement. Id., at§ 353.1-§ 353.5. Unless the juvenile committed 
one of the designated felonies, the court must order the least restrictive 
available alternative consistent with the needs and best interests of the ju-
venile and the need for protection of the community. Id., at§ 352.2(2). 
6 
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two prior petitions had been adjusted. 9 Probable cause was 
found on March 21. On April 11, Rosario was released to his 
father, and the case was terminated without adjustment on 
September 25, 1979. 
Kenneth Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and 
attempted grand larceny for an incident in which he and an-
other boy allegedly tried to steal money from a 14-year-old 
girl and her brother by threatening to blow theirs heads off 
and grabbing them to search their pockets. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3. Morgan, like Rosario, was on release status on 
another petition (for robbery and criminal possession of 
stolen property) at the time of his initial appearance on 
March 27, 1978. He had been arrested four previous times, 
and his mother refused to come to court because he had been 
in trouble so of ten she did not want him home. A probable 
cause hearing was set for March 30, but was continued until 
April 4, when it was combined with a fact-finding hearing. 
Morgan was found guilty of harassment and petit larceny and 
was ordered placed with the Department of Social Services 
9 Every accused juvenile is interviewed by a member of the staff of the 
probation department. This process is known as "probation intake." See 
Testimony of Mr. Benjamin (Supervisor, New York Dept. of Probation), 
J. A., at 142. In the course of the interview, which lasts an average of 45 
minutes, the probation officer will gather what information he can about 
the nature of the case, the attitudes of the parties involved, and the child's 
past history and current family circumstances. Id., at 144, 153. His 
sources of information are the child, his parent or guardian, the arresting 
officer and any records of past contacts between the child and the Family 
Court. On the basis of this interview, the probation officer may attempt 
to "adjust," or informally resolve, the case. FCA § 308.1(2). Adjustment 
is a purely voluntary process in which the complaining witness agrees not 
to press the case further, while the juvenile is given a warning or agrees to 
counseling sessions or, perhaps, referral to a community agency. Id., at 
§ 308.1 (Practice Commentary). In cases involving designated felonies or 
other serious crimes, adjustment is not permitted without written approval 
of the Family Court. Id., at §308.1(4). If a case is not informally ad-
justed, it is referred to the "presentment agency." Seen. 6, infra. 
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for 18 months. He was detained a total of eight days be-
tween his initial appearance and the fact-finding hearing. 
On December 21, 1977, w}lile still in £I'eventive detention 
pending his fact-finding hearing, GregoryMartin instituted a 
ha ~ corpus class action on behalf of "those persons who 
are, or uring the p ndency of this action, will be preven-
tively detained pursuant to" § 320.5(3)(b) of the Family Court 
Act. Rosario and Morgan were subsequently added as addi-
tional na~ These three class representatives 
sought a declaratory judgment that § 320.5(3)(b) violates the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In an unpublished opinion, the district court certified the 
class. ~ The court also held that appellees 
~ not required to exhaust their state remedies before re-
sorting tofeaeral habeas because the highest state court had 
already rejected an identicalchallenge to the juvenile preven-
tive detention statute. See People ex rel. Wayburn v. 
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (1976). Exhaustion of state 
remedies, therefore, would be "an exercise in futility." 
J. A., at 26. 
At trial, appellees offered in evidence the case histories of 
thirty-four members of the class, including the three named 
petitioners. Both parties presented some general statistics 
on the relation between pretrial detention and ultimate dispo-
sition. In addition, there was testimony concerning juvenile 
proceedings from a number of witnesses, including a legal aid 
attorney specializing in juvenile cases, a probation supervi-
sor, a child psychologist, and a Family Court judge. On the 
basis of this evidence, the district court rejected the equal 
10 We have never decided whether Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 23, providing for 
class actions, is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus relief. See Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 527 n. 6 (1979); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 
30 (1976). Although appellants contested the class certification in the dis-
trict court, they did not raise the issue on appeal; nor do they urge it here. 
Again, therefore, we have no occasion to reach the question. 
8 
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protection challenge as "insubstantial," 11 but agreed with ap-
pellees that pretrial detention under the Family Court Act 
violates due process. 12 The court ordered that ']!!__ class 
members in custody pursuant to Family Court Act Section 
[320.5(3)(b) sha be re se orthwith." J. A., at 93. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the trial 
record, the court opined that "the vast majority of juveniles C )t '2-- . , ). detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dis-
,...,. 
1 
,,./; ~ "' missed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released 
c.,,vr v after adjudication." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court concluded 
from that fact that§ 320.5(3)(b) "is utilized principally, not for 
preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for 
unadjudicated criminal acts." Id., at 372. The early release 
of so many of those detained contradicts any asserted need 
for pretrial confinement to protect the community. The 
court went on to conclude that since § 320.5(3)(b) has an un-
11 The equal protection claim, which was neither raised on appeal nor de-
cided by the Second Circuit, is not before us. 
12 The district court gave three reasons for this conclusion. First, under 
the Family Court Act, a juvenile may be held in pretrial detention for up to 
five days without any judicial determination of probable cause. Relying 
on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), the district court concluded 
that pretrial detention without a prior adjudication of probable cause is, 
itself, a per se violation of due process. 513 F. Supp., at 717. 
Second, after a review of the pertinent scholarly literature, the court 
noted that "no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even 
the most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which juveniles 
will engage in violent crime." 513 F. Supp., at 708. Afortiori, the court 
concluded, a Family Court judge cannot make a reliable prediction based 
on the limited information available to him at the initial appearance. Id., 
at 712. Moreover, the court felt that the trial record was "replete" with 
examples of arbitrary and capricious detentions. Id., at 713. 
Finally, the court concluded that preventive detention is merely a euphe-
mism for punishment imposed without an adjudication of guilt. The al-
leged purpose of the detention-to protect society from the juvenile's crim-
inal conduct-is indistinguishable from the purpose of post-trial detention. 
And given "the inability of trial judges to predict which juveniles will com-
mit crimes," there is no rational connection between the decision to detain 
and the alleged purpose, even if that purpose were legitimate. Id., at 716. 
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constitutional impact on the vast majority of juveniles de-
tained under it, it must be declared unconstitutional as to all 
juveniles. Individual litigation would be a practical impossi-
bility because the periods of detention are so short that the 
litigation is mooted before the merits are determined. 13 
II 
There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable 
in juvenile proceedings. "The problem," we have stressed, 
"is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process require-
ment upon such proceedings." In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 
13-14 (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional 
protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to 
juveniles. See In re Gault, supra, at 31-57 (notice of 
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, 
right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed 
v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy). But the 
Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences 
in the treatment of juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiverv. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial). The 
State has "a parens patriae interest in preserving and pro-
moting the welfare of the child," Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U. S. 745, 766 (1982), which makes a juvenile proceeding fun-
damentally different from an adult criminal trial. We have 
tried, therefore, to strike a balance-to respect the "infor-
mality" and "flexibility" that characterize juvenile proceed-
ings, In re Winship, supra, at 366, and yet to ensure that 
such proceedings comport with the "fundamental fairness" 
demanded by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones, 
supra, at 531; McKeiver, supra, at 543 (plurality opinion). 
'
3 Judge Newman concurred separately. He was not convinced that the 
record supported the majority's statistical conclusions. But he thought 
that the statute was procedurally infirm because it granted unbridled dis-
cretion to Family Court judges to make an inherently uncertain prediction 
of future criminal behavior. 689 F. 2d, at 377. 
'. 
10 
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The statutory provision at issue in this case, § 320.5(3)(b), 
permits a brief pretrial detention based on a finding of a "se-
rious risk" that an a~enile may commit a crime be-
fore his return date. The question before the Court is 
whether preventive detention of juveniles pursuant to 
§ 320.5(3)(b) is compatible with the "fundamental fairness" 
required by due process. In contrast to the Court of Ap-
peals, we feel constrained to address this question with refer-
ence to the pretrial detention of the three named plaintiffs to 
this action. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the underlying pur-
pose of the statute is punitive, not preventive. It drew that 
conclusion based on its own perception that too many juve-
niles had been wrongly detained under § 320.5(3)(b). No 
specific juveniles were mentioned, however. None of the 
1 three name~ntiffs was found to h~ve been wrongly de-
tained. The Court of Appeals, in fact, never so much as 
mentioned the names of the class representatives, much less 
the specific circumstances of their detention. The court in-
stead relied heavily on "case histories" of class members 
other than the named parties and statistics drawn from ear-
lier experience with pretrial detention in the New York juve-
nile system. But while such statistics and case histories may 
illuminate the application of a statute to the named parties, 
they cannot afford a basis for class-wide relief if the particu-
lar circumstances of the named parties themselves do not af-
ford it. 
The constitutionality of the statute can only be ·udged by 
reference to t e named plaintiffs since the very foundation of 
the power o e era courts lies in the authority and duty of 
those courts to decide cases and controversies properly be-
fore them. A federal court "has no jurisdiction to pronounce 
any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, 
because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is 
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual 
controversies." Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commission-
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ers, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). A direct corollary of this princi-
ple is "the rule that one to whom application of a statute is 
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the 
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to 
other persons or other situations in which its application 
might be unconstitutional." United States v. Raines, 362 
u. s. 17, 21 (1960). 
Thus, outside of the area where First Amendment consid-
erations permit challenges to the facial validity of a statute 
based on overbreadth, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 
(1982), a criminal statute may be attacked only in its applica-
tion to particular individuals. If the New York statutory 
provision in question is constitutionally infirm as to one or 
more of the three named parties to this action, other mem-
bers of the class who share constitutionally similar charac-
teristics may benefit from the adjudication of unconstitu-
tionality; but if§ 320.5(3)(b) is valid as applied to each of the 
three named parties, the fact that it might in some circum-
stances be applied in an unconstitutional manner to unnamed 
members of the class or to other persons who were once or 
could hypothetically be detained affords no ground for relief 
in this case. Just as "a class representative must be part of 
the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer from the 
same injury' as the class members," East Texas Motor 
Freight v. Rodrigitez, 431 U. S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 
U. S. 208, 216), so, too, the characteristics of the unnamed 
members of a class which are not shared by the named mem-
bers of the class cannot enlarge the legal issues presented to 
the court by the named parties. General Telephone Co. of 
Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147, 156-157 (1982). 
The resulting judicial inquiry may, of course, address con-
tentions of class-wide scope. But each such contention 
stands or falls on its aJfplication to the named plaintiffs. For 
example, the pretrial detention of the named plaintiffs may 
be attacked on the ground that preventive detention of any 
12 
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juvenile is per se unconstitutional. Appellees have pressed 
this argument below and continue to urge it here. They 
argue that regardless of the charges against the juvenile, or 
the juvenile's past record, he may not be preventively de-
tained prior to an adjudication of the merits of the charges 
against him. If sustained, this argument, while applying to 
these particular plaintiffs, would apply equally to all class 
members. If the statute is invalid as applied to the named 
plaintiffs on this ground, it could not validly be applied to de-
tain any juvenile before trial. 
Appellees have also attacked the pretrial detention of the 
named plaintiffs on the ground that the procedural safe-
guards contained in the New York statute, as applied by the 
Family Court, are not adequate to authorize the detention 
before trial of any juvenile charged with an offense. If this 
argument were sustained, the necessary conclusion would be 
that the named plaintiffs had been detained unconstitution-
ally. And, again, the rule derived from their case would in-
validate the detention of any class member held under the 
same procedures. 
But the Court of Appeals did not hold that preventive de-
tention of juveniles is per se unconstitutional or that the New 
York procedures for authorizing pretrial detention are inade-
quate. The Court of Appeals in fact gave very little atten-
tion to the statutory standard and the procedural protections 
which precede detention under § 320.5(3)(b). Instead, the 
court essayed to look to the actual application of the statute 
and to the percentage of "wrongful detentions" under it. 14 
But in doing so, the court failed to address the fundamental 
question of whether these particular plaintiffs had been con-
stitutionally detained. As a consequence, the court's consid-
14 As noted, the Court of Appeals judged the percentage of wrongful de-
tentions by the percentage of juveniles who "either have their petitions dis-
missed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after adjudica-
tion. " 689 F. 2d, at 369. We question the propriety of this equation in 
Part 11l(C), infra. 
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eration of statistics seems to us to have been wide of the 
mark. However broad the rule to be derived from the con-
sideration of the claims of the named plaintiffs, that rule must 
first and foremost be applicable to the facts of the named 
plaintiffs' cases. 
III 
We must, therefore, address the constitutionality of 
§ 320.5(3)(b) by reference to claims properly raised by the 
named parties to this action. T~~eparate though over-
lapping inquiries are necessary. ~ does preventive de-
tention serve a legitimate state objective? See Bell v. Wolf-
ish, 441 U. S. 520, 534 n. 15 (1979); Ken~. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). ~. 
are the procedural safeguards specified in the New York 
statute adequate to detain at least some juveniles charged 
with offenses before trial? See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U. S. 319, 33~1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 
(1975). And 1r , were the particular circumstances sur-
rounding the de ention of the three named plaintiffs such that 
the New York procedures were const1tut10nally applied to 
them? 
The first two questions a ply equally to all members of the 
class o~iuvem .§_S detained prior to tria , an , although it is 
the cases of the named plaintiffs which raise these questions, 
the answers do not depend upon the particular circumstances 
of those cases. But if the first two questions are answered in 
the affirmative, then the circumstances of the class repre-
sentatives become the focus of the inquiry in answering the 
third question. If one or more of those class representatives 
is found to have been unconstitutionally detained on the facts 
of his case, other class members may benefit only to the ex-
tent that they share the constitutionally relevant characteris-
tics. Conversely, if none of the class representatives is 
found tohavebeen unconstitutionallyaefamed on thefacts of 
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have been unconstitutionally detained cannot benefit the 
three named plaintiffs or form a basis for class-wide relief. 
A 
Preventive detention under the Family Court Act is pur-
portedly designed to protect the child and society from the 
potential co'nsequences of his criminal acts. People ex rel. 
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 521-522 (1976). 
When making any detention decision, the Family Court judge 
is specifically directed to consider the needs and best inter-
ests of the juvenile as well as the need for the protection of 
the community. FCA §301.1; In re Craig S., 394 N. Y. S. 
2d 200 (1977). In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 534 n. 15, we 
left open the question whether any governmental objective 
other than ensuring a detainee's presence at trial may con-
stitutionally justify pretrial detention. As an initial matter, 
therefore, we must decide whether, in the context of the ju-
venile system, the combined interest in protecting both the 
community and the juvenile himself from the consequences of 
future criminal conduct is sufficient to justify such detention. 
The "legitimate and com elling state interest" in protect-
ing the commum y om crime cannot be doubted. DeVeau 
v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). See also Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). We have stressed before that 
crime prevention is "a weighty social objective," Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), and this interest persists undi-
luted in the juvenile context. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 
20 n. 26 (1967). The harm suffered by the victim of a crime 
is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. 15 And the 
harm to society generally may even be greater in this context 
15 In 1982, juveniles under 16 accounted for 7.5 percent of all arrests for 
violent crimes, 19.9 percent of all arrests for serious property crime, and 
17. 3 percent of all arrests for violent and serious property crimes com-
bined. 1982 Crime in the United States 176-177 (United States Dept. of 
Justice) ("violent crimes" include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, 
forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault; "serious property crimes" 
include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson). 
' .. 
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given the high rate of recidivisim among juveniles. In re 
Gault, 387 U. S., at 22. 
The juvenile's countervailing interest in freedom from in-
stitutional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is 
undoubtedly substantial as well. See In re Gault, 387 U. S., 
at 27. But that interest must be qualified by the recognition 
that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of cus-
tody. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services, 
458 U. S. 502, 510-511 (1982); In re Gault, supra, at 17. 
Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity 
to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject 
to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, 
the State must play its part as parens patriae. See State v. 
Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 580 (Me. 1979); People ex rel. 
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522 (1976); Baker 
v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971). In 
this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropri-
ate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parens pa-
triae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the 
child." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 766 (1982). 
The New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the statute 
at issue here, stressed at some length "the desirability of pro-
tecting the juvenile from his own folly." People ex rel. 
Way burn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976). 16 
16 "Our society recognizes that juveniles in general are in the earlier 
stages of their emotional growth, that their intellectual development is 
incomplete, that they have had only limited practical experience, and that 
their value systems have not yet been clearly identified or firmly 
adopted .... 
"For the same reasons that our society does not hold juveniles to an 
adult standard of responsibility for their conduct, our society may also con-
clude that there is a greater likelihood that a juvenile charged with delin-
quency, if released, will commit another criminal act than that an adult 
charged with crime will do so. To the extent that self-restraint may be 
expected to constrain adults, it may not be expected to operate with equal 
force as to juveniles. Because of the possibility of juvenile delinquency 
treatment and the absence of second-offender sentencing, there will not be 
16 
82--1248 & 82--1278-OPINION 
SCHALL v. MARTIN 
Society has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from 
the consequences of his criminal ,activity-both from poten-
tial physical injury which may be suffered when a victim 
fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and 
from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer 
pressure may lead the child. See L. 0. W. v. District Court 
of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981); Morris 
v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 140 (R. I. 1980). See also 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115 (1982) (minority "is 
a time and condition of life when a person may be most sus-
ceptible to influence and to psychological damage"); Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (juveniles "often lack the 
experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and avoid 
choices that could be detrimental to them"). 
The substantiality and legitimacy of the state interests un-
derlying this statute are confirmed by the wide-spread use 
and judicial acceptance of preventive detention for juveniles. 
Every State, as well as the United States in the District of 
Co'lumfoa, permits pr~entive detention of juveniles ac~used 
of crime. 17 A number o1 model juvenile justice acts also con--
the deterrent for the juvenile which confronts the adult. Perhaps more 
significant is the fact that in consequence of lack of experience and compre-
hension the juvenile does not view the commission of what are criminal acts 
in the same perspective as an adult .... There is the element of games-
manship and the excitement of 'getting away' with something and the pow-
erful inducement of peer pressures. All of these commonly acknowledged 
factors make the commission of criminal conduct on the part of juveniles in 
general more likely than in the case of adults." People ex rel. Wayburn v. 
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976). 
17 Ala. Code § 12--15--59 (1975); Alas. Stat. § 47.10.140 (1979); 17A Ariz. 
Rev. Stats. Juv. Ct. Rules of Proc., rule 3 (1983--84 Supp.); Ark. Stat. 
Ann, § 45--421 (1983 Supp.); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 628 (1984 Supp.); 
Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19--2--102 (1983 Cum. Supp. ); Conn. Gen. Stats. 
§ 46b-131 (198~ Supp.); Dela. Fam. Ct. Rule 60 (1981); D. C. Code 
§ 16-2310 (1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.032 (1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 15--11-19 
(1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-31.1 (1982 Supp.); Idaho Code § 16-1811 
(1983 Supp.); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 703--4 (198~ Supp.); Ind. Ann. 
Stat. § 31--6--4--5 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.22 (1983--84 
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tain provisions permitting preventive detention. 18 And the 
courts of eight States, including the New York Court of Ap-
peals, have upheld their statutes with specific reference to 
protecting the juvenile and the community from harmful pre-
trial conduct, including pretrial crime. L.O. W. v. District 
Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1632 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Ky. Rev. Stats. 
§ 208.192 (1982); La. Code J uv. Proc. Art. 40 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 15, § 3203 (1983--84 Supp.); Md. Ann. Code § 3--815 (1983 Cum. Supp.); 
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 66 (1983 Supp.); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 712A.15 (1983--84 Supp.); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.171 (1982); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 43-23-11 (1981); Mo. R. Juv. Ct. 111.02 (1981); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 41-5--305 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-255 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 62.140 (1983); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169B:14 (1983 Cum. Supp.); 
N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-56 (1983-84 Supp.); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-24 
(1981 Supp.); N. Y. FCA § 320.5(3) (1983); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-574 
(1981); N. D. Cent. Code §27-20-14 (1974); Ohio Rev. Code Ann., tit. 21, 
ch. 2151.311 (1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. ch. 10, § 1107 (1983--84 Supp.); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 419.573 (1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6325 (1982); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§§ 14-1-20, 21 (1981); S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7-600 (1983 Cum. Supp.); S. D. 
Code § 26-8-19.2 (1983 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-214 (1983 Supp.); 
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.02 (1982-83 Supp.); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30 
(1983 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §643 (1981); Va. Code Ann.§ 16.1-248 
(1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.040 (1983--84 Cum. Supp.); W. Va. 
Code Ann. § 49-5--8 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 48.208 (1983-84 
Supp.); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-206 (1977). 
18 See United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, Standards for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice, Report of the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention (U. S. Gov. Printing Office, July 1980), at 
294-296; Uniform Juvenile Court Act, § 14, 9A U. L. A. (National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-1968); Standard Juvenile 
Court Act, Art. IV, § 16, proposed by the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency (6th Ed. 1959); W. Sheridan, Legislative Guide for Drafting 
Family and Juvenile Court Acts,§ 20(a)(l) (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bu-
reau, Pub. No. 472-1969); see also Standards for Juvenile and Family 
Courts, at 62-63 (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 437-1966). 
Cf. Institute of Judicial Administration/American Bar Association Juvenile 
Justice Standards Relating to Interim Status: The Release, Control, and 
Detention of Accused Juvenile Offenders Between Arrest and Disposition 
3.2B (detention limited to . "reducing the likelihood that the juvenile may 
inflict serious bodily harm on others during the interim"). 
18 
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Court of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981); 
Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 139-140 (R. I. 1980); 
State v. Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 583 (Me. 1979); Pauley v. 
Gross, 574 P. 2d 234, 237-238 (Kan. App. 1977); People ex 
rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976); 
Aubrey v. Gadbois, 123 Cal. Reptr. 365, 366 (CA App. 1975); 
Baker v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971); 
Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 265 A. 2d 348, 
349-350 (Pa. 1970). 
"The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of 
states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that prac-
tice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth consider-
ing in determining whether the practice 'offends some princi-
ple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934)." Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 798 (1952). In light of the uniform legislative 
judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles properly pro-
motes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we con-
clude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose 
compatible with the "fundamental fairness" demanded by the 
Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings. Cf. M cKeiver 
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 548 (1971) (plurality 
opinion). 19 
19 Appellees argue that some limit must be placed on the categories of 
crimes that detained juveniles must be accused of having committed or 
being likely to commit. But the discretion to delimit the categories of 
crimes justifying detention, like the discretion to define criminal offenses 
and prescribe punishments, resides wholly with the state legislatures. 
Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 689 (1980); Rochin v. California, 
342 U. S. 165, 168 (1952). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 
(1980) ("the presence or absence of violence does not always affect the 
strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing 
a particular criminal"). 
More fundamentally, in the instant case, the named plaintiffs have no 
standing to raise the claims of juveniles accused of "minor" crimes. Appel-
lee Martin was charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree assault 
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Of course, the mere invocation of a legitimate purpose will 
not justify particular restrictions and conditions of confine-
ment amounting to punishment. It is axiomatic that "[d]ue 
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished." 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 535 n. 16. Even given, there-
fore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory 
purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms 
and conditions of confinement under § 320.5(3)(b) are in fact 
compatible with those purposes. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mar-
tinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). "A court must decide 
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punish-
ment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate 
governmental purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538. 
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the 
part of the State, that determination generally will turn on 
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] 
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether 
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-
signed [to it.]" Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at 
168-189. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538; Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 613-614 (1960). 
There is no indication in the statute itself that preventive 
detention is used or intended as a punishment. First of all, 
the detention is strictly limited in time. If a juvenile is de-
tained at his initial appearance and has denied the charges 
against him, he is entitled to a probable cause hearing to be 
held not more than three days after the conclusion of the ini-
tial appearance or four days after the filing of the petition, 
whichever is sooner. FCA § 325.1(2). 20 If the Family Court 
and criminal possession of a loaded revolver. Appellee Rosario was 
charged with attempted first-degree robbery and second-degree assault. 
He had pending another delinquency petition for stabbing a student. Ap-
pellee Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and attempted grand 
larceny. It was his fifth arrest, and he had another delinquency petition 
pending for robbery and criminal possession of stolen property. 
20 For good cause shown, the court may adjourn the hearing, but for no 
more than three additional court days. FCA § 325.1(3). 
20 
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judge finds probable cause, he must also determine whether 
continued detention is necessary pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b). 
Id., at §325.3(3). 
Detained juveniles are also entitled to an expedited fact-
finding hearing. If the juvenile is charged with one of a lim-
ited number of designated felonies, the fact-finding hearing 
must be scheduled to commence not more than fourteen days 
after the conclusion of the initial appearance. Id., at § 340.1. 
If the juvenile is charged with a lesser offense, then the fact-
finding hearing must be held not more than three days after 
the initial appearance. 21 In the latter case, since the time for 
the probable cause hearing and the fact-finding hearing coin-
cide, the two hearings are merged. 
Thus, the maximum possible detention under § 320.5(3)(b) 
of a youth accused of a serious crime, assuming a three-day 
extension of the fact-finding hearing for good cause shown, is 
seventeen days. The maximum detention for less serious 
crimes, again assuming a three-day extension for good cause 
shown, is six days. These time-frames seem suited to the 
limited purpose of providing the youth with a controlled envi-
ronment and separating him from improper influences pend-
ing the speedy disposition of his case. 
The conditions of confinement also appear to reflect the 
regulatory purposes relied upon by the State. When a juve-
nile is remanded after his initial appearance, he cannot, ab-
sent exceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison or lockup 
where he would be exposed to adult criminals. FCA 
§ 304.1(2). Instead, the child is screened by an "assessment 
unit" of the Department of Juvenile Justice. Testimony of 
Mr. Kelly (Deputy Commissioner of Operations, New York 
City Department of Juvenile Justice), J. A., at 286-287. 
The assessment unit places the child in either nonsecure or 
secure detention. N onsecure detention involves an open 
21 In either case, the court may adjourn the hearing for not more than 
three days for good cause shown. FCA § 340.1(3). The court must state 
on the record the reason for any adjournment. Id., at §340.1(4). 
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facility in the community, a sort of "halfway house," without 
locks, bars or security officers where the child receives 
schooling and counseling and has access to recreational facili-
ties. Id., at 285; Testimony of Mr. Benjamin, J. A., at 
149-150. 
Secure detention is more restrictive, but it is still consist-
ent with the regulatory and paren·s patriae objectives relied 
upon by the State. Children are assigned to separate dorms 
based on age, size and behavio-r. They wear street clothes 
provided by the institution and partake in educational and 
recreational programs and counselling sessions run by 
trained social workers. Misbehavior is punished by confine-
ment to one's room. See Testimony of Mr. Kelly, J. A., at 
292-297. We cannot conclude from this record that the 
controlled environment briefly imposed by the State on juve-
niles in secure pretrial detention "is imposed for the purpose 
of punishment" rather than as "an incident of some other 
legitimate government purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S., at 538. 
B 
Given the legitimacy of the State's interest in preventive 
detention, and the nonpunitive nature of that detention, the 
~ is wh~ the procedures afforded juveniles 
ed pr10r to fact finding provide sufficient rotection 
against erroneous an unnecessary eprivations of liberty. 
Seet-Matnews v.Elariage, 2124 CT. S:-3I9, 335 -C-1976). In 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), we held that a 
judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to 
any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of 
crime. We did not, however, mandate a specific time-table. 
Nor did we require the "full panoply of adversary safe-
guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and com-
pulsory process of witnesses." Id., at 119. Instead, we rec-
ognized "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by 
the States." Id., at 123. Gerstein arose under the Fourth 
Amendment, but the same concern with "flexibility" and "in-
22 
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formality," while yet ensuring adequate predetention proce-
dures, is present in this context. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 
358, 366 (1970); Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 554 
(1966). 
In many respects, the Family Court Act provides far more 
predetention protection for juveniles than we found to be 
constitut10na require for a u ts m erstein. The initial 
appearance is informa , u e accused juvenile is given full 
notice of the charges against him and a complete steno-
graphic record is kept of the hearing. See 513 F. Supp., at 
702. The juvenile appears accompanied by his parent or 
guardian. 22 He is first informed of his rights, including the 
right to remain silent and the right to be represented by 
counsel chosen by him or by a law guardian assigned by the 
court. FCA § 320.3. The initial appearance may be ad-
journed for no longer than 72 hours or until the next court 
day, whichever is sooner, to enable an appointed law guard-
ian or other counsel to appear before the court. Id., at 
§ 320.2(3). When his counsel is present, the juvenile is in-
formed of the charges against him and furnished with a copy 
of the delinquency petition. Id., at § 320.4(1). A represent-
ative from the presentment agency appears in support of the 
petition. 
The nonhearsay allegations in the delinquency petition and 
supporting depositions must establish probable cause to be-
lieve the juvenile committed the offense. Although the 
Family Court judge is not required to make a finding of prob-
able cause at the initial appearance, the youth may challenge 
the sufficiency of the petition on that ground. FCA § 315.1. 
Thus, the juvenile may oppose any recommended detention 
by arguing that there is not probable cause to believe he com-
mitted the offense or offenses with which he is charged. If 
22 If the juvenile's parent or guardian fails to appear after reasonable and 
substantial efforts have been made to notify such person, the court must 
appoint a law guardian for the child. FCA § 320.3. 
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the petition is not dismissed, the juvenile is given an opportu-
nity to admit or deny the charges. Id., at § 321.1. 23 
At the conclusion of the initial appearance, the present-
ment agency makes a recommendation regarding detention. 
A probation officer reports on the juvenile's record, including 
other prior and current Family Court and probation contacts, 
as well as relevant information concerning home life, school 
attendance, and any special medical or developmental prob-
lems. He concludes by offering his agency's recommenda-
tion on detention. Opposing counsel, the juvenile's parents, 
and the juvenile himself may all speak on his behalf and chal-
lenge any information or recommendation. If the judge does 
decide to detain the juvenile under § 320.5(3)(b), he must 
state on the record the facts and reasons for the detention. 24 
As noted, a detained juvenile is entitled to a formal, adver-
sarial probable cause hearing within three days of his initial 
appearance, with one three-day extension possible for good 
23 If the child chooses to remain silent, he is assumed to deny the charges. 
FCA § 321.1. With the consent of the court and of the presentment 
agency, the child may admit to a lesser charge. If he wishes to admit to 
the charges or to a lesser charge, the court must, before accepting the ad-
mission, advise the child of his right to a fact-finding hearing and of the 
possible specific dispositional orders that may result from the admission. 
Ibid. The court must also satisfy itself that the child actually did commit 
the acts to which he admits. Ibid. 
With the consent of the victim or complainant and the juvenile, the court 
may also refer a case to the probation service for adjustment. If the case 
is subsequently adjusted, the petition is then dismissed. Id., at§ 320.6. 
24 Given that under Gerstein , 420 U. S. , at 119-123, a probable cause 
hearing may be informal and nonadversarial, a Family Court judge could 
make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance. That he is not 
required to do so does not, under the circumstances, amount to a depriva-
tion of due process. Notice, an opportunity for a hearing, and a statement 
of facts and reasons are sufficient to meet the requirements of fundamental 
fairness. Kent v. United States , 383 U. S. 541, 557 (1966). Appellees fail 
to point to a single example where probable cause was not found after a 
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cause shown. 25 The burden at this hearing is on the present-
ment agency to call witnesses and offer evidence in support of 
the charges. Id., at § 325.2. Testimony is under oath and 
subject to cross-examination. Ibid. The accused juvenile 
may call witnesses and offer evidence in his own behalf. If 
the court finds probable cause, the court must again decide 
whether continued detention is necessary under§ 320.5(3)(b). 
Again, the facts and reasons for the detention must be stated 
on the recor,d. 
In sum/'ii"otice, a~ring, and atsfatement of facts and rea-
L,,-soiis'are given prior to any detention under § 320.5(3)(b). A 
formal pro able cause earing 1s then held within a short 
while thereafter, if the fact-finding hearing is not itself sched-
uled within three days. These flexible procedures are con-
stitutionally adequate, whether the inquiry be phrased as one 
under the Fourth Amendment, see Gerstein v. Pugh, or 
under the Due Process Clause, see Kent v. Ufejt,ed States, 383 
u. s. 541, 557. 
Appellees argue, however, that the risk of erroneous and 
unnecessary detentions is too high despite these procedures 
because the standard for detention is fatally vague. Deten-
tion under § 320.5(3)(b) is based on a finding that there is a 
"serious risk" that the juvenile, if released, would commit a 
crime prior to his next court appearence. We have already 
seen that detention of juveniles on that ground serves legiti-
mate regulatory purposes. But appellees claim, and the dis-
trict court agreed, that it is virtually impossible to predict fu-
ture criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy. 
Moreover, they say, the statutory standard fails to channel 
the discretion of the Family Court judge by specifying the 
25 The Court in Gerstein indicated approval of pretrial detention proce-
dures that supplied a probable cause hearing within five days of the initial 
detention. 420 U. S. , at 124 n. 25. The brief delay in the probable cause 
hearing may actually work to the advantage of the juvenile since it gives 
his counsel, usually appointed at the initial appearance pursuant to FCA 
§ 320.2(2), time to prepare. 
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factors on which he should rely in making that prediction. 
The procedural protections noted above are thus, in their 
view, unavailing because the ultimate decision is intrinsically 
arbitrary and uncontrolled. 
Our cases indicate, however, that there is nothing inher- 1 
ently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal con-
duct. Such a judgment forms an important element in many 
decisions, 26 and we have specifically rejected the contention, 
based on the same sort of sociological data relied upon by ap-
pellees and the district court, "that it is impossible to predict 
future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be 
meaningless." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, 'and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 279 
(WHITE, J., concurring). 
We have also recognized that a prediction of future crimi-
nal conduct is "an experienced prediction based on a host of 
variables" which cannot be readily codified. Greenholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 16 (1979). Judge Qui-
nones of the Family Court testifed at trial that he and his col-
26 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274-275 (1976) (death sentence im-
posed by jury); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 9-10 
(1979) (grant of parole); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972) (pa-
role revocation). 
A prediction of future criminal conduct may also form the basis for an 
increased sentence under the "dangerous special offender" statute, 18 
U. S. C. § 3575 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under§ 3575(f), a "dangerous" of-
fender is defined as an individual for whom "a period of confinement longer 
than that provided for such [underlying] felony is required for the protec-
tion of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant." The 
statute has been challenged numerous times on the grounds that the stand-
ard is unconstitutionally vague. Every Court of Appeals considering the 
question has rejected that claim. United States v. Davis, 710 F. 2d 104, 
108-109 (CA3), cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1983); United States v. 
Schell, 692 F. 2d 672, 675-676 (CAlO 1982); United States v. Williamson, 
567 F. 2d 610, 613 (CA4 1977); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F. 2d 1160, 
1175 (CA5 1977); United States v. NeanJ, 552 F. 2d 1184, 1194 (CA7), cert. 
denied, 434 U. S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F. 2d 326, 
336-337 (CA6), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 922 (1976). 
I 
26 
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leagues make a determination under § 320.5(3)(b) based on 
numerous factors including the nature and seriousness of the 
charges; whether the charges are likely to be proved at trial; 
the juvenile's prior record; the adequacy and effectiveness of 
his home supervision; his school situation, if known; the time 
of day of the alleged crime as evidence of its seriousness and 
a possible lack of parental control; and any special circum-
stances that might be brought to his attention by the proba-
tion officer, the child's attorney, or any parents, relatives or 
other responsible persons accompanying the child. Testi-
mony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 254-267. The decision is 
based on as much information as can reasonably be obtained 
at the initi~ e,ppearance. lb~ 
Given t~ ght t~ he~rin~ counsel and to a statement 
of ~ ns, ther e is no reason that the specific factors upon 
which the Family CourtJuage- might reTy must be specified in 
the statute. As the NewYork Cou rt of Appeals concluded, 
-::----. 
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522 
(1976), "to a very real extent Family Court must exercise a 
substitute parental control for which there can be no particu-
larized criteria." There is also no reason, we should add, for 
a federal court to assume that a state court judge will not 
strive to apply state law as conscientiously as possible. 
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 549 (1981). 
·.··.· C 
As noted, the Court of Appeals concluded that the underly-
ing purpose of § 320.5(3)(b) was punitive, not regulatory. 
But the court did not dispute that preventive detention may 
serve legitimate regulatory purposes or that the terms and 
conditions of confinement were compatible with those pur-
poses. Nor did it find that New York failed to provide ade-
quate predetention procedures. The Court of Appeals in-
validated a significant aspect of New York's juvenile justice 
system based solely on some case histories and a statistical 
study which appeared to show that "the vast majority of ju-
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veniles detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their peti-
tions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are 
released after adjudication." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court 
assumed that dismissal of a petition or failure to confine a ju-
venile at the dispositional hearing belied the need to detain 
him prior to fact finding and that, therefore, the pretrial de-
tention constituted punishment. 
In light of our observations earlier in this opinion, the most 
obvious flaw in the Court of Appeals' analysis of the punitive 
nature of pretria1detention is its-failureto focus on the cir-
cumstances in which the nameclpa:rties were detained. With 
respect to those partieDlie ou o ppeals reasoning sim-
ply does not wash. Even if regular dismissals of charges in 
other cases might lend support to the inference that in those 
cases pretrial detention was imposed for an improper pur-
pose, that fact could not aid appellees Martin, Rosario and 
Morgan or other similarly situated class members. 
Kenneth Morgan was arrested and charged with attempted 
robbery and attempted grand larceny while he was on release 
status on another robbery charge. It was his fifth arrest, 
and his mother refused to come to court because he had been 
in trouble so often she did not want him home. See Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 3a, at 3. At his initial appearance, Morgan was 
appointed counsel and notified of the charges against him. 
Counsel spoke on his behalf, arguing against detention; but in 
light of the prior arrests and the lack of parental supervision, 
Morgan was detained. 
Under the circumstances, we can find no due process viola-
tion in the decision of the Family Court judge to detain Mor-
gan under § 320.5(3)(b). Nor does the subsequent dispo-
sition of his case indicate that the pretrial detention was 
employed as a substitute for postadjudication punishment. 
Morgan was detained for eight days pending completion of 
his fact-finding hearing, at which time he was adjudicated a 
delinquent. He Was ordered placed with the Department of 
Social Services for eighteen months. 
28 
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Gregory Martin was charged with first-degree robbery, 
second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. 
He had no prior record, but he was carrying a loaded re-
volver when arrested and he lied to the police about where he 
lived. Given the seriousness of the charges and the lateness 
of the hour at which the crime occurred, the Family Court 
judge ordered Martin detained. Again, we can find no viola-
tion of due process in that decision and no indication that the 
pretrial detention was either intended or employed as a 
punishment. 
Martin was detained for five days before his probable cause 
hearing and for ten more days pending completion of the fact 
finding. He was found guilty on two counts, adjudicated a 
delinquent and placed on two years' probation. Thus, Mar-
tin was not detained following his adjudication as a delin-
quent. ·But pretrial detention should not be considered puni-
tive merely because a juvenile is subsequently discharged 
subject to conditions or put on probation. In fact, such ac-
tions reinforce the original finding that close supervision of 
the juvenile is required. 27 Lenient but supervised dispo-
sition is in keeping with the Act's purpose to promote the 
welfare and development of the child. 28 As the New York 
Court of Appeals noted: 
"It should surprise no one that caution and concern for 
both the juvenile and society may indicate the more con-
servative decision to detain at the very outset, whereas 
the later development of very much more relevant in-
formation may prove that while a finding of delinquency 
27 The Court of Appeals, by contrast, treated probation and releases sub-
ject to conditions as equivelent to unconditional discharges. 689 F. 2d, at 
372-373. 
28 Judge Quinones testified that detention at disposition is considered a 
"harsh solution." At the dispositional hearing, the Family Court judge 
usually has "a much more complete picture of the youngster" and tries to 
tailor the least restrictive dispositional order compatible with that picture. 
Testimony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 279-281. 
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was warranted, placement would not be indicated." 
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 
522 (1976). 
Appellee Rosario, in contrast to both Martin and Morgan, 
was not ultimately adjudicated a delinquent. In fact, his 
case was terminated prior to fact finding. But we still can-
not conclude that the decision to detain him pursuant to 
§ 320.5(3)(b) amounted to a due process violation. A delin-
quency petition may be dismissed for any number of reasons 
collateral to its merits, such as the failure of a witness to 
testify. 29 The Family Court judge cannot be expected to 
anticipate such developments at the initial hearing. He 
must make his decision based on the information available to 
him at that time, and the propriety of his decision must be 
judged in that light. Consequently, the final disposition of a 
case is "largely irrelevant" to the legality of a pretrial deten-
tion. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 145 (1979). 
There are ample grounds in the Record to support the deci-
sion to detain Rosario. He was charged with attempted 
first-degree robbery and second-degree assault. A firearm 
was involved in the incident, and the victims were beaten 
with sticks. Rosario had another delinquency petition pend-
ing for stabbing a student, and two prior petitions had been 
adjusted. The Family Court judge specifically relied on 
these repeated criminal acts and the danger of further crimes 
in ordering Rosario's detention. 
With respect to each of these three cases, the question is 
not whether the decision to aetain was the wisest possible 
~e--1- but only 'whether it was compatible with due process. 
Given the regulatory purpose for the detention of' the named 
parties, the procedural protections that were accorded them, 
and the lack of any indication in the Record that the deten-
tions were either intended or employed as punishment, we 
conclude that they were not unconstitutionally detained pur-
29 The Record does not disclose why Rosario's case was terminated. 
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suant to §320.5(3)(b). It may be that New York Family 
Court judges have detained juveniles in other circumstances 
that would not pass constitutional muster. But the validity 
of those detentions must be adjudicated on a case-by-case 
basis. The Court of Appeals' approval of the wholesale re-
lease of juveniles detained under§ 320.5(3)(b) without regard 
to individual circumstances-without even mentioning the 
circumstances surrounding the detention of the three named 
parties to this case-is contrary to well-established principles 
of constitutional adjudication. See United States v. Raines, 
362 u. s. 17, 21 (1960). 
It is worth adding that the Court of Appeals was also mis-
taken in its conclusion that "individual litigation . . . is a prac-
tical impossibility because the periods of detention are so 
short that the litigation is mooted before the merits are de-
termined." 689 F. 2d, at 373. In fact, one of the juveniles 
in the very case histories upon which the court relied was re-
leased from pretrial detention on a writ of habeas corpus is-
sued by the state Supreme Court. New York courts also 
have adopted a liberal view of the doctrine of "capable of rep-
etition, yet evading review" precisely in order to ensure that 
pretrial detention orders are not unreviewable. In People 
ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 519-520 
(1976), the court declined to dismiss an appeal from the grant 
of a writ of habeas corpus despite the technical mootness of 
the case. 
"Because the situation is likely to recur ... and the sub-
stantial issue may otherwise never be reached (in view of 
the predictably recurring happenstance that, however 
expeditiously an appeal might be prosecuted, fact finding 
and dispositional hearings normally will have been held 
and a disposition made before the appeal could reach 
us), ... we decline to dismiss [the appeal] on the ground 
of mootness." 
The required statement of facts and reasons justifying the 
detention and the stenographic record of the initial appear-
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ance will provide a basis for the review of individual cases. 
Pretrial detention orders in New York may be reviewed by 
writ of habeas corpus brought in state Supreme Court. And 
the judgment of that court is appealable as of right and may 
be taken directly to the Court of Appeals if a constitutional 
question is presented. N. Y. Civil Practice Law§ 5601(b)(2) 
(1978). Permissive appeal from a Family Court order may 
also be had to the appellate division. FCA § 365.2. Or a 
motion for reconsideration may be directed to the Family 
Court judge. Id., at § 355. l(l)(b). These postdetention 
procedures provide a sufficient mechanism for correcting on a 
case-by-case basis any erroneous detentions ordered under 
§ 320.5(3). Such procedures can also be expected to estab-
lish more specific guidelines for detention, fashioned to fit 
concrete situations, that will better inform the discretion of 
Family Court judges. 
IV 
The question before us is not whether a better preventive 
detention system could be devised, but only whether this sys-
tem, as applied to the class representatives in this case, com-
ports with constitutional standards. Given the regulatory 
purpose for the detention and the procedural protections that 
preceded its imposition, we conclude that the detention of the 
three named plaintiffs was not mvahd under the Due'Process 
Clause of the Fourteemli" Amencl'merit:" ______ _
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: Nos. 82-1248 & 82-1278 Schall v. Martin 
I think Justice Rehnquist's opinion has fairly serious flaws, 
and I do not recommend joining it, at least in its entirety. The 
basic problem is that the opinion avoids the factor that makes 
this a difficult case and that was most persuasive to the lower 
- t,'\ 
between the ~ 
:.> 
court: the 1!ttatistics that show a great disparity --  
number of juveniles preventively detained and those ultimately .bl- _,_ 
detained. The plaintiffs' central argument is that that dispari- ~ 
ty shows that the state is either acting irrationally in protect~, 
ing the community for only a few days, has too high an error rate ~-'·--
in identifying those to be detained, or is in fact punishing the 
juveniles without adequate procedures. This was also the basis 
of the majority's decision below. Moreover, in refusing to look 
at those statistics, the opinion reaches out--unnecessarily, as I 
\ '\ 
see i t--to decide a~ issue ir?fclas_s action law without any brief-
c---
ing and without it being presented in the Jurisdictional State-
ment. 
With apologies for the length of this memo, I want to make 
three points.~ I think the opinion's holding on the ~ lass 
acti ~ sue may be wrong. ~ I think it is unnecessary to 
reach that issue in this case in order to avoid looking to the 
plain~1ffs' statistics, because the statistics should be consid-
ered even in addressing the named plaintiffs' individual claims. 
? 
page 2. 
Finally, I think the same result can be reached even if you look 
to the statistics. 
1. The reason WHR does not address the L~tatistical showin~ ' -
is that he would hold that "the characteristics of the unnamed 
members of a class which are not shared by the named members of 
the class cannot enlarge the legal issues presented to the court 
by the named par ties." P. 11. The thrust of the ruling is to 
disable the unnamed plaintiffs from mounting a challenge to the 
statute as applied to them. The source of this rule, and why it 
can be raised to bar claims at this point in the litigation, is 
unclear. WH_.g menti .. ons "cases and controversies" on page 10, sug-
gesting that it is a constitutional rule of standing. See also ~-------- --------
p. 18, n. 19. (His clerk confirms that that is what they are 
getting at.) The cases WHR cites on page 11 do not fully support 
the proposition advanced. Raines is not a class action case. 
Iodriguez and Falcon are cases turning on whether a class was 
properly certified under Rule 23. 
'!here is no question that the representativeness of the named 
plaintiffs is central to a Rule 23 inquiry, but I am not sure it 
can be elevated to a constitutional or jurisdictional question, 
which is essential if the Court is to consider the question sua 
sponte. The logic of cases dealing specifically with the consti-
tutional limits on class actions suggest that the unnamed plain-
tiffs have standing for purposes of Art. III independent of the 
named ,plaintiffs. I have in mind a series of cases in which the 
named plaintiffs' claims became moot during the litigation--~, 
they were offered reinstatement and back pay, or they got their 
page 3. 
divorce in another state. When that happened, this Court did not 
dismiss the actions. Rather, "[a] 1 though the named representa-
ti ve no longer had a personal stake in the outcome," the Court 
held that "' [w]hen the District Court certified the propriety of 
the class action, the class of unnamed persons described in the 
..., 
certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest 
asserted by [the named representative],' and, accordingly, the 
'cases and controversies' requirement of Art. III of the Consti-
. · · a " v · 424 tut1on was sat1sf1e • Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., U.S. 
747, 753 (1976) {quoting ~ osna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 
(1975)). The reason the class certification satisfied Art. III 
requirements was that it ensured the "concrete adverseness" that 
the Constitution requires. Id., at 755. This was confirmed by 
examining the progress of litigation itself, which showed that 
the status of the unnamed class members had been a central part 
of the trial. Id., at 756. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
193-194 (1977) {similar rule in jus tertii cases). 
If this logic is applied to a case in which it develops that 
--class representatives do not completely represent the interests 
of the unnamed class, it would seem that the only Art. III limi-
tation on considering the arguably separate claims of the unnamed 
representatives of the class is "concrete adverseness." Yet I 
have little doubt that the interests of the unnamed class members ,..., ______________________________ ...:-__ ._:. ___ :.:.:;.... 
are suffici ore the 
34 cape histories, which reflect a 
~ 
Court. ~ there are the 
far wider variety of cases 
than the three cases to which WHR feels limited ~ there 
.. 
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are the statistics, which show what happened to the class members 
as a group. 
At bottom, what bothers me about the class action holding is 
that it invests with constitutional significance which members of 
the class the plaintiffs choose as their class representatives. 
This "second-class status" for unnamed class members appears to 
be without precedent as a constitutional matter. As a practical ---------------
matter, I am not sure that it is such a good idea for appellate 
courts to examine whether the named plaintiffs truly represent 
the class in every particular, regardless of whether the common-
(' 
ality of interests is challenged under Rule 23. The result will 
. . 
be that the captions of class actions will grow increasingly long 
as plainti:-ffs seek ' to anticipate every possible distinction that 
some court along the way may come up with. It seems more orderly 
to let these essentially procedural matters rest in the District 
Court. 
do not pretend that I am cert.ain- of all of the above. 
':::---- --0 1 
WHR's proposed rule makes some sense (particularly as a matter of ~ 
Rule 23) • But in the absence of briefing I would not reach it ~ 
unless it is necessary. ------------- I do not think it is in this case. 
4-~ 
The main purpose of the class action holding appears to be to 
avoid looking to the statistics (which show how the statute has 
been applied to the class). But the statistics are in any case 
relevant to the challenges that WHR acknowledges are before the 
Court. He agrees that ~he plaintiffs can attack the statute "on -------
its face" and as a lied to ' the three named plaintiffs. Pp. 2-




nitive rationale and whether there are sufficient procedures to 
protect against erroneous deprivations. It is certainly persua-
sive in such a facial attack that the procedures provided are 
insufficient because they tend to result in too high a number of 
"erroneous" detentions. It also is important to finding a nonpu-
ni tive rationale for the stacute that the vast majority of de-
tainees are eventually released, both in New York and nationwide. 
'Ihis makes the suggested rationale of protecting the community 
seem distinctly insubstantial. 1 Thus, the lower court relied 
heavily on the statistics and appears to have thought it was 
striking down the statute on its face, as well as as applied. 
See J.A. 97, 114. Finally, WHR himself admits that "such statis-
tics and case histories may illuminate the application of the 
statute to the named parties," p. 10, but he never mentions them 
again. 
My point is that even were this an attack on the statute by 
only the three named plaintiffs, they could introduce the statis-
1Put another way, the figures confirm what on its face 
appears to be a central _problem in the statute. The statute 
provides different standards for detaining juveniles--at which 
time the court is to consider the "need to protect the community--
and for final disposition-~at which time the court also is to 
consider the best interests of ·the · child. The plaintiffs argue 
that this suggests that the state's interest in protecting the 
community is in fact marginal. The statistics support the claim, 
since the different standards appear to contribute to the very 
different results obtained at the two stages. The lower court 
?,It it this way: "The incongruities of the statutory scheme yield 
a paradoxical result in practice." J.A. 102. 
WijR does not mention the different standards--he relies on a 
section of the statute providing that the Family Court is always 
supposed to consider the best interests of the child--and ignores 
the showing that the difference may be important. 
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tics relied on below and those statistics would bear on the va-
lidity of the statutory standards and procedures. 
3. Finally, I do not think the statistics necessarily mean 
that the statute must fall. It is the opinion's narrow approach 
that I now am quarreling with, not its result. The statistics do '----------
make it a closer case. They make it plain that the statutory 
nuances that WHR ignores, see note 1 supra, are of major impor-
tance. They also make clear that the "errors" in detaining pee-
ple on little information that WHR brushes aside in his Part 
III(C) are endemic to the system. Nevertheless, the answers that lotf/(.5 
~
he gives also can serve to answer the statistics. That is, it is ~ --------- ....., ---- ------, -
the caution and concern for juveniles generally that --------------~,__.. - --- justifies ~ ~ 
the state in detaining them until more information is obtained.  ' -------- \/)._)~ 
In addition, this remedy appears to be universally thought of as 
necessary. and consistent with fundamental justice. (The trouble 
is that that does not explain why the statute applies two differ-
ent standards at the two stages in the proceeding. See note 1, 
supra. That problem is probably explained by the quite different 
point that evidence on what is in the best interests of the child 
is more difficult to gather than evidence on whether the communi-
ty needs protection.) 
4. To summarize, I find WHR's holding on the nature of class 
actions questionable and unnecessary. I also am disturbed by the 
--------------. 
opinion's general refusal to deal head on with the fact that 
under,the statutory scheme the community is only protected from 
crime for~ riod_ before trial in most cases. - ' (There are oth-
er less important problems, such as the application of Mathews v. 
page 7. 
Eldridge (your op.) to this case in Part II(B); WHR's opinion 
does not appear to go through the balancing of the costs and 
benefits of further procedures that that case envisions, but in-
stead looks to see whether certain minimum standards are satis-
f ied.) If you agree with me--particularly on the first point--! 
suspect you will have to write something separately. For now, we 
'"''--------
can either wait for the dissent, which may make the class action 
point (as well as the Mathews one) for us, or we can go ahead and 
set out these views in a separate concurrence now. 
March 19, 1984 
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Dear Bill: 
Over the weekend I read your opinion - all 3l 
pages. You have the right answer, and I aqree with most of , 
what you have written. I do have some questions. 
Both of the courts below decided the case on the 
basis of the wide disparitv, shown by statiRtics, between 
the number of juveniles detained for brief periods and those 
ultimately found to be detainable. It seems to me that your 
opinion does not address the principal argument of respond-
ents and the grounds uoon which the case was decided by both 
courts below. 
If I understand your opinion correctly, you justi-
fy this implicitly by treating the case as if it w~re not a 
class action. On page 10 you suggest that the case presents 
a constitutional question of standing. See also p. 18, n. 
19 . This issue was not argued or addressed below, nor 
raised in the Jurisdictional Statement here. I am not sure 
that it must be viewed as a constitutional or jurisdictional 
question in this case. Perhaps I am wrong, but I have un-
derstood that for constitutional purpose once the class was 
duly certified, the class itself retained legal status with-
out regard to what happened to the claims of the named rep-
resentatives. ~his at any rate was the rule in the mootness 
cases. 
In any event, unless the Court is willing to hold 
aR a jurisdictional matter that the separate claims of the 
unnamed class members arP. not before the Court, I see no 
reason to address the is~ue at all. 




Contrary to the view of CA2, the statistics do not show that 
the statute has a punitive rationale. It is generally simi-
lar to juvenile detention statutes in other states. In 
those states, as in New York, protection of the public is 
not the only or perhaps even the primary purpose. In my 
view, the statute reflects thA com~~l.ling interest of the 
state in the welfare of iuveniles. Further, there are no 
additional procedures that would change the operati.on of the 
statute siqnificantly without unduly impinging on the 
achievement of legitimate state purposes. 
I will understand, of course, if you prefer not to 
make substantial chanqes along the foreqoinq lines. I will 
then write a separate opinion, joining what I can of your 
opinion ann the iudqment. 
Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
JJuprtmt <1,I47Url irf fJrt ~b .Btau• 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
Re: No. 82-1248) 
82-1274) 
Dear Lewis: 
-ufrington. ~- C!f. 20~'1, 
March 20, 1984 
Schall v. Martin 
Abrams v. Martin 
Thanks for your letter of March 19th about my op1n1on in 
this case. It was one of those conference votes where the 
majority to "reverse" did not fully agree on one line of 
reasoning, and the drafter of the opinion was left to put 
something together as best he could. 
I do not think that the opinion refuses to treat the 
case as a class action; certainly for mootness purposes the 
certification of a class keeps a claim alive, and the claim 
is alive here. The point I try to make in my opinion -- and 
I think it is a justifiable one -- is that even though a 
class was certified, the named plaintiffs must adequately 
represent that class; that is, a court's focus should not be 
on idiosyncrasies of unnamed members of the class not shared 
by the named plaintiffs. For example, respondent's counsel 
in oral argument tried to argue that the typical detainee 
was a "three card monte" player; it was pointed out to him 
that the named plaintiffs in this case had all been arrested 
for far more serious offenses. I think that some of the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case was extremely 
loose, and that part of the looseness stems from its failure 
to focus on these plaintiffs. 
Having said this, I certainly have no objection to 
dealing with the statistics relied on by the Court of 
Appeals; indeed, I think that to do so would strengthen the 
opinion. I agree fully with your paragraph devoted to this 
issue, and I would be happy to incorporate it and expand 
upon it in my opinion. 
- 2 -
In short, I am willing to tone down to some extent my 
. emphasis on the failure of the Court of Appeals to address 
the situations of the named plaintiffs, rather than the 
abstract qualities of the class as a whole, and I am more 
than willing to fully treat the statistical argument. I do 
want to retain some of the language about the failure of the 
Court of Appeals to focus on the character of the named 
plainitffs, because I think this failure was part of the 
reason that the Court of Appeals went astray. If these 
sorts of changes would be sufficient to persuade you to 
join, I will be happy to try my hand at revising the draft. 
Since rel~ 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBE RS 01' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§u:p-rmu C!fcurt o-f tqt ~ttiltb j;htlte 
~a:.a-J:rn:gton. ~. <!J. 2!lffe~, 
Re: No. 82-1248 - Schall v. Martin 
No. 82-1278 - Abrams v. Martin 
Dear Bill: 
March 26, 1984 
~ 
I have spent a good bit of time on this case, for I think 
its posture is important. I agree with your result on the mer-
its, but I am troubled about the _opinion's unwillingness to 
recognize the relevance of the class-wide statistics to a facial 
attack on the statute. 
In other words, I generally share Lewis' concerns when he 
says that the opinion does not address the respondents' princi-
pal argument and the grounds on which the courts below decided 
the case. I also agree that we should seriously consider meet-
ing the statistics head~on and, even in the face of them, rule 
that the statute is valid. 
I hope that you will consider Lewis' suggestions. I think 
it would be helpful indeed if we could develop an opinion in 
which most of us could join and thereby avoid a fractionated 
vote. 
Jus tice Rehnquist 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 82-1248 AND 82-1278 
ELLEN SCHALL, COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK 
CITY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
82--1248 V. 
GREGORY MARTIN ET AL. 
ROBERT ABRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF NEW YORK 
82--1278 V. 
GREGORY MARTIN ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEA 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1984) 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act au 
thorizes pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquen 
based on a finding that there is a "serious risk" that the child 
"may before the return date commit an act which if commit-
ted by an adult would constitute a crime." 1 Appellees 
1 Section 320.5 of the Family Court Act (FCA) provides, in relevant 
part: 
"l. At the initial appearance, the court in its discretion may release the 
respondent or direct his detention. 
3. The court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts 
and reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is detained; 
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on 
the return date; or 
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an 
act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." 
F __ ...., 
2 
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brought suit on behalf of a class of all juveniles detained pur-
suant to that provision. 2 The district court struck down 
§ 320.5(3)(b) as permitting detention without due process of 
law and ordered the immediate release of all class members. 
513 F. Supp. 691 (1981). The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, h~lding the provision "unconstitutional 
as to all juveniles" because the statute is administered in such 
a way that "the detention period serves as punishment im-
posed without proof of guilt established according to the req-
uisite constitutional standard." 689 F. 2d 365, 373-374 
(1982). We noted probable jurisdiction, -- U. S. --
(1983), 3 and now reverse. We conclude that preventive de-
Appellees have only challenged pretrial detention under § 320.5(3)(b). 
Thus, the propriety of detention to ensure that a juvenile appears in court 
on the return date, pursuant to § 320.5(3)(a), is not before the Court. 
2 The original challenge was to § 739(a)(ii) of the FCA, which, at the time 
of the commencement of this suit, governed pretrial release or detention of 
both alleged juvenile delinquents and persons in need of supervision. Ef-
fective July 1, 1983, a new Article 3 to the Act governs, inter alia, "all ju-
venile delinquency actions and proceedings commenced upon or after the 
effective date thereof and all appeals and other post-judgment proceedings 
relating or attaching thereto." FCA § 301.3(1). Article 7 now applies 
only to proceedings concerning persons in need of supervision. 
Obviously, this Court must "review the judgment below in light of the 
... statute as it now stands, not as it once did." Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 
45, 48 (1969). But since new Article 3 contains a preventive detention sec-
tion identical to former § 739(a)(ii), see FCA § 320.5(3), the appeal is not 
moot. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41, 43 (1969). 
3 Although the pretrial detention of the class representatives has long 
since ended, see pp. 3-7, infra, this case is not moot for the same reason 
that the class action in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975), 
was not mooted by the termination of the claims of the named plaintiffs. 
"Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any 
given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal be-
fore he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless 
suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly 
situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. 
The claim, in short, is one that is distinctly 'capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review."' 
82-1248 & 82-1278-0PINION 
SCHALL v. MARTIN 3 
tention under the Family Court Act serves a legitimate state 
objective, and that the procedural protections afforded pre-
trial detainees by the New York statute satisfy the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 
I 
Appellee Gregory Martin was arrested on December 13, 
1977, and charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree 
assault, and criminal possession of a weapon based on an inci-
dent in which he, with two others, allegedly hit a youth on 
the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers. 
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Martin had possession of the gun 
when he was arrested. He was 14 years old at the time and, 
therefore, came within the jurisdiction of New York's Family 
Gourt. 4 The incident occurred at 11:30 at night, and Martin 
lied to the police about where and with whom he lived. He 
was consequently detained overnight. 6 
See also People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 519-520 
(1976). 
' In New York, a child over the age of seven but less than sixteen is not 
considered criminally responsible for his conduct. FCA § 301.2(1). If he 
commits an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, he 
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court. Id., at 
§ 302.1(1). That court is charged not with finding guilt and affixing pun-
ishment, In re Bogart, 259 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (1963), but rather with deter-
mining and pursuing the needs and best interests of the child insofar as 
those are consistent with the need for the protection of the community. 
FCA §301.1. See In re Craig S., 394 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (1977). Juvenile 
proceedings are, thus, civil rather than criminal, although because of the 
restrictions that may be placed on a juvenile adjudged delinquent, some of 
the same protections afforded accused adult criminals are also applicable in 
this context. Cf. FCA § 303.1. 
5 When a juvenile is arrested, the arresting officer must immediately 
notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care. 
FCA § 305.2(3). Ordinarily, the child will be released into the custody of 
his parent or guardian after being issued an "appearance ticket" requiring 
him to meet with the probation service on a specified day. Id., at 
§307.1(1). Seen. 9, supra. If, however, he is charged with a serious 
4 
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A petition of delinquency was filed, 6 and Martin made his 
"initial appearance" in Family Court on December 14th, ac-
companied by his grandmother. 7 The Family Court judge, 
citing the possession of the loaded weapon, the false address 
given to the police, and the lateness of the hour, as evidenc-
ing a lack of supervision, ordered Martin detained under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) (at that time § 739(a)(ii); see n. 2, supra). A 
probable cause hearing was held five days later, · on Decem-
ber 19th, and probable cause was found to exist for all the 
crime, one of several designated felonies, see id., at § 301.2(8), or if his par-
ent or guardian cannot be reached, the juvenile may be taken directly be-
fore the Family Court. Id., at § 305.2. The Family Court judge will 
make a preliminary determination as to the jurisdiction of the court, ap-
point a law guardian for the child, and advise the child of his or her rights, 
including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. 
Only if, as in Martin's case, the Family Court is not in session and special 
circumstances exist, such as an inability to notify the parents, will the child 
be taken directly by the arresting officer to a juvenile detention facility. 
Id., at § 305.2(4)(c). If the juvenile is so detained, he must be brought be-
fore the Family Court within 72 hours or the next day the court is in ses-
sion, whichever is sooner. Id., at§ 307.3(4). The propriety of such de-
tention, prior to a juvenile's initial appearance in Family Court, is not at 
issue in this case. Appellees challenged only judicially ordered detention 
pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b). 
6 A delinquency petition, prepared by the "presentment agency," origi-
nates delinquency proceedings. FCA § 310.1. The petition must contain, 
inter alia, a precise statement of each crime charged and factual allega-
tions which "clearly apprise" the juvenile of the conduct which is the sub-
ject of the accusation. Id., at § 311.1. A petition is not deemed sufficient 
unless the allegations of the factual part of the petition, together with those 
of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable 
cause to believe that the juvenile committed the crime or crimes charged. 
Id., at § 311.2(2). Also, nonhearsay allegations in the petition and sup-
porting deposition must establish, if true, every element of each crime 
charged and the juvenile's commission thereof. Id., at § 311.2(3). The 
sufficiency of a petition may be tested by filing a motion to dismiss under 
§ 315.1. 
7 The first proceeding in Family Court following the filing of the petition 
is known as the initial appearance even if the juvenile has already been 
brought before the court immediately following his arrest. FCA § 320.2. 
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crimes charged. At the fact-finding hearing held December 
27-29, Martin was found guilty on the robbery and criminal 
possession charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent and 
placed on two years' probation. 8 He had been detained pur-
suant to § 320.5(3)(b), between the initial appearance and the 
completion of the fact-finding hearing, for a total of fifteen 
days. 
Appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan, both age 14, 
were also ordered detained pending their fact-finding hear-
ings. Rosario was charged with attempted first-degree rob-
bery and second-degree assault for an incident in which he, 
with four others, allegedly tried to rob two men, putting a 
gun to the head of one of them and beating both about the 
8 The "fact finding" is the juvenile's analogue of a trial. As in the earlier 
proceedings, the juvenile has a right to counsel at this hearing. Id., at 
§ 341.2. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). Evidence may be sup-
pressed on the same grounds as in criminal cases, FCA § 330.2, and proof 
of guilt, based on the record evidence, must be beyond a reasonable doubt, 
id., at§ 342.2. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). If guilt is estab-
lished, the court enters an appropriate order and schedules a dispositional 
hearing. Id., at § 345.1. 
The dispositional hearing is the final and most important proceeding in 
the Family Court. If the juvenile has committed a designated felony, the 
court must order a probation investigation and a diagnostic assessment. 
Id. , at § 351.1. Any other material and relevant evidence may be offered 
by the probation agency or the juvenile. Both sides may call and cross-
examine witnesses and recommend specific dispositional alternatives. 
Id., at § 350.4. The court must find, based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence, id., at § 350.3(2), that the juvenile is delinquent and requires super-
vision, treatment or confinement. Id., at § 352.1. Otherwise, the peti-
tion is dismissed. Ibid. 
If the juvenile is found to be delinquent, then the court enters an order of 
disposition. Possible alternatives include a conditional discharge; proba-
tion for up to two years; nonsecure placement with, perhaps, a relative or 
the division for youth; transfer to the commissioner of mental health; or 
secure placement. Id., at§ 353.1-§ 353.5. Unless the juvenile committed 
one of the designated felonies, the court must order the least restrictive 
available alternative consistent with the needs and best interests of the ju-
venile and the need for protection of the community. Id., at § 352.2(2). 
6 
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head with sticks. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. At the time of 
his initial appearance, on March 15, 1979, Rosario had an-
other delinquency petition pending for knifing a student, and 
two prior petitions had been adjusted. 9 Probable cause was 
found on March 21. On April 11, Rosario was released to his 
father, and the case was terminated without adjustment on 
September 25, 1979. · 
Kenneth Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and 
attempted grand larceny for an incident in which he and an-
other boy allegedly tried to steal money from a 14-year-old 
girl and her brother by threatening to blow theirs heads off 
and grabbing them to search their pockets. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3. Morgan, like Rosario, was on release status on 
another petition (for robbery and criminal possession of 
stolen property) at the time of his initial appearance on 
March 27, 1978. He had been arrested four previous times, 
and his mother refused to come to court because he had been 
in trouble so often she did not want him home. A probable 
cause hearing was set for March 30, but was continued until 
April 4, when it was combined with a fact-finding hearing. 
9 Every accused juvenile is interviewed by a member of the staff of the 
probation department. This process is known as "probation intake." See 
Testimony of Mr. Benjamin (Supervisor, New York Dept. of Probation), 
J. A., at 142. In the course of the interview, which lasts an average of 45 
minutes, the probation officer will gather what information he can about 
the nature of the case, the attitudes of the parties involved, and the child's 
past history and current family circumstances. Id., at 144, 153. His 
sources of information are the child, his parent or guardian, the arresting 
officer and any records of past contacts between the child and the Family 
Court. On the basis of this interview, the probation officer may attempt 
to "adjust," or informally resolve, the case. FCA § 308.1(2). Adjustment 
is a purely voluntary process in which the complaining witness agrees not 
to press the case further, while the juvenile is given a warning or agrees to 
counseling sessions or, perhaps, referral to a community agency. Id., at 
§ 308.1 (Practice Commentary). In cases involving designated felonies or 
other serious crimes, adjustment is not permitted without written approval 
of the Family Court. Id., at § 308.1(4). If a case is not informally ad-
justed, it is referred to the "presentment agency." Seen. 6, infra. 
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Morgan was found guilty of harassment and petit larceny and 
was ordered placed with the Department of Social Services 
for 18 months. He was detained a total of eight days be-
tween his initial appearance and the fact-finding hearing. 
On December 21, 1977, while still in preventive detention 
pending his fact-finding hearing, Gregory Martin instituted a 
habeas corpus class action on behalf of "those persons who 
are, or during the pendency of this action, will be preven-
tively detained pursuant to" § 320.5(3)(b) of the Family Court 
Act. Rosario and Morgan were subsequently added as addi-
tional named plaintiffs. These three class representatives 
sought a declaratory judgment that § 320.5(3)(b) violates the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In an unpublished opinion, the district court certified the 
class. J. A., at 20-32. 10 The court also held that appellees 
were not required to exhaust their state remedies before re-
sorting to federal habeas because the highest state court had 
already rejected an identical challenge to the juvenile preven-
tive detention statute. See People ex rel. Wayburn v. 
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (1976). Exhaustion of state 
remedies, therefore, would be "an exercise in futility." 
J. A., at 26. 
At trial, appellees offered in evidence the case histories of 
thirty-four members of the class, including the three named 
petitioners. Both parties presented some general statistics 
on the relation between pretrial detention and ultimate dispo-
sition. In addition, there was testimony concerning juvenile 
proceedings from a number of witnesses, including a legal aid 
attorney specializing in juvenile cases, a probation supervi-
10 We have never decided whether Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 23, providing for 
class actions, is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus relief. See Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 527 n. 6 (1979); Middendorfv . Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 
30 (1976). Although appellants contested the class certification in the dis-
trict court, they did not raise the issue on appeal; nor do they urge it here. 
Again, therefore, we have no occasion to reach the question. 
8 
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sor, a child psychologist, and a Family Court judge. On the 
basis of this evidence, the district court rejected the equal 
protection challenge as "insubstantial," 11 but agreed with ap-
pellees that pretrial detention under the Family Court Act 
violates due process. 12 The court ordered that "all class 
members in custody pursuant to Family Court Act Section 
[320.5(3)(b)] shall be released forthwith." J. A., at 93. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the trial 
record, the court opined that "the vast majority of juveniles 
detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dis-
missed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released 
after adjudication." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court concluded 
from that fact that § 320.5(3)(b) "is utilized principally, not for 
preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for 
unadjudicated criminal acts." Id., at 372. The early release 
of so many of those detained contradicts any asserted need 
11 The equal protection claim, which was neither raised on appeal nor de-
cided by the Second Circuit, is not before us. 
12 The district court gave three reasons for this conclusion. First, under 
the FCA, a juvenile may be held in pretrial detention for up to five days 
without any judicial determination of probable cause. Relying on Gerstein 
v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), the district court concluded that pre-
trial detention without a prior adjudication of probable cause is, itself, a per 
se violation of due process. 513 F. Supp., at 717. 
Second, after a review of the pertinent scholarly literature, the court 
noted that "no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even 
the most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which juveniles 
will engage in violent crime." 513 F. Supp., at 708. Afortiori, the court 
concluded, a Family Court judge cannot make a reliable prediction based 
on the limited information available to him at the initial appearance. Id., 
at 712. Moreover, the court felt that the trial record was "replete" with 
examples of arbitrary and capricious detentions. Id., at 713. 
Finally, the court concluded that preventive detention is merely a euphe-
mism for punishment imposed without an adjudication of guilt. The al-
leged purpose of the detention-to protect society from the juvenile's crim-
inal conduct-is indistinguishable from the purpose of post-trial detention. 
And given "the inability of trial judges to predict which juveniles will com-
mit crimes," there is no rational connection between the decision to detain 
and the alleged purpose, even if that purpose were legitimate. Id., at 716. 
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for pretrial confinement to protect the community. The 
court therefore concluded that § 320.5(3)(b) must be declared 
unconstitutional as to all juveniles. Individual litigation 
would be a practical impossibility because the periods of de-
tention are so short that the litigation is mooted before the 
merits are determined. 13 
II 
There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable 
in juvenile proceedings. "The problem," we have stressed, 
"is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process require-
ment upon such proceedings." In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 
13-14 (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional 
protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to 
juveniles. See In re Gault, supra, at 31-57 (notice of 
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, 
right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed 
v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy). But the 
Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences 
in the treatment of juveniles. See, e. g., M cKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial). The 
State has "a parens patriae interest in preserving and pro-
moting the welfare of the child," Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U. S. 745, 766 (1982), which makes a juvenile proceeding fun-
damentally different from an adult criminal trial. We have 
tried, therefore, to strike a balance-to respect the "infor-
mality" and "flexibility" that characterize juvenile proceed-
ings, In re Winship, supra, at 366, and yet to ensure that 
such proceedings comport with the "fundamental fairness" 
demanded by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones, 
supra, at 531; McKeiver, supra, at 543 (plurality opinion). 
18 Judge Newman concurred separately. He was not convinced that the 
record supported the majority's statistical conclusions. But he thought 
that the statute was procedurally infirm because it granted unbridled dis-
cretion to Family Court judges to make an inherently uncertain prediction 
of future criminal behavior. 689 F. 2d, at 377. 
10 
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The statutory provision at issue in this case, § 320.5(3)(b), 
permits a brief pretrial detention based on a finding of a "se-
rious risk" that an arrested juvenile may commit a crime be-
fore his return date. The question before us is whether pre-
ventive detention of juveniles pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) is 
compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by due 
process. Two separate inquiries are necessary to answer 
this question. First, does preventive detention under the 
New York statute serve a legitimate state objective? See 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 534 n. 15 (1979); Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S .. 144, 168--169 (1963). And, 
second, are the procedural safeguards contained in the Fam-
ily Court Act adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of 
at least some juveniles charged with crimes? See Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
u. s. 103, 114 (1975). 
A 
Preventive detention under the Family Court Act is pur-
portedly designed to protect the child and society from the 
potential consequences of his criminal acts. People ex rel. 
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 521-522 (1976). 
When making any detention decision, the Family Court judge 
is specifically directed to consider the needs and best inter-
ests of the juvenile as well as the need for the protection of 
the community. FCA §301.1; In re Craig S., 394 N. Y. S. 
2d 200 (1977). In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 534 n. 15, we 
left open the question whether any governmental objective 
other than ensuring a detainee's presence at trial may con-
stitutionally justify pretrial detention. As an initial matter, 
therefore, we must decide whether, in the context of the ju-
venile system, the combined interest in protecting both the 
community and the juvenile himself from the consequences of 
future criminal conduct is sufficient to justify such detention. 
The "legitimate and compelling state interest" in protect-
ing the community from crime cannot be doubted. DeVeau 
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v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). See also Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). We have stressed before that 
crime prevention is "a weighty social objective," Broum v. 
Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), and this interest persists undi-
luted in the juvenile context. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 
20 n. 26 (1967). The harm suffered by the victim of a crime 
is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. 14 And the 
harm to society generally may even be greater in this context 
given the high rate of recidivisim among juveniles. In re 
Gault, 387 U. S., at 22. 
The juvenile's countervailing interest in freedom from in-
stitutional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is 
undoubtedly substantial as well. See In re Gault, 387 U. S., 
at 27. But that interest must be qualified by the recognition 
that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of cus-
tody. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services, 
458 U. S. 502, 510-511 (1982); In re Gault, supra, at 17. 
Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity 
to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject 
to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, 
the State must play its part as parens patriae. See State v. 
Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 580 (Me. 1979); People ex rel. 
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522 (1976); Baker 
v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971). In 
this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropri-
ate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parens pa-
triae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the 
child." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 766 (1982). 
14 In 1982, juveniles under,16 accounted for 7.5 percent of all arrests for 
violent crimes, 19.9 percent of all arrests for serious property crime, and 
17.3 percent of all arrests for violent and serious property crimes com-
bined. 1982 Crime in the United States 176-177 (United States Dept. of 
Justice) ("violent crimes" include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, 
forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault; "serious property crimes" 
include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson). 
12 
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The New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the statute 
at issue here, stressed at some length "the desirability of pro-
tecting the juvenile from his own folly." People ex rel. 
Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976). 15 
Society has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from 
the consequences of his criminal activity-both from poten-
tial physical injury which may be suffered when a victim 
fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and 
from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer 
pressure may lead the child. See L. 0. W. v. District Court 
of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981); Morris 
v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 140 (R. I. 1980). See also 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115 (1982) (minority "is 
a time and condition of life when a person may be most sus-
ceptible to influence and to psychological damage"); Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (juveniles "often lack the 
16 "Our society recognizes that juveniles in general are in the earlier 
stages of their emotional growth, that their intellectual development is 
incomplete, that they have had only limited practical experience, and that 
their value systems have not yet been clearly identified or firmly 
adopted .... 
"For the same reasons that our society does not hold juveniles to an 
adult standard of responsibility for their conduct, our society may also con-
clude that there is a greater likelihood that a juvenile charged with delin-
quency, if released, will commit another criminal act than that an adult 
charged with crime will do so. To the extent that self-restraint may be 
expected to constrain adults, it may not be expected to operate with equal 
force as to juveniles. Because of the possibility of juvenile delinquency 
treatment and the absence of second-offender sentencing, there will not be 
the deterrent for the juvenile which confronts the adult. Perhaps more 
significant is the fact that in consequence of lack of experience and compre-
hension the juvenile does not view the commission of what are criminal acts 
in the same perspective as an adult .... There is the element of games-
manship and the excitement of 'getting away' with something and the pow-
erful inducement of peer pressures. All of these commonly acknowledged 
factors make the commission of criminal conduct on the part of juveniles in 
general more likely than in the case of adults." People ex rel. Wayburn v. 
Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976). 
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experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and avoid 
choices that could be detrimental to them"). 
The substantiality and legitimacy of the state interests un-
derlying this statute are confirmed by the wide-spread use 
and judicial acceptance of preventive detention for juveniles. 
Every State, as well as the United States in the District of 
Columbia, permits preventive detention of juveniles accused 
of crime. 16 A number of model juvenile justice acts also con-
tain provisions permitting preventive detention. 17 And the 
16 Ala. Code § 12-15--59 (1975); Alas. Stat. § 47.10.140 (1979); 17 A Ariz. 
Rev. Stats. Juv. Ct. Rules of Proc., rule 3 (1983-84 Supp.); Ark. Stat. 
Ann, § 45-421 (1983 Supp.); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 628 (1984 Supp.); 
Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-102 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Conn. Gen. Stats. 
§ 46b-131 (1983-84 Supp.); Dela. Fam. Ct. Rule 60 (1981); D. C. Code 
§ 16-2310 (1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.032 (1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-19 
(1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-31.1 (1982 Supp.); Idaho Code § 16-1811 
(1983 Supp.); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 703--4 (1983-84 Supp.); Ind. Ann. 
Stat. § 31-6--4--5 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.22 (1983-84 
Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1632 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Ky. Rev. Stats. 
§ 208.192 (1982); La. Code Juv. Proc. Art. 40 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 15, § 3203 (1983-84 Supp.); Md. Ann. Code § ~15 (1983 Cum. Supp.); 
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 66 (1983 Supp.); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§712A.15 (1983-84 Supp.); Minn. Stat. Ann. §260.171 (1982); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 43-23-11 (1981); Mo. R. Juv. Ct. 111.02 (1981); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 41-5--305 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-255 (1982 Cum. Supp.); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 62.140 (1983); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169B:14 (1983 Cum. Supp.); 
N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-56 (1983-84 Supp.); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-24 
(1981 Supp.); N. Y. FCA § 320.5(3) (1983); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-574 
(1981); N. D. Cent. Code §27-20-14 (1974); Ohio Rev. Code Ann., tit. 21, 
ch. 2151.311 (1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. ch. 10, § 1107 (198~4 Supp.); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 419.573 (1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6325 (1982); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§§ 14-1-20, 21 (1981); S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7-600 (1983 Cum. Supp.); S. D. 
Code § 26-8-19.2 (1983 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-214 (1983 Supp.); 
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.02 (1982-83 Supp.); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30 
(1983 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §643 (1981); Va. Code Ann.§ 16.1-248 
(1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.040 (1983-84 Cum. Supp.); W. Va. 
Code Ann. § 49-5-8 (1983 Cum. Supp.); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 48.208 (1983-84 
Supp.); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-206 (1977). 
17 See United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, Standards for the Administration of Juvenile 
14 
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courts of eight States, including the New York Court of Ap-
peals, have upheld their statutes with specific reference to 
protecting the juvenile and the community from harmful pre-
trial conduct, including pretrial crime. L.0. W. v. District 
Court of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981); 
Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 139-140 (R. I. 1980); 
State v. Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 583 (Me. 1979); Pauley v. 
Gross, 574 P. 2d 234, 237-238 (Kan. App. 1977); People ex 
rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 520-521 (1976); 
Aubrey v. Gadbois, 123 Cal. Reptr. 365, 366 (CA App. 1975); 
Baker v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971); 
Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 265 A. 2d 348, 
349-350 (Pa. 1970). 
"The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of 
states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that prac-
tice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth consider-
ing in determining whether the practice 'offends some princi-
ple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934)." Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 798 (1952). In light of the uniform legislative 
judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles properly pro-
motes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we con-
Justice, Report of the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention (U. S. Gov. Printing Office, July 1980), at 
294-296; Uniform Juvenile Court Act, § 14, 9A U. L. A. (National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-1968); Standard Juvenile 
Court Act, Art. IV, § 16, proposed by the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency (6th Ed. 1959); W. Sheridan, Legislative Guide for Drafting 
Family and Juvenile Court Acts,§ 20(a)(l) (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bu-
reau, Pub. No. 472-1969); see also Standards for Juvenile and Family 
Courts, at 62-63 (Dept. of HEW, Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 437-1966). 
Cf. Institute of Judicial Administration/American Bar Association Juvenile 
Justice Standards Relating to Interim Status: The Release, Control, and 
Detention of Accused Juvenile Offenders Between Arrest and Disposition 
3.2B (detention limited to "reducing the likelihood that the juvenile may 
inflict serious bodily harm on others during the interim"). 
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elude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose 
compatible with the "fundamental fairness" demanded by the 
Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings. Cf. M cKeiver 
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 548 (1971) (plurality 
opinion). 18 
Of course, the mere invocation of a legitimate purpose will 
not justify particular restrictions and conditions of confine-
ment amounting to punishment. It is axiomatic that "[d]ue 
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished." 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 535 n. 16. Even given, there-
fore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory 
purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms 
and conditions of confinement under § 320.5(3)(b) are in fact 
compatible with those purposes. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mar-
tinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). "A court must decide 
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punish-
ment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate 
governmental purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538. 
Absent a showing of an express intent to punish on the part 
of the State, that determination generally will turn on 
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] 
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether 
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-
18 Appellees argue that some limit must be placed on the categories of 
crimes that detained juveniles must be accused of having committed or 
being likely to commit. But the discretion to delimit the categories of 
crimes justifying detention, like the discretion to define criminal offenses 
and prescribe punishments, resides wholly with the state legislatures. 
Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 689 (1980); Rochin v. California, 
342 U. S. 165, 168 (1952). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 
(1980) ("the presence or absence of violence does not always affect the 
strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime"). 
More fundamentally, this sort of attack on a criminal statute must be 
made on a case-by-case basis. United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21 
(1960). The court will not sift through the entire class to determine 
whether the statute was constitutionally applied in each case. And, out-
side the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be 
attacked as overbroad. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982). 
16 
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signed [to it.]" Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at 
168-189. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538; Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 613-614 (1960). 
There is no indication in the statute itself that preventive 
detention is used or intended as a punishment. First of all, 
the detention is strictly limited in time. If a juvenile is de-
tained at his initial appearance and has denied the charges 
against him, he is entitled to a probable cause hearing to be 
held not more than three days after the conclusion of the ini-
tial appearance or four days after the filing of the petition, 
whichever is sooner. FCA § 325.1(2). 19 If the Family Court 
judge finds probable cause, he must also determine whether 
continued detention is necessary pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b). 
Id., at §325.3(3). 
Detained juveniles are also entitled to an expedited fact-
finding hearing. If the juvenile is charged with one of a lim-
ited number of designated felonies, the fact-finding hearing 
must be scheduled to commence not more than fourteen days 
after the conclusion of the initial appearance. Id., at § 340.1. 
If the juvenile is charged with a lesser offense, then the fact-
finding hearing must be held not more than three days after 
the initial appearance. 20 In the latter case, since the time for 
the probable cause hearing and the fact-finding hearing coin-
cide, the two hearings are merged. 
Thus, the maximum possible detention under § 320.5(3)(b) 
of a youth accused of a serious crime, assuming a three-day 
extension of the fact-finding hearing for good cause shown, is 
seventeen days. The maximum detention for less serious 
crimes, again assuming a three-day extension for good cause 
shown, is six days. These time-frames seem suited to the 
limited purpose of providing the youth with a controlled envi-
19 For good cause shown, the court may adjourn the hearing, but for no 
more than three additional court days. FCA § 325.1(3). 
20 In either case, the court may adjourn the hearing for not more than 
three days for good cause shown. FCA § 340.1(3). The court must state 
on the record the reason for any adjournment. Id., at §340.1(4). 
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ronment and separating him from improper influences pend-
ing the speedy disposition of his case. 
The conditions of confinement also appear to reflect the 
regulatory purposes relied upon by the State. When a juve-
nile is remanded after his initial appearance, he cannot, ab-
sent exceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison or lockup 
where he would be exposed to adult criminals. FCA 
§ 304.1(2). Instead, the child is screened by an "assessment 
unit" of the Department of Juvenile Justice. Testimony of 
Mr. Kelly (Deputy Commissioner of Operations, New York 
City Department of Juvenile Justice), J. A., at 286-287. 
The assessment unit places the child in either nonsecure or 
secure detention. N onsecure detention involves an open 
facility in the community, a sort of "halfway house," without 
locks, bars or security officers where the child receives 
schooling and counseling and has access to recreational facili-
ties. Id., at 285; Testimony of Mr. Benjamin, J. A., at 
149-150. 
Secure detention is more restrictive, but it is still consist-
ent with the regulatory and parens patriae objectives relied 
upon by the State. Children are assigned to separate dorms 
based on age, size and behavior. They wear street clothes 
provided by the institution and partake in educational and 
recreational programs and counseling sessions run by trained 
social workers. Misbehavior is punished by confinement to 
one's room. See Testimony of Mr. Kelly, J. A., at 292-297. 
We cannot conclude from this record that the controlled envi-
ronment briefly imposed by the State on juveniles in secure 
pretrial detention "is imposed for the purpose of punishment" 
rather than as "an incident of some other legitimate govern-
ment purpose." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 538. 
The Court of Appeals, of course, did conclude that the un-
derlying purpose of§ 320.5(3)(b) is punitive rather than regu-
latory. But the court did not dispute that preventive deten-
tion might serve legitimate regulatory purposes or that the 
terms and conditions of pretrial confinement in New York are 
18 
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compatible with those purposes. Rather, the court invali-
dated a significant aspect of New York's juvenile justice sys-
tem based solely on some case histories and a statistical study 
which appeared to show that "the vast majority of juveniles 
detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dis-
missed before an adjudication or are released after adjudica-
tion." 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court assumed that dismissal 
of a petition or failure to confine a juvenile at the dispositional 
hearing belied the need to detain him prior to fact finding and 
that, therefore, the pretrial detention constituted punish-
ment. Id., at 373. Since punishment imposed without a 
prior adjudication of guilt is per se illegitimate, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that no juveniles could be held pursuant to 
§ 320.5(3)(b). 
There are some obvious flaws in the statistics and case his-
tories relied upon by the lower court. 21 But even assuming it 
to be the case that "by far the greater number of juveniles 
incarcerated under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] will never be confined as a 
21 For example, as the Court of Appeals itself admits, 689 F. 2d, at 369 n. 
18, the statistical study on which it relied mingles indiscriminately deten-
tions under § 320.5(3)(b) with detentions under § 320.5(3)(a). The latter 
provision applies only to juveniles who are likely not to appear on the re-
turn date if not detained, and appellees concede that such juveniles may be 
lawfully detained. Brief for Appellees, at 93. Furthermore, the thirty-
four case histories on which the court relied were handpicked by appellees' 
counsel from over a three-year period. Compare Plaintiff's Exhibit 19a 
(detention of Geraldo Delgado on March 5, 1976) with Plaintiff's Exhibit 
35a (detention of James Ancrum on August 19, 1979). The Court of Ap-
peals stated that appellants did not contest the representativeness of these 
case histories. 689 F. 2d, at 369 n. 19. Appellants argue, however, that 
there was no occasion to contest their representativeness because the case 
histories were not even offered by appellees as a representative sample, 
and were not evaluated by appellees' expert statistician or the district 
court in that light. See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, at 24-25 n. *. We 
need not resolve this controversy. But it is worth noting that, even if ran-
domly selected, the thirty-four case histories may be too few in number to 
constitute a valid statistical sample. See Mayor v. Educational Equality 
League, 415 U. S. 605, 620--621 (1974). 
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consequence of a disposition imposed after an adjudication of 
delinquency," 689 F. 2d, at 371-372, we find that to be an in-
sufficient ground for upsetting the widely-shared legislative 
judgment that preventive detention serves an important and 
legitimate function in the juvenile justice system. We are 
unpersuaded by the Court of Appeals' rather cavalier equa-
tion of detentions that do not lead to continued confinement 
after an adjudication of guilt and "wrongful" or "punitive" 
pretrial detentions. 
Pretrial detention need not be considered punitive merely 
because a juvenile is subsequently discharged subject to con-
ditions or put on probation. In fact, such actions reinforce 
the original finding that close supervision of the juvenile is 
required. Lenient but supervised disposition is in keeping 
with the Act's purpose to promote the welfare and develop-
ment of the child. 22 As the New York Court of Appeals 
noted: 
"It should surprise no one that caution and concern for 
both the juvenile and society may indicate the more con-
servative decision to detain at the very outset, whereas 
the later development of very much more relevant in-
formation may prove that while a finding of delinquency 
was warranted, placement may not be indicated." Peo-
ple ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y.S. 2d 518, 522 
(1976). 
Even when a case is terminated prior to fact finding, it 
does not follow that the decision to detain the juvenile pursu-
ant to § 320.5(3)(b) amounted to a due process violation. A 
delinquency petition may be dismissed for any number of rea-
sons collateral to its merits, such as the failure of a witness to 
testify. The Family Court judge cannot be expected to 
22 Judge Quinones testified that detention at disposition is considered a 
"harsh solution." At the dispositional hearing, the Family Court judge 
usually has "a much more complete picture of the youngster" and tries to 
tailor the least restrictive dispositional order compatible with that picture. 
Testimony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 27~281. l 
_, 
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anticipate such developments at the initial hearing. He 
makes his decision based on the information available to him 
at that time, and the propriety of the decision must be judged 
in that light. Consequently, the final disposition of a case is 
"largely irrelevant" to the legality of a pretrial detention. 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 145 (1979). 
It may be, of course, that in some circumstances detention 
of a juvenile would not pass constitutional muster. But the 
validity of those detentions must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Section 320.5(3)(b) is not invalid "on its face" by 
reason of the ambiguous statistics and case histories relied 
upon by the court below. 23 We find no justification for the 
conclusion that, contrary to the express language of the stat-
ute and the judgment of the highest state court, § 320.5(3)(b) 
is a punitive rather than a regulatory measure. Preventive 
detention under the Family Court Act serves the legitimate 
state objective, held in common with every State in the coun-
try, of protecting both the juvenile and society from the haz-
ards of pretrial crime. 
B 
Given the legitimacy of the State's interest in preventive 
detention, and the nonpunitive nature of that detention, the 
23 Several amici argue that similar statistics obtain throughout the coun-
try. See, e. g., Brief of the American Bar Association, at 23; Brief of the 
Association for Children of New Jersey, at 8, 11; Brief of the Youth Law 
Center and the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, at 13-14. But even if 
New York's experienc_e were duplicated on a national scale, that fact would 
not lead us, as amici urge, to conclude that every State and the United 
States is illicitly punishing juveniles prior to their trial. On the contrary, 
if such statistics obtain nationwide, our conclusion is strengthened that the 
existence of the statistics in this case is not a sufficient ground for striking 
down New York's statute. As already noted: "The fact that a practice is 
followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to 
whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth con-
sidering in determining whether the practice 'offends some principle of jus-
tice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as 
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remaining question is whether the procedures afforded juve-
niles detained prior to fact finding provide sufficient protec-
tion against erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of lib-
erty. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). 24 
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975), we held that a 
judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to 
any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of 
crime. We did not, however, mandate a specific time-table. 
Nor did we require the "full panoply of adversary safe-
guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and com-
pulsory process of witnesses." Id., at 119. Instead, we rec-
ognized "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by 
the States." Id., at 123. Gerstein arose under the Fourth 
Amendment, but the same concern with "flexibility" and "in-
formality," while yet ensuring adequate predetention proce-
dures, is present in this context. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 
358, 366 (1970); Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 554 
(1966). 
In many respects, the Family Court Act provides far more 
predetention protection for juveniles than we found to be 
constitutionally required for adults in Gerstein. The initial 
appearance is informal, but the accused juvenile is given full 
notice of the charges against him and a complete steno-
graphic record is kept of the hearing. See 513 F. Supp., at 
702. The juvenile appears accompanied by his parent or 
guardian. 25 He is first informed of his rights, including the 
fundamental. ' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934)." Le-
land v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798 (1952). 
24 Appellees urge the alleged lack of procedural safeguards as an alterna-
tive ground for upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Brief for 
Appellees, at 62-75. The court itself intimated that it would reach the 
same result on that ground, 689 F. 2d, at 373-374, and Judge Newman, in 
his concurrence, relied expressly on perceived procedural flaws in the stat-
ute. Accordingly, we deem it necessary to consider the question. 
25 If the juvenile's parent or guardian fails to appear after reasonable and 
substantial efforts have been made to notify such person, the court must 
appoint a law guardian for the child. FCA § 320.3. 
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right to remain silent and the right to be represented by 
counsel chosen by him or by a law guardian assigned by the 
court. FCA § 320.3. The initial appearance may be ad-
journed for no longer than 72 hours or until the next court 
day, whichever is sooner, to enable an appointed law guard-
ian or other counsel to appear before the court. Id., at 
§ 320.2(3). When his counsel is present, the juvenile is in-
formed of the charges against him and furnished with a copy 
of the delinquency petition. Id., at § 320.4(1). A represent-
ative from the presentment agency appears in support of the 
petition. 
The nonhearsay allegations in the delinquency petition and 
supporting depositions must establish probable cause to be-
lieve the juvenile committed the offense. Although the 
Family Court judge is not required to make a finding of prob-
able cause at the initial appearance, the youth may challenge 
the sufficiency of the petition on that ground. FCA § 315.1. 
Thus, the juvenile may oppose any recommended detention 
by arguing that there is not probable cause to believe he com-
mitted the offense or offenses with which he is charged. If 
the petition is not dismissed, the juvenile is given an opportu-
nity to admit or deny the charges. Id., at § 321.1. 26 
At the conclusion of the initial appearance, the present-
ment agency makes a recommendation regarding detention. 
A probation officer reports on the juvenile's record, including 
other prior and current Family Court and probation contacts, 
26 If the child chooses to remain silent, he is assumed to deny the charges. 
FCA § 321. 1. With the consent of the court and of the presentment 
agency, the child may admit to a lesser charge. If he wishes to admit to 
the charges or to a lesser charge, the court must, before accepting the ad-
mission, advise the child of his right to a fact-finding hearing and of the 
possible specific dispositional orders that may result from the admission. 
Ibid. The court must also satisfy itself that the child actually did commit 
the acts to which he admits. Ibid. 
With the consent of the victim or complainant and the juvenile, the court 
may also refer a case to the probation service for adjustment. If the case 
is subsequently adjusted, the petition is then dismissed. Id., at §320.6. 
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as well as relevant information concerning home life, school 
attendance, and any special medical or developmental prob-
lems. He concludes by offering his agency's recommenda-
tion on detention. Opposing counsel, the juvenile's parents, 
and the juvenile himself may all speak on his behalf and chal-
lenge any information or recommendation. If the judge does 
decide to detain the juvenile under § 320.5(3)(b), he must 
state on the record the facts and reasons for the detention. 27 
As noted, a detained juvenile is entitled to a formal, adver-
sarial probable cause hearing within three days of his initial 
appearance, with one three-day extension possible for good 
cause shown. 28 The burden at this hearing is on the present-
ment agency to call witnesses and offer evidence in support of 
the charges. Id., at § 325.2. Testimony is under oath and 
subject to cross-examination. Ibid. The accused juvenile 
may call witnesses and off er evidence in his own behalf. If 
the court finds probable cause, the court must again decide 
whether continued detention is necessary under§ 320.5(3)(b). 
Again, the facts and reasons for the detention must be stated 
on the record. 
In sum, notice, a hearing, and a statement of facts and rea-
sons are given prior to any detention under§ 320.5(3)(b). A 
formal probable cause hearing is then held within a short 
while thereafter, if the fact-finding hearing is not itself sched-
uled within three days. These flexible procedures are con-
27 Given that under Gerstein , 420 U. S., at 119--123, a probable cause 
hearing may be informal and nonadversarial, a Family Court judge could 
make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance. That he is not 
required to do so does not, under the circumstances, amount to a depriva-
tion of due process. Appellees fail to point to a single example where 
probable cause was not found after a decision was made to detain the child. 
28 The Court in Gerstein indicated approval of pretrial detention proce-
dures that supplied a probable cause hearing within five days of the initial 
detention. 420 U. S. , at 124 n. 25. The brief delay in the probable cause 
hearing may actually work to the advantage of the juvenile since it gives 
his counsel, usually appointed at the initial appearance pursuant to FCA 
§ 320.2(2), time to prepare. 
24 
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stitutionally adequate, whether the inquiry be phrased as one 
under the Fourth Amendment, see Gerstein v. Pugh, or 
under the Due Process Clause, see Kent v. United States, 383 
U. S. 541, 557 (1966). Appellees have failed to note any ad-
ditional procedures that would significantly improve the ac-
curacy of the determintion without unduly impinging on the 
achievement of legitimate state purposes. 29 
Appellees argue, however, that the risk of erroneous and 
unnecessary detentions is too high despite these procedures 
because the standard for detention is fatally vague. Deten-
tion under § 320.5(3)(b) is based on a finding that there is a 
"serious risk" that the juvenile, if released, would commit a 
crime prior to his next court appearence. We have already 
seen that detention of juveniles on that ground serves legiti-
mate regulatory purposes. But appellees claim, and the dis-
trict court agreed, that it is virtually impossible to predict fu-
ture criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy. 
Moreover, they say, the statutory standard fails to channel 
the discretion of the Family Court judge by specifying the 
factors on which he should rely in making that prediction. 
The procedural protections noted above are thus, in their 
view, unavailing because the ultimate decision is intrinsically 
arbitrary and uncontrolled. 
Our cases indicate, however, that from a legal point of view 
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of 
future criminal conduct. Such a judgment forms an impor-
29 Judge Newman, in his concurrence below, offered a list of statutory 
improvements. These suggested changes included: limitations on the 
crimes for which the juvenile has been arrested or which he is likely to 
commit if released; a determination of the likelihood that the juvenile com-
mitted the crime; an assessment of the juvenile's background; and a more 
specific standard of proof. The first and second of these suggestions have 
already been considered. Seen. 18 and n. 27, supra. We need only add 
to the discussion in n. 18 that there is no indication that delimiting the cate-
gory of crimes justifying detention would improve the accuracy of the 
§ 320.5(3)(b) determination in any respect. The third and forth sugges-
tions are discussed in text, infra. 
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tant element in many decisions,80 and we have specifically re-
jected the contention, based on the same sort of sociological 
data relied upon by appellees and the district court, "that it is 
impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is 
so vague as to be meaningless." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 
262, 274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.); id., at 279 (WHITE, J., concurring). 
We have also recognized that a prediction of future crimi-
nal conduct is "an experienced prediction based on a host of 
variables" which cannot be readily codified. Greenholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 16 (1979). Judge Qui-
nones of the Family Court testifed at trial that he and his col-
leagues make a determination under § 320.5(3)(b) based on 
numerous factors including the nature and seriousness of the 
charges; whether the charges are likely to be proved at trial; 
the juvenile's prior record; the adequacy and effectiveness of 
his home supervision; his school situation, if known; the time 
of day of the alleged crime as evidence of its seriousness and 
a possible lack of parental control; and any special circum-
30 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274-275 (1976) (death sentence im-
posed by jury); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 9-10 
(1979) (grant of parole); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972) (pa-
role revocation). 
A prediction of future criminal conduct may also form the basis for an 
increased sentence under the "dangerous special offender" statute, 18 
U. S. C. § 3575 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under§ 3575(0, a "dangerous" of-
fender is defined as an individual for whom "a period of confinement longer 
than that provided for such [underlying] felony is required for the protec-
tion of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant." The 
statute has been challenged numerous times on the grounds that the stand-
ard is unconstitutionally vague. Every Court of Appeals considering the 
question has rejected that claim. United States v. Davis, 710 F. 2d 104, 
108-109 (CA3), cert. denied, - U. S. - (1983); United States v. 
Schell, 692 F. 2d 672, 675-676 (CAl0 1982); United States v. Williamson, 
567 F. 2d 610, 613 (CA4 1977); United States v. B<YWdach, 561 F. 2d 1160, 
1175 (CA51977); United States v. Neary, 552 F. 2d 1184, 1194 (CA7), cert. 
denied, 434 U. S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F. 2d 326, 
336-337 (CA6), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 922 (1976). 
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stances that might be brought to his attention by the proba-
tion officer, the child's attorney, or any parents, relatives or 
other responsible persons accompanying the child. Testi-
mony of Judge Quinones, J. A., at 254-267. The decision is 
based on as much information as can reasonably be obtained 
at the initial appearance. Ibid. 
Given the right to a hearing, to counsel and to a statement 
of reasons, there is no reason that the specific factors upon 
which the Family Court judge might rely must be specified in 
the statute. As the New York Court of Appeals concluded, 
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 522 
(1976), "to a very real extent Family Court must exercise a 
substitute parental control for which there can be no particu-
larized criteria." There is also no reason, we should add, for 
a federal court to assume that a state court judge will not 
strive to apply state law as conscientiously as possible. 
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 549 (1981). 
It is worth adding that the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit was mistaken in its conclusion that "individual litiga-
tion ... is a practical impossibility because the periods of de-
tention are so short that the litigation is mooted before the 
merits are determined." 689 F. 2d, at 373. In fact, one of 
the juveniles in the very case histories upon which the court 
relied was released from pretrial detention on a writ of ha-
beas corpus issued by the state Supreme Court. New York 
courts also have adopted a liberal view of the doctrine of "ca-
pable of repetition, yet evading review" precisely in order to 
ensure that pretrial detention orders are not unreviewable. 
In People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 518, 
519-520 (1976), the court declined to dismiss an appeal from 
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus despite the technical 
mootness of the case. 
"Because the situation is likely to recur ... and the sub-
stantial issue may otherwise never be reached (in view of 
the predictably recurring happenstance that, however 
expeditiously an appeal might be prosecuted, fact-find-
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ing and dispositional hearings normally will have been 
held and a disposition made before the appeal could 
reach us), ... we decline to dismiss [the appeal] on the 
ground of mootness." 
The required statement of facts and reasons justifying the 
detention and the stenographic record of the initial appear-
ance will provide a basis for the review of individual cases. 
Pretrial detention orders in New York may be reviewed by 
writ of habeas corpus brought in state Supreme Court. And 
the judgment of that court is appealable as of right and may 
be taken directly to the Court of Appeals if a constitutional 
question is presented. N. Y. Civil Practice Law§ 5601(b)(2) 
(1978). Permissive appeal from a Family Court order may 
also be had to the appellate division. FCA § 365.2. Or a 
motion for reconsideration may be directed to the Family 
Court judge. Id., at § 355. l(l)(b). These postdetention 
procedures provide a sufficient mechanism for correcting on a 
case-by-case basis any erroneous detentions ordered under 
§ 320.5(3). Such procedures may well flesh out the stand-
ards specified in the statute. 
III 
The question before us today is not whether a better pre-
ventive detention system could be devised, but only whether 
this system, as applied by the New York Family Court, com-
ports with constitutional standards. Given the regulatory 
purpose for the detention and the procedural protections that 
precede its imposition, we conclude that § 320.5(3)(b) of the 
New York Family Court Act is not invalid under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
March 27, 1984 
82-1248 and 82-1278 Schall v. Martin 
Dear Bill: 
I should have replied sooner to your letter of 
March 20. ~lthough with the wedding activity in your fam-
ily, you probably have not been concerned. 
In considerinq further this case, I think it is 
necessary to view it · - as plaintiffs do in their complaint -
as a facial challenge to the statute. If I am right about 
this, the aoplication of the statute to the named plaintiffs 
is irrelevant. I therefore suggest that the discussion of 
these plaintiffs in Parts II and III(C) in your second draft 
be omitted, or that reference to them be deemphasized, sim-
ply because this seems to weaken rather than strengthen a 
holding that the atatute is facially valid. 
In Part III(A) you do not mention the fact that on 
its face the statute provid~s different standards for "pre-
trial" detention on the one hand and final disposition on 
the other. CA2, relying on statistics that showed a dispar-
ity, thought this distinction was important because it sug-
gested a punitive rationale. This is not a frivolous argu-
ment. Also as to Part III(B), the statistics are relevant 
not to the question whether the procedures provided are ade-
quate to minimize erroneous detentions. I think the answer -
as you suggest in Part III(C) - is the opinion of the New 
York Court of ~ppeals in Schupf.. The broader answer, as we 
have agreed, is the careful process provided by the New York 
statute and the state's interest. 
In your letter of March 20, you conclude~ by ask-
ing whether I would join you if the changes you suqgeste~ 
were made. Possibly I could, Bill, but - as indicated above 
- I am not sure that. they would fully satisfy my concerns as 
to the importance of meeting the statistical arguments head 
on, and sustaining the facial validity of the statute with-
out regard to the claims of the named plaintiffs. 




.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
"u.prtnu Qiirttrt of tlrt ~tb "bdt" 
'Jlu!rhtghnt. ~- <q. 2llffe~~ 
March 27, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1248 Schall v. Martin 
Dear Chief, Byron, Harry, Lewis, and Sandra: 
Some time ago I circulated the first draft of a 
proposed Court opinion in this case, and the Chief and 
Sandra joined it. Byron, Lewis, and Harry all of whom also 
voted to reverse at Conference (with, as I recall it, 
varying degrees of conviction} did not join. Last week 
Lewis wrote me saying that he agreed with the result, but 
that he did not agree with my emphasis on the "class action" 
aspect of the case, and was inclined to simply treat the 
merits of the constitutional claim and uphold the statute. 
I communicated the substance of Lewis' comments to Byron and 
Harry; Harry said he agreed with my account of Lewis' 
comments, and Byron indicated that while he did not think he 
had the same objections as Lewis did to the present draft, 
he would not be averse to seeing the revisions which Lewis 
suggested. 
I have now pretty much gone back to the drawing boards 
and, by reinterpreting the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
in a way that I now feel is more faithful to the views of 
that court, have produced a draft which almost entirely 
dispenses with any treatment of the "class action" aspect of 
the case and simply upholds the statute on the merits. I 
had originally thought that the Court of Appeals reasoned 
that because the statute was applied punitively as to some 
juveniles, it was therefore invalid "on its face" as to all 
juveniles. I have now come to think that the Court of 
Appeals used the statistical evidence as to some of the 
juveniles as a basis for concluding that the purpose of the 
statute was not a legitimate nonpunitive one, and therefore 
that the statute was unconstitutional under the reasoning of 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and Kenned~ v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). While I still disagree with 
the result reached by the Court of Appeals, I no longer feel 
I have reason to criticize the methodological approach taken 
by that court. 
Reviewing my highly impressionistic Conference notes, 
it seems to me that both the Chief and Sandra were quite 
willing to deal with the case on its merits across the 
board, so they should not be dissatisfied with the revised 
opinion, and I am hopeful that the revisions will make the 
opinion more palatable to Byron, Harry, and Lewis. 
Obviously any one of you can disabuse me of these notions, 
but I want very much to have a Court opinion in this case if 
I possibly can. 
I enclose a copy of the revised opinion. May I hear 
from each of you at your convenience as to your reactions to 
it? 







JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.in:prnnt QJO'ltrl of tlrt ~ .§ta:tu 
Jkglfinghtn. ~. OJ. 2llffe'l' 
March 28, 1984 
Re: 82-1248 and 82-1278 -
Schall v. Martin 
Abrams v. Martin 
Dear Bill, 
I will join your third draft. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 







.tnttrtmt QJ01trt af t4, 'Juittb .ttab,s-
JJulfmgt.on, ~. QJ. 2llffe'!' 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Bill, 
March 28, 1984 
No. 82-1248 Schall v. Martin 
No. 82-1278 Abrams v. Martin 
I am still with you on the 3rd Draft. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
Jen U::S/28/84 ,~ 
~--µ-
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: 
responds to substantially all of our concerns. It ~J~~s 
cussion of class actions almost entirely, responds ~ -
tiffs' statistical argument, at least in large part, and~ l ~ 
a clearer invocation of the Mathews v. Eldridge analys~~ave "/ L/ 
a few fairly minor suggestions, but essentially I thi~fj,_? 
ion is OK TO JOIN. 
(1) I note that the opinion still does not mention the fact 
that the statute appears to prescribe different standards for 
pretrial detention and post-"trial" disposition. I do not think 
the point is important in the long run, and I suspect that even-
tually WHR illl have t ~ eal with it in response to the dissent; 
there are several ready answers. Thus, I don't recommend sug-
gesting any changes on this score; I draw your attention to it 
only because the disparity was mentioned in your letter to WHR of 
March 28th. 
(2) I am concerned that the opinion still does not make clear 
merely by way of analo-
gy. There is langua pp. 23-24 that suggests 
the view that Gerstein establishes what procedures are "constitu-
tionally adequate" for any pretrial action. Of course, this view 
is wrong under Mathews; the content of due process varies depend-
ing on the circumstances, and the circumstances involved in 
Gerstein are significantly different from those here. Gerstein 
addressed the question of what procedures are necessary to deter-
mine whether a person committed a crime in the past; if probable 
cause is found, the defendant may still be released on bail or on 
personal recognizance. The question here is what procedures are 
necessary to determine whether a juvenile will commit a crime in 
the future; if a serious risk is found, the juvenile is detained. 
Thus, Gerstein is merely analogous authority, not controlling. 
To make this clear, I would suggest three changes. ( i) On 
page 21, first ,r, change the final sentence to read, "Gerstein 
arose under the Fourth Amendment and dealt with the question of 
whether the accused had committed a er ime in the past, but the 
same concern with 'flexibility' and 'informality,' while yet en-
suring adequate predetention procedures, is present in this con-
text." (ii) On page 21, final ,r, change the first sentence to 
read, "In many respects, the Family Court Act provides far more 
predetention protection for juveniles than we found to be consti-
tutionally required to determine probable cause for adults in 
Gerstein." (iii) In place of the carryover sentence on pages 23-
24, insert: "The question addressed in the initial appearance in 
this case is closely analogous to the probable cause determina-
tion of Gerstein v. Pugh. We conclude that the same procedures 
are constitutionally adequate here. 
States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966) ." 
See also Kent v. United 
[Of course, much more might 
be said on the topic of how closely analogous the probable cause 
determination is to the determination of serious risk of future 
crime, but these changes at least will ensure that this opinion 
is not seen as altering due process analysis.] , 
( 3) Purely by way of strengthening WHR' s opinion, I would 
suggest that he mention the fact that appellees have ci tea na-
tionwide studies purporting to show that across the country there 
is a similar disparity between the number of juveniles detained 
before trial and the number ultimately incarcerated that there is 
in New York. Appellees' Brief at 79-81. This goes to the point 
that New York's statute is not out of line with what other states 
have viewed as acceptable. The place I would put it is as a 
footnote after the carryover sentence on pages 18-19. 
March 2~, 1984 
82-1248 and 82-1279 Schall v. Martin 
Dear Bill: 
Please ioin me. 
Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/sa 
cc: 'rhe Conference 
Sincerely, 
.inprmu ~amt af tltt ~b .itatt• 
jlufri:nghnt. ~- ~- 211'.?ll' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March 29, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1248 and 82-1279 Schall v. Martin 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Earlier this week I circulated a substantially changed 
version of my earlier drafts in this case to those who had 
voted to "reverse" at Conference, trying to find out if the 
revised version had more appeal than the old one. Lewis and 
Sandra have joined the new version and sent copies of their 
join letters to the Conference~ Byron has joined but sent 
copies only to those who received earlier copies of the 
revised version. I now therefore withdraw the earlier 
draft, and enclose copies of the third draft for those who 
have not previously received them. 
Sincerely, 
iJJVv-
.h.prnru QJ01trl qf tlf t 'Jmub !\tat.ts 
-ulrittgton. ~. <If. 2llffe,., 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
Re: No. 82-1248) 
82-1278) 
Dear Harry: 
April 2, 1984 
Schall v. Martin 
Abrams v. Martin 
I will be happy to make the changes which you suggest, 
and they will appear in my next circulation of this opinion. 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.§uµuutt <qonrt cf tlp~ ~ttilt~ jshtlts 
~aglyin:gfott. ~- <q. 2llffe'!, 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 82-1248) Schall v. Martin 
No. 82-1278) Abrams v. Martin 
Dear Bill: ' I\;•.• I.' I 1 1, j J ; 
April 2, 1984 
Please join me in your third draft cir'culated March 27~ · :-1 ;·.,,. , :, 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES > 
Nos. 82-1248 AND 82-1278 J ~ 
ELLEN SCHALL, COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK ~ (L~ , 
CITY DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE I~ 
82-1248 v. 
GREGORY MARTIN ET AL. 
ROBERT ABRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF NEW YORK 
82-1278 V. 
GREGORY MARTIN ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1984] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The New York Family Court Act governs the treatment of 
persons between 7 and 16 years of age who are alleged to 
have committed acts that, if committed by adults, would con-
stitute crimes. 1 The Act contains two provisions that au-
thorize the detention of juveniles arrested for offenses cov-
ered by the Act 2 for up to 17 days pending adjudication of 
1 N. Y. Jud. Law §§ 301.2(1), 302.1(1) (McKinney 1983) [hereinafter 
FCA]. Children over 13 accused of homicide and children over 14 accused 
of kidnapping, arson, rape, or a few other serious crimes are exempted 
from the coverage of the Act and instead are prosecuted as "juvenile of-
fenders" in the adult criminal courts. N. Y. Penal Law § 10.00(18) (Mc-
Kinney 1983-1984 Supp.). For the sake of simplicity, offenses covered by 
the Family Court Act, as well as the more serious offenses enumerated 
above, hereafter will be referred to generically as crimes. 
2 Ironically, juveniles arrested for very serious offenses, see n. 1, supra, 
are not subject to preventive detention under this or any other provision. 
2 
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their guilt. 3 Section 320.5(3)(a) empowers a judge of the 
New York Family Court to order detention of a juvenile if he 
finds "there is a substantial probability that he will not ap-
pear in court on the return date." Section 320.5(3)(b), the 
provision at issue in these cases, authorizes detention if the 
judge finds "there is a serious risk [the juvenile] may before 
the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult 
would constitute a crime." 4 
There are few limitations on§ 320.5(3)(b). Detention need 
not be predicated on a finding that there is probable cause to 
believe the child committed the offense for which he was ar-
rested. The provision applies to all juveniles, regardles13 of 
their prior records or the severity of the offenses of which 
they are accused. The provision is not limited to the preven-
tion of dangerous crimes; a prediction that a juvenile if re-
leased may commit a minor misdemeanor is sufficient to jus-
tify his detention. Aside from the reference to "serious 
risk," the requisite likelihood that the juvenile will misbehave 
before his trial is not specified by the statute. 
The Court today holds that preventive detention of a juve-
nile pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) does not violate the Due Process 
8 Strictly speaking, "guilt" is never adjudicated under the Act; nor is the 
juvenile ever given a trial. Rather, whether the juvenile committed the 
offense is ascertained in a "fact-finding hearing." In most respects, how-
ever, such a hearing is the functional equivalent of an ordinary criminal 
trial. For example, the juvenile is entitled to counsel and the state bears 
the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile 
committed the offense of which he is accused. See FCA §§ 341.2(1), 
342.2(2); cf. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 
(1967) (establishing constitutional limitations on the form of such proceed-
ings in recognition of the severity of their impact upon juveniles). For 
convenience, the ensuing discussion will use the terminology associated 
with adult criminal proceedings when describing the treatment of juveniles 
in New York. 
• At the time appellees first brought their suit, the pertinent portions of 
FCA § 320.5(3) were embodied in FCA § 739(a). I agree with the majority 
that the reenactment of the crucial provision under a different numerical 
heading does not render the case moot. See ante, at 2, n. 2. 
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Clause. Two rulings are essential to the Court's decision: 
that the provision promotes legitimate government objec-
tives important enough to justify the abridgment of the de-
tained juveniles' liberty interests, ante, at 20; and that the 
provision incorporates procedural safeguards sufficient to 
prevent unnecessary or arbitrary impairment of constitution-
ally protected rights, ante, at 2~24, 26. Because I disagree 
with both of those rulings, I dissent. 
I 
The District Court made detailed findings, which the Court 
of Appeals left undisturbed, regarding the manner in which 
§ 320.5(3)(b) is applied in practice. Unless clearly erroneous, 
those findings are binding upon us, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
52(a), and must guide our analysis of the constitutional ques-
tions presented by these cases. 
The first step in the process that leads to detention under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) is known as "probation intake." A juvenile may 
arrive at intake by one of three routes: he may be brought 
there directly by an arresting officer; he may be detained for 
a brief period after his arrest and then taken to intake; he 
may be released upon arrest and directed to appear at a des-
ignated time. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 701 
(SDNY 1981). The heart of the intake procedure is a 10 to 
40-minute interview of the juvenile, the arresting officer, and 
sometimes the juvenile's parent or guardian. The objectives 
of the probation officer conducting the interview are to deter-
mine the nature of the offense the child may have committed 
and to obtain some background information on him. Ibid. 
On the basis of the information derived from the interview 
and from an examination of the juvenile's record, the proba-
tion officer decides whether the case should be disposed of in-
formally ("adjusted") or whether it should be referred to the 
Family Court. If the latter, the officer makes an additional 
recommendation regarding whether the juvenile should be 
detained. "There do not appear to be any governing criteria 
4 
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which must be followed by the probation officer in choosing 
between proposing detention or parole .... " Ibid. 
The actual decision whether to detain a juvenile under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) is made by a Family Court judge at what is 
called an "initial appearance"-a brief hearing resembling an 
arraignment. 6 513 F. Supp., at 702. The information on 
which the judge makes his determination is very limited. 
He has before him a "petition for delinquency'' prepared by a 
state agency, charging the juvenile with an offense, accompa-
nied with one or more affidavits attesting to the juvenile's in-
volvement. Ordinarily the judge has in addition the written 
report and recommendation of the probation officer. How-
ever, the probation officer who prepared the report rarely at-
tends the hearing. 513 F. Supp., at 702. Nor is the com-
plainant likely to appear. Consequently, "[o]ften there is no 
one present with personal knowledge of what happened." 
Ibid. 
In the typical case, the judge appoints counsel for the juve-
nile at the time his case is called. Thus, the lawyer has no 
opportunity to make an independent inquiry into the juve-
nile's background or character, and has only a few minutes to 
prepare arguments on the child's behalf. 513 F. Supp., at 
702, 708. The judge ordinarily does not interview the juve-
nile, 513 F. Supp., at 708, makes no inquiry into the truth of 
allegations in the petition, 513 F. Supp., at 702, and does not 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe the ju-
venile committed the offense. 6 The typical hearing lasts be-
• If the juvenile is detained upon arrest, this hearing must be held on the 
next court day or within 72 hours, whichever comes first. FCA § 307.3(4). 
"The majority admits that "the Family Court judge is not required to 
make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance," but contends 
that the juvenile has the option to challenge the sufficiency of the petition 
for delinquency on the ground that it fails to establish probable cause. 
Ante, at 22. None of the courts that have considered the constitutionality 
of New York's preventive-detention system has suggested that a juvenile 
has a statutory right to a probable-cause determination before he is de-
tained. The provisions cited by the majority for its novel reading of the 
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tween 5 and 15 minutes, and the judge renders his decision 
immediately afterward. 513 F. Supp., at 702. 
Neither the statute nor any other body of rules guides the 
efforts of the judge to determine whether a given juvenile is 
likely to commit a crime before his trial. In making deten-
tion decisions, "each judge must rely on his own subjective 
judgment, based on the limited information available to him 
at court intake and whatever personal standards he himself 
has developed in exercising his discretionary authority under 
the statute." Ibid. Family Court judges are not provided 
information regarding the behavior of juveniles over whose 
cases they have presided, so a judge has no way of refining 
the standards he employs in making detention decisions. 
513 F. Supp., at 712. 
After examining a study of a sample of 34 cases in which 
juveniles were detained under § 320.5(3)(b) 7 along with vari-
statute provide only shaky support for its contention. FCA § 315.1, which 
empowers the juvenile to move to dismiss a petition lacking allegations suf-
ficient to satisfy § 311.2, provides that "[a] motion to dismiss under this 
section must be made within the time provided for in section 332.2:" 
§ 332.2, in turn, provides that pretrial motions shall be made within 30 days 
after the initial appearance and before the fact-finding hearing. If the ju-
venile has been detained, the judge is instructed to "hear and determine 
pre-trial motions on an expedited basis," § 332.2(4), but is not required to 
rule upon such motions peremptorily. In sum, the statutory scheme 
seems to contemplate that a motion to dismiss a petition for lack of proba-
ble cause, accompanied with "supporting affidavits, exhibits and memo-
randa of law,"§ 332.2(2), would be filed sometime after the juvenile is de-
tained under § 320.5(3)(b). And there is no reason to expect that the 
ruling on such a motion would be rendered before the juvenile would in any 
case be entitled to a probable cause hearing under § 325.1(2). That counsel 
for a juvenile ordinarily is not even appointed until a few minutes prior to 
the initial appearance, see supra, at --, confirms this interpretation. 
The lesson of this foray into the tangled provisions of the New York Family 
Court Act is that this Court ought to adhere to its usual policy of relying 
whenever possible for interpretation of a state statute upon courts better 
acquainted with its terms and applications. 
7 The majority refuses to consider the circumstances of these 34 cases, 
dismissing them as unrepresentative and too few in number to constitute a 
6 
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ous statistical studies of pretrial detention of juveniles in 
New York, 8 the District Court made findings regarding the 
circumstances in which the provision habitually is invoked. 
Three of those findings are especially germane to appellees' 
challenge to the statute. First, a substantial number of 
"first offenders" are detained pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b). For 
example, 9 of the 34 juveniles in the sample had no prior con-
tact with the Family Court before being detained and 23 had 
no prior adjudications of delinquency. 513 F. Supp., at 
695-700. Second, many juveniles are released-for periods 
ranging from 5 days to several weeks-after their arrests 
and are then detained under § 320.5(3)(b), despite the ab-
valid statistical sample, ante, at 18, n. 21, and focuses instead on the lurid 
facts associated with the cases of the three named appellees. I cannot 
agree that the sample is entitled to so little weight. There was uncon-
tested testimony at trial to the effect that the 34 cases were typical. App. 
128 (testimony of Steven Hiltz, an attorney with 8 and one half years of 
experience before the Family Court). At no point in this litigation have 
the appellants offered an alternative selection of instances in which 
§ 320.5(3)(b) has been invoked. And most importantly, despite the fact 
that the District Court relied heavily on the sample when assessing the 
manner in which the statute is applied, see 513 F. Supp., at 695-700, appel-
lants did not dispute before the Court of Appeals the representativeness of 
the 34 cases, see 689 F. 2d, at 369, n. 19. When the defendants in a plain-
tiff class action challenge on appeal neither the certification of the class, see 
ante, at 7, n. 10, nor the plaintiffs' depiction of the character of the class, 
we ought to analyze the case as it comes to us and not try to construct a 
new version of the facts on the basis of an independent and selective review 
of the record. 
8 As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, 689 F. 2d, at 369, n. 18, there 
are defects in all of the available statistical studies. Most importantly, 
none of the studies distinguishes persons detained under § 320.5(3)(a) from 
persons detained under § 320.5(3)(b). However, these flaws did not dis-
able the courts below from making meaningful-albeit rough-generaliza-
tions regarding the incidence of detention under the latter provision. Es-
pecially when conjoined with the sample of 34 cases submitted by 
appellees, see n. 7, supra, the studies are sufficient to support the three 
findings enumerated in the text. Even the majority, though it chastizes 
appellees for failing to assemble better data, ante, at 18, and n. 21, does not 
suggest that those findings are clearly erroneous. 
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sence of any evidence of misconduct during the time between 
their arrests and "initial appearances." Sixteen of the 34 
cases in the sample fit this pattern. 513 F. Supp., at 705, 
713-714. Third, "the overwhelming majority" of the juve-
niles detained under § 320.5(3)(b) are released either before 
or immediately after their trials, either unconditionally or on 
parole. 513 F. Supp., at 705. At least 23 of the juveniles in 
the sample fell into this category. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 
F. 2d 365, 369, n. 19 (CA2 1982); see 513 F. Supp., at 
695-700. 
Finally, the District Court made a few significant findings 
concerning the conditions associated with "secure detention" 
pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b). 9 In a "secure facility," "[t]he juve-
niles are subjected to strip-searches, wear institutional cloth-
ing and follow institutional regimen. At Spofford [Juvenile 
Detention Center], which is a secure facility, some juveniles 
who have had dispositional determinations and were awaiting 
placement (long term care) comingle with those in pretrial 
detention (short term care)." 513 F. Supp., at 695, n. 5. 
It is against the backdrop of these findings that the conten-
tions of the parties must be examined. 
II 
A 
As the majority concedes, ante, at 9, the fact that 
§ 320.5(3)(b) applies only to juveniles does not insulate the 
provision from review under the Due Process Clause. 
"[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone." In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967). 
Examination of the provision must of course be informed by a 
9 The State director of detention services testified that, in 1978, ap-
proximately 6 times as many juveniles were admitted to "secure facilities" 
as to "non-secure facilities." See 513 F. Supp., at 703, n. 8. These fig-
ures are not broken down as to persons detained under § 320.5(3)(a) and 
persons detained under § 320.5(3)(b). There seems no dispute, however, 
that most of the juveniles held under the latter provision are subjected to 
"secure detention." 
8 
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recognition that juveniles have different needs and capacities 
than adults, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 
550 (1971), but the provision still "must measure up to the es-
sentials of due process and fair treatment," Kent v. United 
States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966). 
To comport with "fundamental fairness,"§ 320.5(3)(b) must 
satisfy two requirements. First, it must advance goals com-
mensurate with the burdens it imposes on constitutionally 
protected interests. Second, it must not punish the juve-
niles to whom it applies. 
The majority only grudgingly and incompletely acknowl-
edges the applicability of the first of these tests, but its grip 
on the cases before us is undeniable. It is manifest that 
§ 320.5(3)(b) impinges upon fundamental rights. If the "lib-
erty'' protected by the Due Process Clause means anything, 
it means freedom from physical restraint. Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673-674 (1977); Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 572 (1972). Only a very important gov-
ernment interest can justify deprivation of liberty in this 
basic sense. 10 
The majority seeks to evade the force of this principle by 
discounting the impact on a child of incarceration pursuant to 
§ 320.5(3)(b). The curtailment of liberty consequent upon 
detention of a juvenile, the majority contends, is mitigated 
by the fact that "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some 
10 This principle underlies prior decisions of the Court involving various 
constitutional provisions as they relate to pretrial detention. In Gerstein 
v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113-114 (1975), we relied in part on the severity of 
"[t]he consequences of prolonged detention" in construing the Fourth 
Amendment to forbid pretrial incarceration of a suspect for an extended 
period of time without "a judicial determination of probable cause." In 
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1951), we stressed the importance of a 
person's right to freedom until proven guilty in construing the Eighth 
Amendment to proscribe the setting of bail "at a figure higher than an 
amount reasonably calculated to" assure the presence of the accused at 
trial. Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 149-150, 153 (1979) (STE-
VENS, J., dissenting). 
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form of custody." Ante, at 11. In any event, the majority 
argues, the conditions of confinement associated with "secure 
detention" under § 320.5(3)(b) are not unduly burdensome. 
Ante, at 17. These contentions enable the majority to sug-
gest that § 320.5(3)(b) need only advance a "legitimate state 
objective" to satisfy the strictures of the Due Process Clause. 
Ante, at 3, 10, 20. 11 
The majority's arguments do not survive scrutiny. Its 
characterization of preventive detention as merely a transfer 
of custody from a parent or guardian to the State is difficult 
to take seriously. Surely there is a qualitative difference be-
tween imprisonment and the condition of being subject to the 
supervision and control of an adult who has one's best inter-
ests at heart. And the majority's depiction of the nature of 
confinement under § 320.5(3)(b) is insupportable on this 
record. As noted above, the District Court found that se-
cure detention ent~ls incarceration in a facility closely re-
sembling a jail and that pretrial detainees are sometimes 
mixed with juveniles who have been found to be delinquent. 
Supra, at--. Evidence adduced at trial reinforces these 
findings. For example, Judge Quinones, a Family Court 
judge with 8 years of experience, described the conditions of 
detention as follows: 
"Then again, Juvenile Center, as much as we might 
try, is not the most pleasant place in the world. If you 
put them in detention, you are liable to be exposing 
11 The phrase "legitimate governmental objective" appears at several 
points in the opinion of the Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
e.g., id., at 538-539, and the majority may be relying implicitly on that 
decision for the standard it applies in these cases. If so, the reliance is 
misplaced. Wolfish was exclusively concerned with the constitutionality 
of conditions of pretrial incarceration under circumstances in which the le-
gitimacy of the incarceration itself was undisputed; the Court avoided any 
discussion of the showing a state must make in order to justify pretrial de-
tention in the first instance. See id., at 533-534, and n. 15. The standard 
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these youngsters to all sorts of things. They are liable 
to be exposed to assault, they are liable to be exposed to 
sexual assaults. You are taking the risk of putting them 
together with a youngster that might be much worse 
than they, possibly might be, and it might have a bad ef-
fect in that respect." App. 270. 
Many other observers of the circumstances of juvenile deten-
tion in New York have come to similar conclusions. 12 
In short, fairly viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile pur-
suant to § 320.5(3)(b) gives rise to injuries comparable to 
those associated with imprisonment of an adult. In both 
situations, the detainee suffers stigmatization and severe 
limitation of his freedom of movement. See In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358, 367 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U. S., at 27. In-
deed, the impressionability of juveniles may make the experi-
ence of incarceration more injurious to them than to adults; 
all too quickly juveniles subjected to preventive detention 
come to see society at large as hostile and oppressive and to 
see themselves as irremediably "delinquent." 13 Such serious 
injuries to presumptively innocent persons-encompassing 
the curtailment of their constitutional rights to liberty---<!an 
be justified only by a weighty public interest that is substan-
tially advanced by the statute. 14 
12 All of the 34 juveniles in the sample were detained in Spofford Juvenile 
Center, the detention facility for New York City. Numerous studies of 
that facility have attested to its unsavory characteristics. See, e. g., Citi-
zens Committee for Children of New York, Juvenile Detention Problems in 
New York City (1970). Conditions in Spofford have been successfully 
challenged on constitutional grounds (by a group of inmates of a different 
type), see Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (SDNY 1973), but never-
theless remain grim, see Mayor's Task Force on Spofford: First Report v, 
viii-ix, 20-21 (June 1978). Not surprisingly, a former New York City 
Deputy Mayor for Criminal Justice, has averred that "Spofford is, in many 
ways, indistinguishable from a prison." Exhibit 30 (Affidavit of Herbert 
Sturz, June 29, 1978, § 6). 
13 Cf. Aubry, The Nature, Scope and Significance of Pre-Trial Detention 
of Juveniles in California, 1 Black L. J. 160, 164 (1971). 
14 This standard might be refined in one of two ways. First, it might be 
argued that, because § 320.5(3)(b) impinges upon "[l]iberty from bodily re-
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The applicability of the second of the two tests is admitted 
even by the majority. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535 
(1979), the Court held that an adult may not be punished 
prior to determination that he is guilty of a crime. 15 The ma-
jority concedes, as it must, that this principle applies to juve-
niles. Ante, at 10, 15. Thus, if the only purpose substan-
tially advanced by § 320.5(3)(b) is punishment, the provision 
must be struck down. 
For related reasons, § 320.5(3)(b) cannot satisfy either of 
the requirements discussed above that together define "fun-
damental fairness" in the context of pretrial detention. 
B 
The State and the majority contend that § 320.5(3)(b) ad-
vances a pair of intertwined government objectives: "protect-
ing the community from crime," ante, at 10, and "protecting a 
juvenile from the consequences of his criminal activity," ante, 
at 12. More specifically, the majority argues that detaining 
a juvenile for a period of up to 17 days prior to his trial has 
straint," which has long been "recognized as the core of the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause," Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal In-
mates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), the provision can pass constitutional muster only if it 
promotes a "compelling" government interest. See People ex rel. 
Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y.2d 682, 687, 385 N. Y.S. 2d 518, - (1976) 
(requiring a showing of a "compelling State interest" to uphold 
§ 320.5(3)(b)); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1968). Alter-
natively, it might be argued that the comparitively brief period of incarcer-
ation permissible under the provision warrants a slight lowering of the con-
stitutional bar. Applying the principle that the strength of the state 
interest needed to legitimate a statute depends upon the degree to which 
the statute encroaches upon fundamental rights, see Williams v. Illinois, 
399 U. S. 235, 259-260, 262-263 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the re-
sult), it might be held that an important-but not quite "compelling"-ob-
jective is necessary to sustain § 320.5(3)(b). In the present context, there 
is no need to choose between these doctrinal options, because § 320.5(3)(b) 
would fail either test. 
16 See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-672 and n. 40, 
673-674 (1977); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 112 (1969); Thompson 
v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199, 206 (1960). 
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two desirable effects: it protects society at large from the 
crimes he might have committed during that period if re-
leased; and it protects the juvenile himself "both from poten-
tial physical injury which may be suffered when a victim 
fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and 
from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer 
pressure may lead the child." Ante, at 10-13. 
Appellees and some amici argue that public purposes of 
this sort can never justify incarceration of a person who has 
not been adjudicated guilty of a crime, at least in the absence 
of a determination that there exists probable cause to believe 
he committed a criminal offense. 16 We need not reach that 
categorial argument in these cases because, even if the pur-
poses identified by the majority are conceded to be compel-
ling, they are not sufficiently promoted by detention pursu-
ant to § 320.5(3)(b) to justify the concomitant impairment of 
the juveniles' liberty interests. 17 To state the case more pre-
cisely, two circumstances in combination render § 320.5(3)(b) 
invalid in toto: in the large majority of cases in which the pro-
vision is invoked, its asserted objectives are either not ad-
vanced at all or are only minimally promoted; and, as the pro-
vision is written and administered by the state· courts, the 
cases in which its asserted ends are significantly advanced 
cannot practicably be distinguished from the cases in which 
they are not. 
1 
Both of the courts below concluded that only occasionally 
and accidentally does pretrial detention of a juvenile under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) prevent the commission of a crime. Three sub-
1
• Cf. Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (1968) (Chambers Opinion 
of Black, J.) (questioning whether a defendant's dangerousness can ever 
justify denial of bail). 
17 An additional reason for not reaching appellees' categorical objection 
to the purposes relied upon by the State is that the Court of Appeals did 
not pass upon the validity of those objectives. See 689 F. 2d, at 372. We 
are generally chary of deciding important constitutional questions not 
reached by a lower court. 
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sidiary findings undergird that conclusion. First, Family 
Court judges are incapable of determining which of the juve-
niles who appear before them would commit offenses before 
their trials if left at large and which would not. In part, this 
incapacity derives from the limitations of current knowledge 
concerning the dynamics of human behavior. On the basis of 
evidence adduced at trial, supplemented by a thorough re-
view of the secondary literature, see 513 F. Supp., at 
708-712, and nn. 31-32, the District Court found that "no di-
agnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even the 
most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which 
juveniles will engage in violent crime." Id., at 708. The ev-
idence supportive of this finding is overwhelming. 18 An inde-
pendent impediment to identification of the defendants who 
would misbehave if released is the paucity of data available at 
an initial appearance. The judge must make his decision 
whether to detain a juvenile on the basis of a set of allega-
tions regarding the child's alleged offense, a cursory review 
of his background and criminal record, and the recommenda-
tion of a probation officer who, in the typical case, has seen 
the child only once. 513 F. Supp., at 712. In view of this 
scarcity of relevant information, the District Court credited 
18 See American Psychiatric Association, Task Force Report on the Clin-
ical Aspects of Violent Individuals 28--30 (1974); Cocozza & Steadman, The 
Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing 
Evidence, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 1084, 1094-1101 (1976); Cohen, Groth & 
Siegel, The Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, 24 Crime & Delinquency 
28 (1976); Diamond, Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 439 (1974); Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the Dangerousness of"Nor-
mal" Criminal Defendants, 66 Va. L. Rev. 523, 542-544 (1980); Ennis & 
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins In 
the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Schlessinger, The Prediction 
of Dangerousness in Juveniles: A Replication, 24 Crime & Delinquency 40, 
47 (1978); Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repet-
itively Violent Offender, 69 J. Crim. L. & C. 226, 229-231 (1978); Wenk, 
Robinson & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted, 18 Crime & Delinquency 
393, 401 (1972); Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 Harv. Civ. 
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 289 (1971). 
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the testimony of appellees' expert witness, who "stated that 
he would be surprised if recommendations based on intake in-
terviews were better than chance and assessed the judge's 
subjective prognosis about the probability of future crime as 
only 4% better than chance-virtually wholly unpredictable." 
513 F. Supp., at 708. 19 
Second, § 320.5(3)(b) is not limited to classes of juveniles 
whose past conduct suggests that they are substantially more 
likely than average juveniles to misbehave in the immediate 
future. The provision authorizes the detention of persons 
arrested for trivial offenses 20 and persons without any prior 
19 The majority brushes aside the District Court's findings on these two 
issues with the remark that "a prediction of future criminal conduct ... 
forms an important element in many decisions, and we have specifically re-
jected the contention ... 'that it is impossible to predict future behavior 
and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.' " Ante, at 24-25 
(footnote and citation omitted). Whatever the merits of the decision~ 
upon which the majority relies, but cf., e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, --
U. S. --, -- (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), they do not control the prob-
lem before us. In each of the cases in which the Court has countenanced 
reliance upon a prediction of future conduct in a decision-making process 
impinging upon life or liberty, the affected person had already been con-
victed of a crime. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 
(1979) (grant of parole); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976) (death sen-
tence); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation). 
The constitutional limitations upon the kinds of factors that may be relied 
on in making such decisions are significantly looser than those upon deci-
sion-making processes that abridge the liberty of presumptively innocent 
persons. Cf. United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972) ("[A] trial 
judge in the federal judicial system generally has wide discretion in deter-
mining what sentence to impose. . . . [B]efore making that determina-
tion, a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the 
source from which it may come."). 
20 For example, Tyrone Parson, age 15, one of the members of the sam-
ple, was arrested for enticing others to play three-card monte. Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 18b. After being detained for 5 days under§ 320.5(3)(b), the peti-
tion against him was dismissed on the ground that "the alleged offense did 
not come within the provisions of the penal law.'' 513 F. Supp., at 
698-699. 
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contacts with juvenile court. Even a finding that there is 
probable cause to believe a juvenile committed the offense 
with which he was charged is not a prerequisite to his deten-
tion. See supra, at --. 21 
Third, the courts below concluded that circumstances sur-
rounding most of the cases in which § 320.5(3)(b) has been in-
voked strongly suggest that the detainee would not have 
committed a crime during the period before his trial if he had 
been released. In a significant proportion of the cases, the 
juvenile had been released after his arrest and had not com-
mitted any reported crimes while at large, see supra, at--; 
it is not apparent why a juvenile would be more likely to mis-
behave between his initial appearance and his trial than be-
tween his arrest and initial appearance. Even more telling 
is the fact that "the vast majority'' of persons detained under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) are released either before or immediately after 
their trials. 698 F. 2d, at 369; see 513 F. Supp., at 705. 
The inference is powerful that most detainees, when exam-
ined more carefully than at their initial appearances, are 
deemed insufficiently dangerous to warrant futher 
incarceration. 22 
In contrast to the breadth of the coverage of the Family Court Act, the 
District of Columbia adult preventive-detention statute that was upheld in 
United States v. Edwards, 430 A. 2d 1321 (DC App. 1981), cert. denied, 
445 U. S. 1022 (1982), authorizes detention only of persons charged with 
one of a prescribed set of "dangerous crime[s]" or "crimes[s] of violence." 
Prediction whether a given person will commit a crime in the future is 
especially difficult when he has committed only minor crimes in the past. 
Cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U. S. 222, 231 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting) 
("No court can predict with confidence whether a misdemeanor defendant 
is likely to become a recidivist.") 
21 By contrast, under the District of Columbia statute, see n. 20, supra, 
the judge is obliged before ordering detention to find, inter alia, a "sub-
stantial probability" that the defendant committed the serious crime for 
which he was arrested. D. C. Code Ann. § 23-1322(b)(2)(C) (1981). 
22 Both courts below made this inference. See 689 F. 2d, at 372; 513 F. 
Supp., at 705. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the 
statute, did not disagree with this explanation of the incidence of its appli-
16 
82-1248 & 82-1278---DISSENT 
SCHALL v. MARTIN 
The rarity with which invocation of§ 320.5(3)(b) results in 
detention of a juvenile who otherwise would have committed 
a crime fatally undercuts the two public purposes assigned to 
the statute by the State and the majority. The argument 
that § 320.5(3)(b) serves "the State's 'parens patriae interest 
in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,'" ante, 
at 11 (citation omitted), now appears particularly hollow. 
Most juveniles detained pursuant to the provision are not 
benefitted thereby, because they would not have committed 
crimes if left to their own devices (and thus would not have 
been exposed to the risk of physical injury or the perils of the 
cycle of recidivism, see ante, at 12). On the contrary, these 
juveniles suffer several serious harms: deprivation of liberty, 
stigmatization as "delinquent" or "dangerous," as well as im-
pairment of their ability to prepare their legal defenses. 23 
The benefits even to those few juveniles who would have 
committed crimes if released are not unalloyed; the gains to 
them are at least partially offset by the aforementioned inju-
ries. In view of this configuration of benefits and harms, it 
is not surprising that Judge Quinones repudiated the sugges-
tion that detention under§ 320.5(3)(b) serves the interests of 
the detainees. App. 269-270. 
cation. People ex rel . Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d, at 690, 385 
N. Y. S. 2d, at-. 
Release (before or after trial) of some of the juveniles detained under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) may well be due to a different factor: the evidence against 
them may be insufficient to support a finding of guilt. It is conceivable 
that some of those persons are so crime-prone that they would have com-
mitted an offense if not detained. But even the majority does not suggest 
that persons who could not be convicted of any crime may nevertheless be 
imprisoned for the protection of themselves and the public. 
23 See Testimony of Steven Hiltz, App. 130-134 (describing the detri-
mental effects of pretrial detention of a juvenile upon the preparation and 
presentation of his defense); cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 533 (1972); 
Bitter v. United States, 389 U. S. 15, 16-17 (1967) (per curiam); Stack v. 
Boyle, 342 U. S., at 8; Miller, Preventive Detention-A Guide to the 
Eradication of Individual Rights, 16 Howard L. J. 1, 15 (1970). 
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The argument that § 320.5(3)(b) protects the welfare of the 
community fares little better. Certainly the public reaps no 
benefit from incarceration of the majority of the detainees 
who would not have committed any crimes had they been re-
leased. Prevention of the minor offenses that would have 
been committed by a small proportion of the persons detained 
confers only a slight benefit on the community. 24 Only in oc-
casional cases does incarceration of a juvenile pending his 
trial serve to prevent a crime of violence and thereby signifi-
cantly promote the public interest. Such an infrequent and 
haphazard gain is insufficient to justify curtailment of the lib-
erty interests of all the presumptively innocent juveniles who 
would have obeyed the law pending their trials had they been 
given the chance. 25 
2 
The majority seeks to deflect appellees' attack on the con-
stitutionality of § 320.5(3)(b) by contending that they have 
framed their argument too broadly. It is possible, the ma-
jority acknowledges, "that in some circumstances detention 
of a juvenile [pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b)] would not pass con-
stitutional muster. But the validity of those detentions must 
24 Cf. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, 56 U. Va. L. Rev., at 381 ("[Under 
a statute proposed by the Attorney General,] trivial property offenses may 
be deemed sufficiently threatening to warrant preventive imprisonment. 
No tenable concept of due process could condone a balance that gives so 
little weight to the accused's interest in pretrial liberty."). 
25 Some amici contend that a preventive-detention statute that, unlike 
§ 320.5(3)(b), covered only specific categories of juveniles and embodied 
stringent procedural safeguards would result in incarceration only of juve-
niles very likely to commit crimes of violence in the near future. It could 
be argued that, even though such a statute would unavoidably result in de-
tention of some juveniles who would not have committed any offense if re-
leased (because of the impossibility of reliably predicting the behavior of 
individual persons, see supra, at--), the gains consequent upon the de-
tention of the large proportion who would have committed crimes would be 
sufficient to justify the injuries to the other detainees. To decide the cases 
before us, we need not consider either the feasibility of such a scheme or its 
constitutionality. 
18 
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be determined on a case-by-case basis." Ante, at 20; see 
ante, at 15, n. 18. The majority thus implies that, even if 
the Due Process Clause is violated by most detentions under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) because those detainees would not have commit-
ted crimes if released, the statute nevertheless is not invalid 
"on its face" because detention of those persons who would 
have committed a serious crime comports with the Constitu-
tion. Separation of the properly detained juveniles from the 
improperly detained juveniles must be achieved through 
"case-by-case" adjudication. 
There are some obvious practical impediments to adoption 
of the majority's proposal. Because a juvenile may not be 
incarcerated under § 320.5(3)(b) for more than 17 days, it 
would be impracticable for a particular detainee to secure his 
freedom by challenging the constitutional basis of his deten-
tion; by the time the suit could be considered, it would have 
been rendered moot by the juvenile's release or long-term de-
tention pursuant to a delinquency adjudication. 26 Nor could 
211 The District Court, whose knowledge of New York procedural law 
surely exceeds ours, concluded that "[t]he short span of pretrial detention 
makes effective review impossible." 513 F. Supp., at 708, n. 29. The ma-
jority dismisses this finding, along with a comparable finding by the Court 
· of Appeals, see 689 F. 2d, at 373, as "mistaken." Ante, at 26. But nei-
ther of the circumstances relied upon by the majority supports its confident 
judgment on this point. That the New York courts suspended their usual 
rules of mootness in order to consider an attack on the constitutionality of 
the statute as a whole, see People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d, 
at 686, 385 N. Y. S. 2d, at 519-520, in no way suggests that they would be 
willing to do so if an individual detainee challenged the constitutionality of 
§ 320.5(3)(b) as applied to him. The majority cites one case in which a de-
tainee did obtain his release by securing a writ of habeas corpus. How-
ever, that case involved a juvenile who was not given a probable-cause 
hearing within 6 days of his detention-a patent violation of the state stat-
ute. See 513 F. Supp., at 708. That a writ of habeas corpus could be 
obtained on short notice to remedy a glaring statutory violation provides 
no support for the majority's suggestion that individual detainees could ef-
fectively petition for release by challenging the constitutionality of their 
detentions. 
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an individual detainee avoid the problem of mootness by fil-
ing a suit for damages or for injunctive relief. This Court's 
declaration that § 320.5(3)(b) is not unconstitutional on its 
face would almost certainly preclude a finding that detention 
of a juvenile pursuant to the statute violated any clearly es-
tablished constitutional rights; in the absence of such a find-
ing all state officials would be immune from liability in dam-
ages, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). And, 
under current doctrine pertaining to the standing of an indi-
vidual victim of allegedly unconstitutional conduct to obtain 
an injunction against repetition of that behavior, it is far from 
clear that an individual detainee would be able to obtain an 
equitable remedy. Compare INS v. Delgado, -- U.S. 
--, --, n. 4 (1984), with City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
- u. s. -, - (1983). 
But even if these practical difficulties could be surmounted, 
the majority's proposal would be inadequate. Precisely be-
cause of the unreliability of any determinat1on whether a par-
ticular juvenile is likely to commit a crime between his arrest 
and trial, see supra, at --, no individual detainee would be 
able to demonstrate that he would have abided by the law 
had he b"een released. In other words, no configuration of 
circumstances would enable a juvenile to establish that he fell 
into the category of persons unconstitutionally detained 
rather than the category constitutionally detained. 27 Thus, 
to protect the rights of the majority of juveniles whose incar-
ceration advances no legitimate state interest, § 320.5(3)(b) 
must be held unconstitutional "on its face." 
21 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Family Court judges, 
when making findings justifying a detention pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b), do 
not specify whether there is a risk that the juvenile would commit a serious 
crime or whether there is a risk that he would commit a petty offense. A 
finding of the latter sort should not be sufficient under the Due Process 
Clause to justify a juvenile's detention. See supra, at -, and n. 24. 
But a particular detainee has no way of ascertaining the grounds for his 
incarceration. 
20 
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The :findings reviewed in the preceding section lend cre-
dence to the conclusion reached by the courts below: 
§ 320.5(3)(b) "is utilized principally, not for preventive pur-
poses, but to impose punishment for unadjudicated criminal 
acts." 689 F. 2d, at 372; see 513 F. Supp., at 715-717. 
The majority contends that, of the many factors we have 
considered in trying to determine whether a particular sanc-
tion constitutes "punishment," see Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963), the most useful are 
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the sanction] may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it ap-
pears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as- -
signed," ibid. (footnotes omitted). See ante, at 15-16. As-
suming arguendo that this test is appropriate, but cf. Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 u. s., at 564-565 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), it 
requires affirmance in these cases. The alternative purpose 
assigned by the State to § 320.5(3)(b) is the prevention of 
crime by the detained juveniles. But, as has been shown, 
that objective is advanced at best sporadically by the provi-
sion. Moreover, § 320.5(3)(b) frequently is invoked under 
circumstances in which it is extremely unlikely that the juve-
nile in question would commit a crime while awaiting trial. 
The most striking of these cases involve juveniles who have 
been at large without mishap for a substantial period of time 
prior to their initial appearances, see supra, at --, and de-
tainees who are adjudged delinquent and are nevertheless re-
leased into the community. In short, § 320.5(3)(b) as admin-
istered by the New York courts surely "appears excessive in 
relation to" the putatively legitimate objectives assigned to 
it. 
The inference that§ 320.5(3)(b) is punitive in nature is sup-
ported by additional materials in the record. For example, 
Judge Quinones and even appellants' counsel acknowledged 
. . 
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that one of the reasons juveniles detained pursuant to 
§ 320.5(3)(b) usually are released after the determination of 
their guilt is that the judge decides that their pretrial deten-
tion constitutes sufficient punishment. 689 F. 2d, at 
370-371, and nn. 27-28. Another Family Court judge admit-
ted using "preventive detention" to punish one of the juve-
niles in the sample. 513 F. Supp., at 708. 28 
In summary, application of the litmus test the Court tradi-
tionally has used to identify punitive sanctions supports the 
finding of the lower courts that preventive detention under 
§ 320.5(3)(b) consitutes punishment. Because punishment of 
juveniles before adjudication of their guilt violates the Due 
Process Clause, see supra, at --, the provision cannot 
stand. 
III 
If the record did not establish the impossibility, on the 
basis of the evidence available to a Family Court judge at a 
§ 320.5(3)(b) hearing, of reliably predicting whether a given 
juvenile would commit a crime before his trial, and if the pur-
poses relied upon by the State were promoted sufficiently to 
justify the deprivations of liberty effected by the provision, I 
would nevertheless strike down § 320.5(3)(b) because of the 
absence of procedural safeguards in the provision. As Judge 
Newman, concurring in the Court of Appeals observed, 
"New York's statute is unconstitutional because it permits 
liberty to be denied, prior to adjudication of guilt, in the exer-
cise of unfettered discretion as to an issue of considerable un-
certainty-likelihood of future criminal behavior." 689 F. 
2d, at 375. 
28 See Transcript of the initial appearance of Ramon Ramos, #1356/80, 
Judge Heller presiding, Exhibit 42, p. 11: 
"This business of being able to get guns, is now completely out of propor-
tion. We are living in a jungle, and it is time that these youths that are 
brought before the Court, know that they are in a Court, and that if these 
allegations are true, that they are going to pay the penalty. 
As for the reasons I just state[d] on the record , . . . I am remand[ing] 
the respondent to the Commissioner of Juvenile Justice, secure detention." 
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Appellees point out that§ 320.5(3)(b) lacks two crucial pro-
cedural constraints. First, a New York Family Court judge 
is given no guidance regarding what kinds of evidence he 
should consider or what weight he should accord different 
sorts of material in deciding whether to detain a juvenile. 29 
For example, there is no requirement in the statute that the 
judge take into account the juvenile's background or current 
living situation. Nor is a judge obliged to attach significance 
to the nature of a juvenile's criminal record or the severity of 
the crime for which he was arrested. 30 Second, § 320.5(3)(b) 
does not specify how likely it must be that a juvenile will 
commit a crime before his trial to warrant his detention. 
The provision indicates only that there must be a "serious 
risk" that he will commit an offense and does not prescribe 
the standard of proof that should govern the judge's deter-
mination of that issue. 31 
Not surp.risingly, in view of the lack of directions provided 
by the statute, different judges have adopted different ways 
of estimating the chances whether a juvenile will misbehave 
in the near future. "Each judge follows his own individual 
approach to [the detention] determination." 513 F. Supp., 
at 702; see App. 265 (testimony of Judge Quninones). This 
29 The absence of any limitations on the sorts of reasons that may support 
a determination that a child is likely to commit a crime if released means 
that the statutory requirement that the judge state "reasons" on the 
record, see ante, at 23, does not meaningfully constrain the decision-mak-
ing process. 
80 See 513 F. Supp., at 713: 
''Whether the juvenile was a first offender with no prior conduct, whether 
the court was advised that the juvenile was an obediant son or was needed 
at home, whether probation intake recommended parole, the case histories 
in this record disclose that it was not unusual for the court to discount 
these considerations and order remand based on a 5 to 15 minute 
evaluation." 
31 Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 431-433 (1979) ("clear and con-
vincing" proof constitutionally required to justify civil commitment to men-
tal hospital). 
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discretion exercised by Family Court judges in making de-
tention decisions gives rise to two related constitutional prob-
lems. First, it creates an excessive risk that juveniles will 
be detained "erroneously''-i. e., under circumstances in 
which no public interest would be served by their incarcera-
tion. Second, it fosters arbitrariness and inequality in a de-
cision-making process that impinges upon fundamental 
rights. 
A 
One of the purposes of imposing procedural constraints on 
decisions affecting life, liberty, or property is to reduce the 
incidence of error. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 
80--81 (1972). In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), 
the Court identified a complex of considerations that has 
proven helpful in determining what protections are constitu-
tionally required in particular contexts to achieve that end: 
"[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the of-
ficial action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail." Id., at 335. 
As Judge Newman recognized, 689 F. 2d, at 375--376, a re-
view of these three factors in the context of New York's pre-
ventive detention scheme compels the conclusion that the 
Due Process Clause is violated by § 320.5(3)(b) in its present 
form. First, the private interest affected by a decision to 
detain a juvenile is personal liberty. Unnecessary abridg-
ment of such a fundamental right, see supra, at --, should 
be avoided if at all possible. 
Second, there can be no dispute that there is a serious risk 
under the present statute that a juvenile will be detained er-
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roneously-i. e., despite the fact that he would not commit a 
crime if released. The findings of fact reviewed in the pre-
ceding sections make apparent that the vast majority of de-
tentions pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) advance no state interest; 
only rarely does the statute operate to prevent crime. See 
supra, at --. This high incidence of demonstrated error 
should induce a reviewing court to exercise utmost care in en-
suring that no procedures could be devised that would im-
prove the accuracy of the decision-making process. Oppor-
tunities for improvement in the extant regime are apparent 
even to a casual observer. Most obviously, some measure of 
guidance to Family Court judges regarding the evidence they 
should consider and the standard of proof they should use in 
making their determinations would surely contribute to the 
quality of their detention determinations. 32 
The majority purports to see no value in such additional 
safeguards, contending that activity of estimating the likeli-
hood that a given juvenile will commit a crime in the near fu-
ture involves subtle assessment of a host of variables, the 
precise weight of wµich cannot be determined in advance. 
Ante, at 2&-26. A review of the hearings that resulted in the 
detention of the juveniles included in the sample o:f 34 cases 
reveals the majority's depiction of the decision-making proc-
ess to be hopelessly idealized. For example, the operative 
32 Judge Newman, concurring below, pointed to three other protections 
lacking in § 320.5(3)(b): "the statute places no limits on the crimes for which 
the person subject to detention has been arrested ... , the judge ordering 
detention is not required to make any evaluation of the degree of likelihood 
that the person committed the crime of which he is accused[,] ... [and the 
statute] places no limits on the type of crimes that the judge believes the 
detained juvenile might commit if released." 689 F. 2d, at 377. In my 
view, the absence of these constraints is most relevant to the question 
whether the ends served by the statute can justify its broad reach, see 
Part IIB, supra. However, as Judge Newman observed, they could also 
be considered procedural flaws. Certainly, a narrowing of the categories 
of persons covered by§ 320.5(3)(b), along the lines sketched by Judge New-
man, would reduce the incidence of error in its application. 
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portion of the initial appearance of Tyrone Parson, the three-
card monte player, consisted of the following: 
COURT OFFICER: Will you identify yourself. 
TYRONE PARSON: Tyrone Parson, Age 15. 
THE COURT: Miss Brown, how many times has Tyrone 
been known to the Court? 
MISS BROWN: Seven Times. 
THE COURT: Remand the respondent. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18a. 33 
This kind of parody of reasoned decision-making would be 
less likely to occur if judges were given more specific and 
mandatory instructions regarding the information they 
should consider and the manner in which they should assess 
it. 
Third and finally, the imposition of such constraints on the 
deliberations of the Family Court judges would have no ad-
verse effect on the State's interest in detaining dangerous ju-
veniles and would give rise to insubstantial administrative 
burdens. For example, a simple directive to Family Court 
judges to state on the record the significance they give to the 
seriousness of the offense of which a juvenile is accused and 
to the nature of the juvenile's background would contribute 
materially to the quality of the decision-making process with-
out significantly increasing the duration of initial 
appearances. 
In summary, the three factors enumerated in Mathews in 
combination incline overwhelmingly in favor of imposition of 
more stringent constraints on detention determinations 
under § 320.5(3)(b). Especially in view of the impracticabil-
ity of correcting erroneous decisions .through judicial review, 
38 Parson's case is not unique. The hearings accorded Juan Santiago and 
Daniel Nelson, for example, though somewhat longer in duration, were 
nearly as cavalier and undiscriminating. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 13a, 22a. 
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see supra, at --, the absence of meaningful procedural 
safeguards in the provision renders it invalid. See Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 757, and n. 9 (1982). 
B 
A principle underlying many of our prior decisions in vari-
ous doctrinal settings is that government officials may not be 
accorded unfettered discretion in making decisions that im-
pinge upon fundamental rights. Two concerns underlie this 
principle: excessive discretion fosters inequality in the distri-
bution of entitlements and harms, inequality which is espe-
cially troublesome when those benefits and burdens are 
great; and . discretion can mask the use by officials of illegiti-
mate criteria in allocating important goods and rights. 
So, in striking down on vagueness grounds a vagrancy or-
dinance, we emphasized the "unfettered discretion it places 
in the hands of the ... police." Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 168 (1972). Such flexibility was 
deemed constitutionally offensive because it "permits and en-
courages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the 
law." Id., at 170. Partly for similar reasons, we have con-
sistently held violative of the First Amendment ordinances 
which make the ability to engage in constitutionally protected 
speech "contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official-
as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or 
withheld in the discretion of such official." Staub v. City of 
Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 322 (1958); accord Shuttlesworth v. 
City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 151, 153 (1969). Analo-
gous considerations inform our understanding of the dictates 
of the Due Process Clause. Concurring in the judgment in 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), striking down a 
statute that conditioned the right to marry upon the satisfac-
tion of child-support obligations, JUSTICE POWELL aptly 
observed: 
"Quite apart from any impact on the truly indigent, the 
statute appears to 'confer upon [the judge] a license for 
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arbitrary procedure,' in the determination of whether an 
applicant's children are 'likely thereafter to become pub-
lic charges.' A serious question of procedural due proc-
ess is raised by this feature of standardless discretion, 
particularly in light of the hazards of prediction in this 
area." Id., at 402, n. 4 (quoting Kent v. United States, 
383 u. s. 541, 553 (1966)). 
The concerns that powered these decisions are strongly im-
plicated by New York's preventive-detention scheme. The 
effect of the lack of procedural safeguards constraining deten-
tion decisions under§ 320.5(3)(b) is that the liberty of a juve-
nile arrested even for a petty crime is dependent upon the 
"caprice" of a Family Court judge. See 513 F. Supp., at 707. 
The absence of meaningful guidelines creates opportunities 
for judges to use illegitimate criteria when deciding whether 
juveniles should be incarcerated pending their trials--:--for ex-
ample, to detain children for the express purpose of punish-
ing them. 34 Even the judges who strive conscientiously to 
apply the law have little choice but to assess juveniles' dan-
gerousness on the basis of whatever standards they deem ap-
propriate. 35 The resultant variation in detention decisions 
gives rise to a level of inequality in the deprivation of a funda-
mental right too great to be countenanced under the 
Constitution. 
IV 
The majority acknowledges-indeed, founds much of its ar-
gument upon-the principle that a State has both the power 
and the responsiblity to protect the interests of the children 
within its jurisdiction. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S., 
at 766. Yet the majority today upholds a statute whose net 
:w See n. 28, supra. 
36 See 513 F . Supp., at 708: 
"It is clear that the judge decides on pretrial detention for a variety of rea-
sons-as a means of protecting the community, as the policy of the judge to 
remand, as an express punitive device, or because of the serious nature of 
the charge[,] among others." (citations omitted) 
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impact on the juveniles who come within its purview is over-
whelmingly detrimental. Most persons detained under the 
provision reap no benefit and suffer serious injuries thereby. 
The welfare of only a minority of the detainees is even argu-
ably enhanced. The inequity of this regime, combined with 
the arbitrariness with which it is administered, are bound to 
disillusion its victims regarding the virtues of our system of 
criminal justice. I can see-and the majority has pointed 
to-no public purpose advanced by the statute sufficient to 
justify the harm it works. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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